Tag: Rule 141 Rules of Court

Sheriff’s Duty and Public Trust: Illegal Exaction and Misconduct in Writ Execution

TL;DR

The Supreme Court ruled that Sheriff Ma. Consuelo Joie Almeda-Fajardo was guilty of gross misconduct and serious dishonesty for demanding and receiving money directly from a litigant for writ execution expenses and for releasing a seized vehicle without proper procedure. This decision underscores that sheriffs must strictly adhere to rules regarding fees and property seizure to maintain public trust in the justice system. Sheriffs cannot demand direct payments or unilaterally release seized assets without court approval, and violations will be met with serious penalties, including fines and potential dismissal.

Breach of Trust: When a Sheriff’s Actions Undermine Justice

This case revolves around a complaint filed by Reynaldo M. Solema against Sheriff Ma. Consuelo Joie Almeda-Fajardo for malfeasance, grave misconduct, and illegal exaction. Solema alleged that Fajardo, in implementing a Writ of Execution, demanded and received PHP 18,000.00 directly from him for expenses. Further, after seizing a vehicle, Fajardo released it without court authorization, purportedly in exchange for PHP 100,000.00. The core legal issue is whether Fajardo violated established procedures for writ execution and if her actions constitute misconduct warranting disciplinary action. This case highlights the critical role of sheriffs in the judicial system and the importance of their adherence to rules to ensure fairness and public trust.

The Supreme Court meticulously examined the facts. It was established that Fajardo indeed received PHP 18,000.00 directly from Solema, a clear violation of Rule 141, Section 10 of the Rules of Court. This rule mandates that all expenses for writ execution must be estimated by the sheriff, approved by the court, and deposited with the Clerk of Court, not directly with the sheriff. The Court emphasized that this procedure is designed to prevent corruption and ensure transparency in the handling of funds related to court processes. Fajardo’s direct demand and receipt of money circumvented this crucial safeguard. The Court cited previous cases like Malabanan v. Ruiz, reiterating that these rules are “clear cut and do not provide for procedural shortcuts.”

Furthermore, Fajardo’s release of the seized Starex Van without court approval or proper third-party claim procedure was deemed a grave breach of duty. Rule 39, Section 16 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure when property levied upon is claimed by a third person. It requires the third-party claimant to submit an affidavit and for the judgment creditor to post a bond if they wish to maintain the levy. Fajardo disregarded this process entirely, releasing the vehicle based on a Deed of Sale and allegedly receiving PHP 100,000.00 in exchange, although the latter was not substantiated. The Court noted the inconsistency in Fajardo’s justifications for releasing the vehicle, further undermining her credibility. The Court referenced Trinidad v. Javier, drawing parallels in the sheriff’s actions of demanding money and disregarding procedures, which were deemed dishonest, prejudicial to service, and grave misconduct.

The Supreme Court applied the amended Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as per A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC, which now governs administrative cases against judiciary personnel. This amendment emphasizes the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, violations of which constitute misconduct. Gross misconduct, as defined in Office of the Court Administrator v. Del Rosario, involves “corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rules.” Fajardo’s actions met this threshold, demonstrating a flagrant disregard for established rules and raising strong suspicion of misappropriation of funds. Her actions were categorized as both Gross Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty, serious charges under Rule 140.

While dismissal is typically the penalty for such offenses, the Court noted that Fajardo had already been previously dismissed in Gillera v. Fajardo. Therefore, in lieu of dismissal, the Court imposed a fine of PHP 300,000.00, broken down into PHP 150,000.00 for each count of Gross Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty. This penalty reflects the gravity of Fajardo’s offenses and serves as a stern warning to all court personnel regarding adherence to procedural rules and ethical conduct. The decision reinforces the principle that sheriffs, as front-line representatives of the judiciary, must maintain the highest standards of integrity and diligence to preserve public confidence in the administration of justice. Any deviation from prescribed procedures, especially concerning financial matters and property seizure, will be met with serious consequences.

FAQs

What was Sheriff Fajardo accused of?	Sheriff Fajardo was accused of malfeasance, grave misconduct, and illegal exaction related to the implementation of a Writ of Execution.
What specific actions did Sheriff Fajardo take that were problematic?	She directly demanded and received PHP 18,000 from the complainant for expenses and released a seized vehicle without court authorization or following proper procedure for third-party claims.
What rules did Sheriff Fajardo violate?	She violated Rule 141, Section 10 regarding sheriff’s expenses and Rule 39, Section 16 regarding third-party claims on levied property.
What is Rule 141, Section 10 about?	This rule dictates the proper procedure for handling sheriff’s expenses, requiring court approval and deposit with the Clerk of Court, prohibiting direct payments to the sheriff.
What is Rule 39, Section 16 about?	This rule outlines the procedure when a third party claims ownership of seized property, requiring an affidavit and potentially a bond from the judgment creditor.
What was the Supreme Court’s ruling?	The Supreme Court found Sheriff Fajardo guilty of two counts of Gross Misconduct and one count of Serious Dishonesty and ordered her to pay a fine of PHP 300,000.00.
Why wasn’t Sheriff Fajardo dismissed in this case?	She had already been previously dismissed in another case, so the Court imposed a fine instead, in lieu of a second dismissal.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
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October 3, 2023

Sheriff’s Duty and Dishonesty: Upholding Integrity in Fee Collection

TL;DR

The Supreme Court dismissed Sheriff Jerry R. Marcelino for serious dishonesty and dereliction of duty. Marcelino improperly received P100,000 in sheriff’s fees directly from a litigant without issuing official receipts or remitting the funds to the court. This decision reinforces that sheriffs must strictly adhere to procedural rules regarding fee collection and handling, ensuring transparency and preventing abuse of authority. Accepting direct payments, even if claimed as ‘voluntary,’ is a violation and undermines the integrity of court processes.

Token of Appreciation or Tainted Transaction? The Case of the Unreceipted Sheriff’s Fees

This case revolves around a complaint filed by Antonio K. Litonjua against Sheriff Jerry R. Marcelino. Litonjua alleged that Marcelino demanded and received P100,000 in sheriff’s fees during the execution of a judgment in favor of Fruehauf Electronics Phil. Corp. The core issue is whether Sheriff Marcelino acted improperly by accepting these payments directly and failing to remit them through official channels. Marcelino claimed the payments were voluntary ‘tokens of appreciation,’ while Litonjua insisted they were demanded sheriff’s fees. This discrepancy highlights a critical point of contention: the permissible scope of financial interactions between sheriffs and litigants.

The factual backdrop involves an ejectment case where Fruehauf was the winning party. During the execution phase, Sheriff Marcelino allegedly collected P100,000 in two installments, evidenced by vouchers signed by him but without official receipts issued. When the Court of Appeals nullified the initial judgment, Fruehauf sought a refund of these fees, prompting the discovery of the unreceipted payments. Atty. Bautista, the Clerk of Court, confirmed that no such payments were officially recorded. Marcelino admitted receiving P50,000 from one voucher but denied the other, claiming the received amount was a voluntary gratuity from Fruehauf’s lawyer, Benedict Litonjua, for satisfactory service. This narrative of ‘voluntary payment’ became Marcelino’s central defense.

The Supreme Court, however, sided with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), which found Marcelino guilty of dishonesty and dereliction of duty. The Court emphasized that accepting voluntary payments from litigants is strictly prohibited for sheriffs. Such practices breed suspicion of impropriety and compromise the integrity of the judicial process. The ruling underscored that sheriffs must adhere to Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, which meticulously outlines the procedure for handling sheriff’s expenses. This rule mandates that interested parties deposit estimated expenses with the Clerk of Court, who then disburses the funds to the sheriff, subject to liquidation and court approval. Direct payments to sheriffs circumvent this process and are explicitly disallowed.

Sec. 10. Sheriffs, process servers and other persons serving processes.

x x x x

With regard to sheriff’s expenses in executing writs issued pursuant to court orders or decisions or safeguarding the property levied upon, attached or seized, including kilometrage for each kilometer of travel, guards’ fees, warehousing and similar charges, the interested party shall pay said expenses in an amount estimated by the sheriff, subject to the approval of the court. Upon approval of said estimated expenses, the interested party shall deposit such amount with the clerk of court and ex officio sheriff, who shall disburse the same to the deputy sheriff assigned to effect the process, subject to liquidation within the same period for rendering a return on the process. The liquidation shall be approved by the court. Any unspent amount shall he refunded to the party making the deposit. A full report shall be submitted by the deputy sheriff assigned with his return, and the sheriff’s expenses shall be taxed as costs against the judgment debtor.

The Court cited precedents like Garcia v. Alejo, reiterating that sheriffs cannot accept gratuities, even if purportedly given in good faith. The timing of the payments, during ongoing execution proceedings, further undermined Marcelino’s ‘token of appreciation’ claim. The vouchers themselves indicated ‘payment of sheriff fees,’ contradicting his assertion of voluntary gratuity. Marcelino’s 17 years of experience as a sheriff was considered an aggravating factor, as he should have been well-versed in the proper protocols. The Court determined that Marcelino’s actions constituted misappropriation of funds, amounting to dishonesty and dereliction of duty. His failure to follow established procedures was a clear violation.

The penalty of dismissal was deemed appropriate, especially considering Marcelino’s prior administrative offenses. The Court referenced Section 50 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, allowing for the imposition of the penalty corresponding to the most serious charge when multiple offenses are involved. Dishonesty, being a grave offense, warrants dismissal, particularly in light of Marcelino’s repeated infractions. His past records, including a prior finding of abuse of authority and a suspension for less serious dishonesty and neglect of duty, demonstrated a pattern of misconduct. The Supreme Court emphasized the high standards expected of sheriffs as ranking officers of the court, tasked with upholding the integrity of the justice system. Their conduct must be beyond reproach to maintain public trust and confidence in the judiciary.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether Sheriff Marcelino committed misconduct by directly receiving sheriff’s fees from a litigant without proper documentation and remittance to the court.
What did the Supreme Court rule?	The Supreme Court found Sheriff Marcelino guilty of serious dishonesty and dereliction of duty and ordered his dismissal from service.
Why was Sheriff Marcelino dismissed?	He was dismissed for improperly accepting P100,000 in sheriff’s fees directly from a litigant, failing to issue official receipts, and not remitting the funds to the court, which constitutes dishonesty and violation of procedural rules.
What are the proper procedures for sheriff’s fees?	Rule 141 of the Rules of Court requires litigants to deposit estimated sheriff’s expenses with the Clerk of Court, who then disburses the funds to the sheriff, subject to liquidation and court approval. Direct payments to sheriffs are not allowed.
Can sheriffs accept ‘voluntary payments’ or gratuities?	No, sheriffs are prohibited from accepting any voluntary payments or gratuities from parties in the course of their duties, as this can create suspicion of impropriety and undermine the integrity of the service.
What is the practical implication of this ruling?	This case serves as a strong reminder to all sheriffs and court personnel to strictly adhere to the rules regarding financial transactions and to avoid any conduct that could compromise the integrity of their office and the judiciary.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

October 9, 2018

Sheriff’s Authority and Fees: Ensuring Proper Collection in Extrajudicial Foreclosures

TL;DR

The Supreme Court ruled that a sheriff acted improperly by directly billing and attempting to collect fees for extrajudicial foreclosure services from a bank. Philippine law dictates that only the Clerk of Court is authorized to collect such fees. This decision reinforces the importance of adhering to established procedures for fee collection in foreclosure proceedings to maintain transparency and prevent potential abuse within the judiciary.

Unauthorized Billing: Upholding Due Process in Sheriff Fee Collection

This case arose from a billing statement issued by Sheriff Roger D. Corea to Rural Bank of Polomolok for services related to extrajudicial foreclosure. The bank questioned the legality of these charges, prompting an investigation into Sheriff Corea’s actions. The core legal question is whether a sheriff can directly bill and collect fees for extrajudicial foreclosure services, or if this authority is exclusively vested in the Clerk of Court. Understanding the proper procedure for fee collection is crucial to ensuring fairness and preventing impropriety in the foreclosure process.

The Supreme Court’s decision hinged on the interpretation of Circular No. 7-2002 and Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. These legal instruments clearly delineate the process for collecting fees in extrajudicial foreclosures. According to Section 2 of Circular No. 7-2002, it is unequivocally the Clerk of Court who is authorized to collect filing fees at the outset of an extrajudicial foreclosure. This provision aims to centralize fee collection and ensure proper accounting within the court system. The circular explicitly states, “Upon receipt of the application, the Clerk of Court shall… collect the appropriate filing fees…”

Furthermore, Section 6 of the same circular, in conjunction with Rule 141, reinforces the Clerk of Court’s role in fee collection after the sale. These rules specify the fees to be collected based on the amount collected in the foreclosure sale. The Revised Rules of Court, specifically sections 10(h), 10(l), and 21(d) of Rule 141, while updating the fee amounts, did not alter the fundamental principle that the Clerk of Court is the designated collector. The Court highlighted that Sheriff Corea’s direct billing was a clear deviation from established procedure. His defense, that the billed amounts were negotiable and subject to the bank’s approval, was deemed insufficient and even raised further suspicion about the legitimacy of the charges.

The Supreme Court emphasized the vital role of sheriffs in the judicial system, quoting Spouses Villa v. Judge Ayco, stating that their conduct must always uphold the integrity of the court. Sheriffs are expected to perform their duties honestly and diligently, maintaining public trust in the judiciary. The Court reiterated the principle from Judge Tan v. Paredes, noting that sheriffs cannot unilaterally demand money without following proper procedures, as this could be construed as dishonesty or extortion. Sheriff Corea’s actions, even if not intentionally malicious, created an appearance of impropriety and undermined the public’s confidence in the court’s processes.

Ultimately, the Court found Sheriff Corea guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. While this is considered a grave offense, the Court, considering Sheriff Corea’s long service record, imposed a penalty of suspension for two months without pay, coupled with a stern warning. This penalty underscores the seriousness with which the Supreme Court views deviations from established fee collection procedures and emphasizes the need for strict adherence to legal protocols by all court personnel. This case serves as a crucial reminder that all court personnel, especially sheriffs who handle financial matters, must act with utmost transparency and accountability to maintain the integrity of the Philippine justice system.

FAQs

What was the main issue in this case?	The central issue was whether a sheriff could directly bill and collect fees for extrajudicial foreclosure services, or if this was the exclusive responsibility of the Clerk of Court.
Who is authorized to collect fees for extrajudicial foreclosures?	According to Supreme Court Circular No. 7-2002 and Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, only the Clerk of Court is authorized to collect fees related to extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings.
What did Sheriff Corea do wrong?	Sheriff Corea directly billed the Rural Bank of Polomolok for sheriff’s service fees and incidental expenses in extrajudicial foreclosure cases, which is against established procedure.
What was the Court’s ruling?	The Supreme Court found Sheriff Corea guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and suspended him for two months without pay.
What is ‘conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service’?	It refers to actions by a public servant that are detrimental or derogatory to the service and undermine public trust in government institutions, in this case, the judiciary.
Why is it important for fees to be collected by the Clerk of Court?	Centralized fee collection by the Clerk of Court ensures transparency, accountability, and proper accounting of court funds, preventing potential misuse or unauthorized collection of fees by individual court personnel.
What is the practical implication of this ruling?	This ruling clarifies and reinforces the correct procedure for fee collection in extrajudicial foreclosures, protecting parties from potential unauthorized charges and ensuring proper financial management within the courts.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

November 9, 2015

Presumption of Regularity Prevails: Dismissal of Complaint Against Sheriff Due to Recanted Testimony

TL;DR

In Isidoro Abapo v. Juan A. Gato, the Supreme Court dismissed an administrative complaint against a sheriff accused of extortion and neglect of duty. The complainant, Abapo, initially claimed Sheriff Gato demanded money to enforce a writ of attachment and failed to act despite partial payment. However, during the investigation, Abapo recanted his allegations, stating they arose from a misunderstanding. The Court emphasized that in administrative proceedings, the complainant bears the burden of proving allegations with substantial evidence. Since Abapo withdrew his accusations, and no corroborating evidence was presented, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties in favor of Sheriff Gato stood. This case highlights that unsubstantiated claims, especially when recanted by the complainant, are insufficient to overcome this presumption and warrant disciplinary action against a public officer.

When Words Waver: The Fragility of Complaints Against Public Officials

The case of Isidoro Abapo against Sheriff Juan A. Gato began with serious allegations of neglect of duty and violation of anti-graft laws. Abapo claimed Sheriff Gato demanded P5,000 for enforcing a writ of attachment, a crucial step in a civil case Abapo had filed. Despite a partial payment of P3,000, Abapo asserted the writ remained unenforced. This prompted Abapo to file a complaint, seeking accountability for the sheriff’s inaction and alleged financial impropriety. The narrative, however, took an unexpected turn during the formal investigation. What happens when the very foundation of a complaint—the complainant’s testimony—crumbles under scrutiny?

The legal framework governing administrative complaints against public officials places the onus of proof squarely on the complainant. The Supreme Court has consistently held that administrative proceedings, while not strictly bound by technical rules of evidence, still require substantial evidence to support any finding of wrongdoing. Substantial evidence is defined as “more than a mere scintilla” – it must be relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In this case, Abapo’s initial affidavit-complaint and early testimony formed the basis of the charges against Sheriff Gato. However, the proceedings revealed a critical shift. During his testimony before the Executive Judge, Abapo unequivocally retracted his accusations.

COURT: (To Witness)
Q To clarify, what you have given now is merely with respect to the service of the writ of attachment which according to you was served by the respondent. How about the other aspect, the alleged sum of money taken by the respondent?

A I will also withdraw that case, Your Honor.

Q Why?

A Because this case arises due to our misunderstanding, Your Honor.

COURT:
Q By saying out of misunderstanding, you mean to say that the charge of demanding money from you by the respondent is likewise not true and correct?

WITNESS:
A Yes, Your Honor.

This recantation fundamentally altered the evidentiary landscape of the case. The Court emphasized the significance of this withdrawal, noting that the corroborating testimonies presented by the complainant became baseless without Abapo’s primary claim. Furthermore, the Court invoked the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. This legal principle presumes that public officials act in good faith and with due care in carrying out their responsibilities. To overcome this presumption, compelling evidence of irregularity or misconduct is required. In the absence of such evidence, especially when the complainant himself disavows his initial allegations, the presumption stands.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) initially recommended a fine for Sheriff Gato based on his failure to comply with Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, which outlines the procedure for sheriffs to request and receive funds for expenses. This rule mandates prior court approval for estimated expenses and proper liquidation and reporting. However, the Supreme Court, upon review, disagreed with the OCA’s finding. While acknowledging the procedural requirements of Rule 141, the Court prioritized the lack of substantiation for the core accusations against Sheriff Gato. The Court highlighted that even the alleged payment of P3,000 by Abapo was undocumented, lacking any receipt or written proof.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Abapo v. Gato underscores the importance of credible and substantiated evidence in administrative complaints against public officials. It clarifies that a complainant’s change of heart, particularly a direct recantation of sworn statements, significantly weakens their case. Moreover, it reinforces the presumption of regularity, which protects public officers from unsubstantiated claims unless compelling evidence demonstrates otherwise. For citizens interacting with the judiciary, this case serves as a reminder of the need to ensure the veracity and factual basis of any complaints they file. For court personnel, it reaffirms the protection afforded by the presumption of regularity, but also emphasizes the continuous need for adherence to procedural rules, such as Rule 141, to avoid even the appearance of impropriety.

FAQs

What was the main charge against Sheriff Gato?	Sheriff Gato was charged with neglect of duty for failing to enforce a writ of attachment and for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for allegedly demanding money from the complainant.
What was the complainant’s key action that affected the case?	The complainant, Isidoro Abapo, recanted his allegations during the investigation, stating that the complaint was based on a misunderstanding and withdrawing his accusations against Sheriff Gato.
What is the legal principle of ‘presumption of regularity’?	The presumption of regularity is a legal principle that assumes public officials perform their duties properly and in good faith, unless proven otherwise by sufficient evidence.
What kind of evidence is needed in administrative cases?	Administrative cases require ‘substantial evidence,’ which is more than just a suspicion or a hint of wrongdoing. It must be relevant evidence that a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
What is Rule 141 of the Rules of Court about?	Rule 141, Section 9, of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure for sheriffs to request and receive funds for expenses related to serving court processes, requiring court approval and proper liquidation.
What was the Supreme Court’s final ruling in this case?	The Supreme Court dismissed the administrative complaint against Sheriff Gato due to insufficiency of evidence, upholding the presumption of regularity in his performance of duties.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

March 23, 2004

Upholding Public Trust: Court Employees and the Fair Transcription of Stenographic Notes

TL;DR

The Supreme Court ruled that a court stenographer violated the rules by overcharging for transcripts of stenographic notes. The decision emphasizes that court employees must adhere to the prescribed fees for transcription services and serve the public interest over personal gain. This means stenographers cannot demand excessive payments or treat transcriptions as a private transaction, reinforcing the principle that public office is a public trust. By setting this precedent, the Court aims to ensure fair access to court records and uphold the integrity of the judicial system, making it clear that overcharging for stenographic work can result in suspension.

Beyond the Call: When Fair Fees Meet Public Duty

This case revolves around a complaint filed against Sonia Bagadiong, a court stenographer, for allegedly overcharging a litigant, Beatriz E. De Guzman, for transcripts of stenographic notes. De Guzman claimed she was charged an excessive amount per page and that the fees demanded were much higher than what she expected. This raised the core legal question of whether Bagadiong violated the prescribed fees for transcription services and whether her actions undermined the public’s trust in the judiciary.

The facts of the case reveal that De Guzman requested a copy of the transcript of stenographic notes from a court hearing. She was surprised to find that Bagadiong charged her P21.00 per page. De Guzman inquired about the propriety of this amount, also alleging that she was paying P800.00 for transcripts at every hearing. In response, Bagadiong justified the higher fee by claiming the transcripts were single-spaced and needed to be typed at home due to the complainant’s urgency. She also argued that she typically charged P10.00 per double-spaced page with more time provided and that the transcription was additional to her other court duties.

Bagadiong further argued that De Guzman should have exhausted administrative remedies by first raising the issue with the presiding judge. She also contended that the fees were a private matter between her and the complainant and did not affect her official duties. However, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found these arguments unpersuasive. The OCA initially recommended a fine, but later, after reviewing additional comments from Bagadiong, suggested a three-month suspension without pay.

The Supreme Court anchored its decision on Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by Administrative Circular No. 31-90. This section clearly stipulates the fees for stenographers, which is P5.00 per page before an appeal is taken. The Court emphasized that any deviation from this prescribed fee constitutes an administrative violation. As the Court stated in Alivia vs. Nieto,

The administration of justice is a sacred task; by the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, all those involved in it must faithfully adhere to, hold inviolate, and invigorate the principle solemnly enshrined in the 1987 Constitution that a public office is a public trust…

The Court rejected Bagadiong’s argument that transcription was merely an additional task. Administrative Circular No. 24-90 mandates that stenographers transcribe notes within twenty days and submit a verified monthly certification of compliance. The Court also pointed out that stenographic notes are official documents and cannot be removed from court records without authorization. Bagadiong admitted to taking the notes home without proper authorization, further solidifying the case against her.

The Supreme Court also referenced Rodas vs. Aquilizan, underscoring a court stenographer’s duty to serve the public, sometimes at the sacrifice of personal interest. By overcharging, Bagadiong undermined the judiciary’s commitment to public service. The Court noted that despite her years of service, Bagadiong seemed unaware of the basic concept of public service, which includes charging only the prescribed fees. The Court concluded that Bagadiong had indeed overcharged De Guzman for the stenographic notes, warranting disciplinary action.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court found Bagadiong guilty of violating the rules regarding the transcription of stenographic notes. As a result, she was suspended from office without pay for two months. The Court issued a stern warning that any similar offense in the future would be dealt with more severely, reinforcing the importance of adhering to prescribed fees and serving the public interest.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether a court stenographer violated the prescribed fees for transcribing stenographic notes and undermined public trust by overcharging a litigant.
What fees are stenographers allowed to charge for transcripts?	According to Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, stenographers should charge P5.00 per page before the appeal is taken.
Can stenographers remove stenographic notes from court records?	No, stenographic notes are considered official documents and cannot be removed from court records without a court order.
What is the duty of a court stenographer regarding transcriptions?	Stenographers are required to transcribe stenographic notes within twenty days and submit a verified monthly certification of compliance.
What was the Supreme Court’s ruling in this case?	The Supreme Court found the stenographer guilty of overcharging and suspended her from office without pay for two months, with a warning against future violations.
Why is it important for court employees to adhere to prescribed fees?	Adhering to prescribed fees ensures fair access to court records, upholds the integrity of the judicial system, and maintains public trust in the administration of justice.

This case serves as a crucial reminder to all court employees that public office is a public trust. Adherence to rules and regulations, especially concerning fees for services, is paramount in maintaining the integrity and credibility of the judiciary. This decision sets a clear precedent for the consequences of failing to uphold these standards.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

March 15, 1999