TL;DR
The Supreme Court ruled that a security guard, Allan Ador, was constructively dismissed because his employer, Jamila and Company Security Services, Inc., kept him on “floating status”—without work assignments—for almost a year. Philippine labor law limits floating status to six months. Going beyond this period is considered constructive dismissal, even if the employer claims the employee needed to renew licenses. The Court emphasized that employers cannot use expired licenses as a pretext to avoid providing work after the six-month limit. This decision protects employees from indefinite unpaid suspension and clarifies the rights of security guards under floating status.
Trapped in Limbo: When Awaiting Assignment Becomes Unfair Dismissal
Imagine being told to wait for a new job assignment, only to find yourself in an endless waiting game with no pay and no clear end in sight. This was the predicament of Allan Ador, a security guard for Jamila and Company Security Services, Inc. Ador found himself in “floating status,” a common situation in the security industry where guards are between assignments. The legal question at the heart of this case, Allan M. Ador v. Jamila and Company Security Services, Inc., is: At what point does this temporary “floating status” become an illegal dismissal, and what are the rights of employees caught in this precarious situation?
Ador claimed illegal dismissal, arguing he was unjustly left without assignments for an extended period. Jamila Security countered that Ador was not given assignments because he failed to renew his security guard license and other clearances, a requirement under Republic Act No. 5487, the Private Security Agency Law. The Labor Arbiter initially sided with Ador, declaring his dismissal illegal. However, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed this, finding constructive dismissal but only awarding separation pay. The Court of Appeals further overturned the NLRC, stating there was neither illegal nor constructive dismissal, blaming Ador for not renewing his documents. The Supreme Court, however, ultimately sided with Ador, emphasizing the legal limits of “floating status” and the employer’s responsibilities.
The Supreme Court grounded its decision on the established principle that while “floating status” is permissible in the security industry due to the nature of client contracts, it cannot extend indefinitely. Citing the case of Tatel v. JLFP Investigation Security Agency, Inc., the Court reiterated that temporary off-detail is acceptable when security guards are between assignments, but this period should not exceed a “reasonable time.” Crucially, the Court has consistently applied Article 292 of the Labor Code, setting a maximum of six months for such temporary suspensions. In Ador’s case, he was on floating status from May 2012 to April 2013 – almost a year, significantly exceeding the six-month limit. This lengthy period, the Court reasoned, transformed his situation into constructive dismissal.
The security agency argued that Ador’s lack of a renewed security license justified their inaction. However, the Supreme Court scrutinized the evidence and found that Ador’s license was actually valid until March 2015. The Court highlighted a certification proving the license’s validity, directly contradicting the security agency’s claim. This discrepancy led the Court to conclude that the agency misled Ador, using the license issue as a pretext. Referencing Salvaloza v. NLRC, the Court underscored that an employer cannot use an allegedly expired license as a shield to justify prolonged floating status beyond six months, especially when the license is, in fact, valid.
Furthermore, the Court addressed the insubordination charge leveled against Ador. Jamila Security claimed Ador was terminated for insubordination for ignoring three notices to report for work. The Court debunked this, pointing out that the notices were sent late and were general return-to-work orders lacking specific assignment details required by DOLE Department Order No. 14, Series of 2001 (DO 14-01). These notices, according to the Court, did not meet the criteria for valid orders that could form the basis of insubordination. The Court cited Padilla v. Airborne Security Service, Inc., emphasizing that general return-to-work orders, without specific client details, are often used to mask constructive dismissal. The Supreme Court concluded that the insubordination charge was a mere attempt to justify an already illegal dismissal.
As a result of the constructive dismissal, the Supreme Court reinstated the Labor Arbiter’s decision, albeit with modifications. Ador was awarded separation pay equivalent to one month’s salary per year of service and backwages from May 12, 2012, until the finality of the decision. The Court clarified that while the NLRC and Court of Appeals had previously awarded separation pay at a lower rate based on DO 14-01 for authorized causes, Ador’s dismissal was not for an authorized cause but was illegal. Therefore, the standard remedies for illegal dismissal—separation pay and full backwages—applied. The Court also affirmed the award of attorney’s fees, directing it to be deposited as a trust fund for the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), which represented Ador. However, the Court absolved the individual respondents, Sergio Jamila III and Eddimar O. Arcena, from personal liability, as there was no evidence of bad faith on their part beyond their corporate positions.
This case serves as a significant reminder to security agencies and employers in general about the limitations of “floating status.” It reinforces the six-month rule and clarifies that employers must have valid grounds and cannot use flimsy excuses to keep employees in indefinite unpaid suspension. The decision underscores the importance of timely and specific return-to-work orders and the employee’s right to fair treatment and due process, even in industries with unique employment conditions.
FAQs
| What is “floating status” in the security industry? | “Floating status” is when security guards are between job assignments, typically when contracts end or clients request replacements. During this time, they usually don’t receive salary. |
| How long can “floating status” legally last in the Philippines? | Philippine labor law, based on Supreme Court jurisprudence and Article 292 of the Labor Code, limits “floating status” to a maximum of six months. |
| What happens if “floating status” exceeds six months? | If “floating status” extends beyond six months, it is considered constructive dismissal, meaning the employee is effectively terminated without just cause. |
| What is constructive dismissal? | Constructive dismissal occurs when an employer’s actions make continued employment unbearable or impossible, forcing the employee to resign. In this case, prolonged unpaid “floating status” is considered constructive dismissal. |
| What are the remedies for constructive dismissal? | Employees constructively dismissed are entitled to separation pay (typically one month’s salary per year of service) and backwages (unpaid salary from the time of dismissal until final court decision). |
| Can an employer use an expired license as a reason for prolonged “floating status”? | No, especially if the license is actually valid, as in this case. Employers cannot use license issues as a pretext to circumvent the six-month limit on “floating status.” |
| What should a return-to-work order contain to be valid? | According to DOLE DO 14-01, return-to-work orders for security guards should include details like job description, work hours, work shift, and applicable pay rates, not just a general instruction to report to the office. |
For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.
Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Ador v. Jamila Security, G.R. No. 245422, July 07, 2020

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