Tag: Rule 45 Petition

  • Binding Agreements: Why You Can’t Back Out of a Deal Your Lawyer Makes (Balasbas v. Uy Realty)

    TL;DR

    This Supreme Court case, Balasbas v. Uy Realty, clarifies that you are generally bound by agreements your lawyer makes on your behalf in court, even if you didn’t personally consent to every detail. The petitioners in this case tried to argue they weren’t bound by a settlement their lawyer agreed to because they didn’t know about it and the survey it was based on was inaccurate. The Supreme Court rejected this, emphasizing that clients are responsible for their lawyer’s actions in court. This means if your lawyer makes a deal in court, it’s considered your deal, and you’ll have to live with it unless there’s clear evidence of serious lawyer misconduct that deprived you of your rights. This ruling underscores the importance of choosing a lawyer you trust and staying informed about your case.

    When Your Lawyer Speaks, It’s You Speaking: The Case of the Contested Land

    The case of Marilou Balasbas, et al. v. Roberto L. Uy Realty & Development Corporation revolves around a land dispute in Pasay City. Roberto L. Uy Realty claimed ownership of a property occupied by Marilou Balasbas and several others (petitioners). Uy Realty filed a case to recover possession, arguing the petitioners were illegally occupying their land. The petitioners, on the other hand, claimed they had been living there for years and were tenants of a different owner previously, and that their properties were on a different lot altogether. The central legal question became: Are the petitioners bound by the agreements made by their lawyer during court proceedings, specifically regarding the results of a land survey that determined they were encroaching on Uy Realty’s property?

    During the trial at the Regional Trial Court (RTC), both parties agreed to conduct a survey to determine if the petitioners’ houses were indeed on Uy Realty’s land. A survey team was formed, and a report was submitted indicating that some of the petitioners’ houses encroached on Uy Realty’s property. Based on this report and stipulations made by both parties’ lawyers, the RTC issued a partial judgment ordering the petitioners to vacate the encroached areas. Later, after a full trial, the RTC ruled in favor of Uy Realty, ordering the petitioners to vacate and pay attorney’s fees. The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that their lawyer had entered into a compromise without their consent and that the survey reports were inaccurate. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision, emphasizing that the petitioners were bound by the actions of their counsel and the agreed-upon survey.

    The Supreme Court echoed the CA’s ruling. The Court highlighted the principle of judicial admissions, stating that agreements made by parties or their lawyers in court are considered binding admissions. These admissions remove the need for further proof and can only be contested if proven to be made through palpable mistake or if no admission was actually made. In this case, the stipulations regarding the survey and its results were considered judicial admissions. The Court emphasized that the petitioners failed to demonstrate any palpable mistake in these admissions.

    Furthermore, the Supreme Court reiterated the well-established rule that a client is bound by the actions of their counsel. This principle is rooted in the idea that when a client hires a lawyer, they grant that lawyer implied authority to manage the case. Any action or mistake made by the lawyer within the scope of this authority is legally considered the client’s own action or mistake. The Court acknowledged exceptions to this rule, such as gross negligence by the lawyer depriving the client of due process, deprivation of liberty or property, or when justice requires otherwise. However, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to fall under any of these exceptions, relying mainly on their claim of lack of knowledge and alleged inaccuracies in the survey, which were deemed insufficient to overturn the established agreements and findings.

    The Supreme Court underscored the importance of the survey process itself. The surveys were conducted by a court-appointed commission, with representatives from both parties present. Both parties actively participated and even submitted documents used as references for the survey. Therefore, the Court reasoned that the petitioners were barred from later questioning the survey procedures or results, having actively participated in and agreed to the process. The Court found no compelling reason to overturn the factual findings of the lower courts, which were based on the survey reports and the judicial admissions of the parties. Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld the CA decision, ordering the petitioners to vacate the portions of land they were found to be illegally occupying.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether the petitioners were bound by the stipulations and judicial admissions made by their lawyer during court proceedings, particularly regarding a land survey.
    What is a judicial admission? A judicial admission is a statement of fact made by a party or their lawyer during court proceedings that is considered binding and removes the need for further proof.
    Are clients always bound by their lawyer’s actions? Generally, yes. Clients are bound by their lawyer’s actions in court, as the lawyer is considered to have implied authority to manage the case. There are limited exceptions, such as gross negligence by the lawyer.
    What was the survey about in this case? The survey was conducted to determine if the petitioners’ houses were located on the respondent’s (Uy Realty) titled property.
    What did the Supreme Court decide? The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, ruling that the petitioners were bound by their lawyer’s stipulations and the survey results, and ordered them to vacate the respondent’s property.
    What is the practical takeaway from this case? This case emphasizes the importance of choosing a lawyer you trust and staying informed about your case, as you are generally bound by your lawyer’s actions in court.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Balasbas v. Uy Realty, G.R. No. 187544, October 03, 2016

  • Construction Disputes and Payment Delays: Upholding Contractual Agreements in Project Timelines

    TL;DR

    The Supreme Court affirmed that construction companies cannot halt work due to payment disagreements if the contract requires billings to be approved by a project manager first. In this case, ACS Development (ADPROM) stopped construction because Montaire Realty (MARDC) didn’t fully pay their bill, pending approval from Angel Lazaro & Associates (ALA), the project manager. The Court ruled ADPROM’s work stoppage was unjustified and upheld the Court of Appeals’ decision, which denied ADPROM interest on unpaid billings and required them to pay liquidated damages for project delays. This highlights the importance of adhering to agreed-upon payment terms and dispute resolution processes in construction contracts. Unilateral work stoppages without proper contractual basis can lead to financial penalties for contractors.

    When a Contractor Stops Building: Who Pays for the Delay?

    This case, ACS Development & Property Managers, Inc. v. Montaire Realty and Development Corporation, revolves around a construction agreement gone awry, specifically focusing on the repercussions of a contractor halting work due to disputed payments. The central legal question is whether a contractor is justified in stopping work and demanding full payment when the agreed-upon payment process involves prior approval of billings by a project manager. This decision clarifies the obligations of parties in construction contracts regarding payment terms, dispute resolution, and the consequences of unjustified work stoppages.

    ACS Development & Property Managers, Inc. (ADPROM) and Montaire Realty and Development Corporation (MARDC) entered into a Construction Agreement for townhouses. Angel Lazaro & Associates (ALA) was designated as the project’s construction manager, responsible for approving ADPROM’s progress billings before MARDC would make payments. Disputes arose when ALA approved only a reduced amount of Progress Billing No. 9, disagreeing with certain costs claimed by ADPROM. Despite ongoing discussions and consolidated billings, ADPROM stopped work, citing non-payment of their demanded amount. MARDC then issued a notice of default and eventually terminated the contract, claiming overpayment and demanding refunds. ADPROM, feeling aggrieved, initiated arbitration with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) to recover sums of money, while MARDC counterclaimed.

    The CIAC initially ruled in favor of ADPROM, awarding unpaid billings, interest, and refund of retention fees. However, the Court of Appeals (CA) modified this decision, removing the interest on unpaid billings and imposing liquidated damages on ADPROM for the delay caused by the work stoppage. The CA reasoned that since the contract stipulated ALA’s approval as a prerequisite for payment, MARDC was not in default. The CA also found ADPROM’s work stoppage unjustified, triggering the liquidated damages clause in the contract. Unsatisfied with the CA ruling, ADPROM elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Certiorari, arguing grave abuse of discretion by the CA.

    The Supreme Court dismissed ADPROM’s petition, emphasizing that certiorari was the incorrect remedy; a Petition for Review under Rule 45 should have been filed. Even if treated as a Petition for Review, the Court found no reason to overturn the CA’s decision. The Supreme Court underscored the binding nature of contracts, stating that “contracts constitute the law between the parties”, and parties are obligated to adhere to their stipulations as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.

    The Court highlighted key provisions in the Construction Agreement. Article III and Article IV clearly stated that MARDC’s payment obligation was contingent upon ALA’s approval of ADPROM’s progress billings. Specifically, Article IV, Section 4.2.3 stated:

    “[MARDC] shall pay [ADPROM] within seven (7) working days from receipt of the progress billing submitted by [ADPROM], duly approved by [ALA].”

    Because ALA had not fully approved Progress Billing No. 9 due to discrepancies, MARDC was not in default, and consequently, ADPROM was not entitled to interest on the unpaid billings. Furthermore, ADPROM’s work stoppage was deemed a breach of contract. The Court pointed to Article XIII, Section 13.1 of the agreement, which mandated amicable dispute resolution, and Article IX on Liquidated Damages, which stipulated penalties for unexcused delays:

    “[F]or every calendar day of unexcused delay in the completion of its Work under this Agreement, [ADPROM] shall pay [MARDC] the sum of Thirty[-]Nine Thousand Five Hundred (P39,500.00) per calendar day as liquidated damages.”

    The Court affirmed the CA’s award of liquidated damages, emphasizing that ADPROM’s unilateral work stoppage, without justifiable grounds and before exhausting amicable settlement options, constituted an unexcused delay. While ADPROM was entitled to the unpaid billings and retention fees for work completed, they were liable for the financial consequences of their premature work stoppage. The Supreme Court modified the interest rate on the monetary awards to six percent (6%) per annum from finality of the decision until full payment, aligning with prevailing jurisprudence.

    Issue CIAC Ruling CA Ruling SC Ruling
    Interest on Unpaid Billings Awarded to ADPROM Removed CA affirmed (No interest)
    Liquidated Damages Not awarded to MARDC Awarded to MARDC CA affirmed (Liquidated Damages for MARDC)
    Unpaid Billings & Retention Awarded to ADPROM Affirmed CA affirmed (Awarded to ADPROM)

    FAQs

    What was the main issue in this case? The central issue was whether the contractor, ADPROM, was justified in stopping work due to non-payment and whether they were entitled to interest on unpaid billings, despite a contractual clause requiring project manager approval for payments.
    Why did the Supreme Court rule against ADPROM regarding interest? The Court ruled against ADPROM because the Construction Agreement stipulated that payments were contingent on ALA’s approval of billings. Since ALA had not fully approved the disputed billing, MARDC was not in default, and thus, no interest accrued.
    What are liquidated damages in this context? Liquidated damages are pre-agreed financial penalties for delays in project completion. In this case, ADPROM was contractually obligated to pay MARDC P39,500 per day for unexcused delays.
    Was ADPROM completely denied payment? No, ADPROM was still awarded the unpaid billings and retention fees by the CIAC and this was affirmed by the CA and the Supreme Court. However, they had to pay liquidated damages and lost the interest on billings.
    What is the significance of project manager approval in construction contracts? Project manager approval clauses are crucial for ensuring proper verification of work progress and cost before payments are released, protecting the project owner from overpayments and ensuring accountability.
    What is the correct legal remedy to question a CA decision in CIAC cases? The correct legal remedy is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, not a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, although in this case, the court still considered the merits despite the procedural error.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: ACS Development & Property Managers, Inc. v. Montaire Realty and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 195552, April 18, 2016

  • Judicial Deference to Ombudsman: Upholding Discretion in Probable Cause Determinations

    TL;DR

    The Supreme Court affirmed the Ombudsman’s dismissal of robbery, corruption, and falsification charges against several individuals, including a Labor Arbiter and Deputy Sheriffs. The Court emphasized that the Ombudsman has broad discretionary powers to investigate and prosecute public officials, and judicial review is limited to instances of grave abuse of discretion. In this case, the Ombudsman found no probable cause for the charges, a determination the Supreme Court upheld, highlighting its reluctance to interfere with the Ombudsman’s prosecutorial judgment unless there is a clear showing of arbitrariness or capriciousness. This ruling reinforces the Ombudsman’s independence and the judiciary’s respect for its findings in preliminary investigations.

    Levy or Loot? Examining the Limits of Ombudsman Review in Auction Dispute

    This case, Antonio Z. King v. Francisco A. Robles, revolves around a contested execution of a labor judgment and the subsequent criminal complaints filed by Antonio King against several individuals involved in the process. King alleged that a lawful levy of company properties spiraled into robbery and corruption, accusing a Labor Arbiter, Deputy Sheriffs, and private individuals of conspiring to unlawfully take company assets under the guise of a writ of execution. The core legal question is whether the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in dismissing King’s complaints for lack of probable cause, thereby warranting judicial intervention.

    The dispute originated from a labor case where Azkcon Group of Companies was ordered to pay Rogelio Gebilaguin backwages. When Azkcon failed to pay, a writ of execution was issued, leading Deputy Sheriffs to levy properties. Philippine Metal and Alloy Fabrication Corporation (PMAFC), represented by King, claimed ownership of the levied properties and filed a third-party claim, arguing the levy was excessive and illegal. Despite this claim, the auction proceeded, and Rogelio, through his representative, purchased the levied assets. King, asserting that the taken properties far exceeded the judgment amount and that procedural irregularities tainted the auction, filed criminal charges for Robbery, Violation of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), and Falsification of Public Documents against the respondents before the Ombudsman.

    The Ombudsman, after investigation, dismissed all charges for lack of probable cause. It reasoned that the element of intent to gain in robbery was absent because Rogelio acquired the properties through a legal auction. The Ombudsman also found no evidence of manifest partiality, bad faith, or falsification in the actions of the public officials involved, concluding their actions were within the bounds of their duties and the NLRC rules on execution. King challenged this dismissal before the Supreme Court, arguing the Ombudsman erred in its assessment of probable cause.

    The Supreme Court, in its decision penned by Justice Del Castillo, firmly sided with the Ombudsman. The Court reiterated the constitutional and statutory mandate granting the Ombudsman broad investigatory and prosecutorial powers, emphasizing its independence from external interference. The decision underscored that judicial review of the Ombudsman’s decisions is narrow, limited only to instances of grave abuse of discretion. The Court quoted precedent defining grave abuse of discretion as:

    Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer concerned, equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.

    Applying this standard, the Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion by the Ombudsman. The Court held that the Ombudsman’s dismissal was based on a reasonable evaluation of the evidence, concluding that King failed to present sufficient grounds to establish probable cause for the crimes charged. Specifically, the Court noted the Ombudsman’s finding that Rogelio’s acquisition of the properties through auction negated the element of unlawful taking required for robbery. Furthermore, the Court deferred to the Ombudsman’s assessment that the actions of the Labor Arbiter and Deputy Sheriffs were within their official duties and did not constitute graft or falsification.

    The Supreme Court also addressed King’s argument regarding the alleged over-levy of properties. The Court clarified that this issue is essentially factual, requiring an evaluation of evidence, which is beyond the scope of a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. The Court reiterated that it is not a trier of facts and will not delve into evidentiary matters unless there are exceptional circumstances, which were not present in this case. The decision effectively reinforces the principle of judicial deference to administrative agencies, particularly the Ombudsman, in matters falling within their expertise and discretionary powers. It underscores that the Ombudsman’s role in determining probable cause is a critical aspect of its mandate to combat corruption and malfeasance in public office, and the courts will generally not substitute their judgment for that of the Ombudsman unless a clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated.

    FAQs

    What was the central issue in this case? The core issue was whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing criminal complaints for lack of probable cause, and whether the Supreme Court should overturn the Ombudsman’s decision.
    What is ‘probable cause’ in this context? Probable cause refers to a reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person accused is likely guilty of it. It’s the standard required for filing criminal charges.
    What is the role of the Ombudsman? The Ombudsman is a constitutional body tasked with investigating and prosecuting public officials for illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient acts. It plays a crucial role in combating corruption in the Philippines.
    Why did the Supreme Court defer to the Ombudsman’s decision? The Court deferred because it recognized the Ombudsman’s broad discretionary powers and found no evidence of grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsman’s assessment of probable cause. Judicial review is limited to cases of clear abuse.
    What does ‘grave abuse of discretion’ mean? Grave abuse of discretion is when a public officer’s judgment is capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or exercised in a manner that is patently wrong and indicative of bad faith or ill-motive.
    What were the specific charges dismissed by the Ombudsman? The Ombudsman dismissed charges of Robbery, Violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), and Falsification of Public Documents.
    What is the practical implication of this ruling? This ruling reinforces the independence and authority of the Ombudsman in the Philippines. It highlights that courts will generally respect the Ombudsman’s findings in preliminary investigations unless there is a clear and demonstrable grave abuse of discretion.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: King v. Robles, G.R. Nos. 197096-97, December 07, 2015

  • Procedural Deadlines are Final: Why Second Motions for Reconsideration Can Cost You Your Appeal

    TL;DR

    The Supreme Court affirmed that filing a second motion for reconsideration in appellate courts is prohibited and does not stop the clock for filing a petition for review. In this case, Rodging Reyes’s petition was dismissed because he filed a third motion for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals, which is a prohibited pleading. His subsequent petition to the Supreme Court was filed beyond the deadline, even though he argued for leniency. The Court emphasized that procedural rules, like deadlines, are crucial for the orderly administration of justice and must generally be followed strictly. Missing deadlines due to prohibited motions can be fatal to an appeal, underscoring the importance of understanding and adhering to procedural rules in litigation.

    When Second Chances Run Out: The Perils of Ignoring Procedural Rules in Appeals

    This case of Rodging Reyes v. People highlights a critical aspect of Philippine remedial law: the strict adherence to procedural rules, particularly concerning motions for reconsideration and appeal periods. At its heart, this case is not about the merits of Grave Threats or Other Light Threats, but about whether Mr. Reyes properly followed the steps to have his case reviewed by a higher court. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled against Mr. Reyes, not because his initial conviction was necessarily wrong, but because he failed to comply with the procedural requirements for appealing his case to the Court of Appeals and subsequently to the Supreme Court itself. This decision serves as a stark reminder that even valid legal arguments can be lost if proper procedure is not meticulously followed.

    The legal journey began when Mr. Reyes was charged with Grave Threats. After being found guilty by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), he appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which modified the conviction to Other Light Threats but upheld the monetary penalties, albeit reduced. Dissatisfied, Mr. Reyes sought further review by the Court of Appeals (CA). However, his petition in the CA was dismissed due to a series of procedural missteps, including late filing, incomplete docket fees, and deficiencies in the petition itself. Critically, after the CA initially dismissed his petition and denied his first motion for reconsideration, Mr. Reyes filed a second motion for reconsideration, and then a third. It was this series of motions that proved to be his undoing.

    The Supreme Court pointed to a fundamental rule of procedure: second motions for reconsideration are generally prohibited. Rule 52, Section 2 of the Rules of Court explicitly states, “No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.” This rule is grounded in the principle of immutability of judgments, which dictates that at some point, litigation must end. The Court cited McBurnie v. Ganzon, emphasizing that finality is essential for the orderly and efficient administration of justice. While there are exceptions to procedural rules, as highlighted in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, these are reserved for situations where strict adherence would lead to a grave injustice. The Court found no such compelling circumstances in Mr. Reyes’s case.

    The crucial legal point is that a prohibited pleading, such as a second motion for reconsideration, does not stop or suspend the running of the period to appeal. The Court cited Securities and Exchange Commission v. PICOP Resources, Inc. and Obando v. Court of Appeals to reinforce this principle. As Dinglasan v. Court of Appeals explained, allowing second motions to toll the appeal period would lead to an “absurd situation” where parties could indefinitely delay the finality of judgments by filing prohibited motions. The Supreme Court unequivocally stated that Mr. Reyes’s third motion for reconsideration was a “mere scrap of paper” with no legal effect. Therefore, the period to file his petition for review to the Supreme Court ran from the denial of his first motion for reconsideration in the CA, making his petition filed way beyond the deadline.

    Beyond the issue of prohibited motions, the CA also cited other procedural infirmities for dismissing Mr. Reyes’s petition, including the failure to pay complete docket fees and deficiencies in the statement of material dates and attachments. The Court acknowledged the rule in Manchester v. Court of Appeals that payment of docket fees is jurisdictional. While acknowledging the more lenient approach in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, which allows for payment within a reasonable time if there is no intent to defraud, the Court did not delve deeply into this aspect, as the issue of the prohibited motion was already decisive. The Court reiterated that extensions of time to file petitions are discretionary and conditional upon paying the full docket fees within the original reglementary period.

    Ultimately, the Supreme Court declined to relax the rules in Mr. Reyes’s case, finding no persuasive reasons to do so. While acknowledging the importance of resolving cases on their merits, the Court emphasized that procedural rules are not mere technicalities but essential tools for ensuring fairness and order in the legal system. The Court concluded that Mr. Reyes failed to demonstrate any injustice that would warrant a deviation from these established rules. Even considering the merits, the Court noted that Mr. Reyes’s arguments were factual, and petitions under Rule 45 are limited to questions of law, further justifying the denial of his petition. This case serves as a cautionary tale for litigants: procedural compliance is as vital as substantive legal arguments in navigating the Philippine judicial system.

    FAQs

    What was the main procedural issue in this case? The main issue was whether the petitioner’s filing of a third motion for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals was proper and if it tolled the period to appeal to the Supreme Court.
    What is a second motion for reconsideration? A second motion for reconsideration is a motion filed by the same party asking the court to reconsider its judgment or final resolution for a second time. It is generally prohibited under the Rules of Court.
    Why are second motions for reconsideration generally prohibited? To ensure the finality of judgments and to prevent endless litigation. The principle of immutability of judgments dictates that legal disputes must eventually come to an end.
    Does filing a prohibited pleading stop the period to appeal? No, filing a prohibited pleading, like a second motion for reconsideration, does not suspend or stop the running of the period to file an appeal or petition for review.
    What are docket fees and why are they important? Docket fees are the fees required to be paid when filing a case or an appeal. Payment of docket fees is generally considered jurisdictional, meaning the court may not acquire jurisdiction over the case without proper payment.
    Can courts ever relax procedural rules? Yes, in exceptional circumstances where strict adherence to procedural rules would lead to manifest injustice. However, the Supreme Court has emphasized that these exceptions are rare and require compelling reasons.
    What was the final ruling of the Supreme Court in this case? The Supreme Court denied Rodging Reyes’s petition, affirming the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of his petition for review due to procedural errors, primarily the filing of a prohibited third motion for reconsideration and the late filing of his petition.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 193034, July 20, 2015