Tag: Republic Act No. 8974

  • Ensuring Just Compensation: Upholding Property Rights in Philippine Expropriation Law

    TL;DR

    The Supreme Court affirmed that government agencies in the Philippines must strictly adhere to the requirements of Republic Act No. 8974 when expropriating private property for national infrastructure projects. Specifically, before taking possession through a Writ of Possession, agencies must pay the property owner 100% of the Bureau of Internal Revenue’s (BIR) current zonal valuation. This case underscores that incorrect or insufficient prepayment, even if based on a government valuation, can invalidate the Writ of Possession. It protects property owners by ensuring they receive proper preliminary compensation before the government takes their land for public use, reinforcing the principle of just compensation from the outset of expropriation proceedings.

    Fair Price First: Protecting Landowners in Government Infrastructure Projects

    Can the government take your land for a highway project by only paying a fraction of its value upfront? This case, Republic vs. Heirs of Gabriel Q. Fernandez, delves into the crucial balance between public interest and private property rights in the Philippines, specifically concerning expropriation for national infrastructure. The core legal question revolves around the government’s obligation to correctly and fully comply with the pre-payment requirements mandated by Republic Act No. 8974 before seizing private land for public projects. At the heart of the dispute was whether the Republic properly valued and prepaid for the Fernandez property before obtaining a Writ of Possession, or if they shortchanged the landowners, violating the law and their constitutional rights.

    The Republic of the Philippines, aiming to construct a four-lane highway in Balanga, Bataan, initiated expropriation proceedings against the Heirs of Gabriel Q. Fernandez. The government deposited an amount based on a zonal valuation of P15.00 per square meter, classifying the land as “pastureland.” However, the Heirs of Fernandez contested this valuation, arguing that their property was agricultural land (“A1”) with a zonal value of P50.00 per square meter. They further argued that the Republic had not complied with Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, which outlines the guidelines for expropriation, particularly the requirement of paying 100% of the BIR zonal valuation before a Writ of Possession can be issued. The trial court initially sided with the Republic, granting the Writ of Possession, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, finding that the Republic had not deposited the correct amount.

    The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals’ decision, emphasizing the mandatory nature of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974. The Court clarified that this law represents a significant shift from previous expropriation procedures. Prior laws merely required a deposit, not immediate payment to the landowner before possession. Republic Act No. 8974, however, mandates “immediate payment of the initial just compensation prior to the issuance of the writ of possession.” This prepayment is not the final “just compensation” determined later in the proceedings, but a provisional amount specifically calculated as 100% of the BIR zonal valuation to enable the government to promptly proceed with infrastructure projects while ensuring landowners receive immediate preliminary recompense.

    A key point of contention was the correct zonal valuation. The Republic presented a BIR certification classifying the land as “pastureland” (P15.00/sqm), while the Heirs of Fernandez presented a different BIR document classifying it as “A1” agricultural land (P50.00/sqm). Upon closer examination, the Supreme Court found discrepancies in the Republic’s document, noting typewritten annotations not present in the Heirs’ document or the BIR’s online records. Applying the rules of evidence regarding altered documents, the Court deemed the Republic’s evidence inadmissible due to lack of proper authentication of these alterations. Referencing the BIR website and the Heirs’ document, the Court concluded that the correct zonal valuation was indeed P50.00 per square meter for “A1” land.

    Furthermore, even if the Republic’s valuation were considered, the Court pointed out an inconsistency. The Republic’s own evidence, the tax declaration, classified the land as “Veg. land” (vegetable land), corresponding to “A7” in the BIR classification, not “pastureland” (“A9”). Thus, even by their own flawed document, the P15.00/sqm valuation was incorrect. The Court firmly stated that the implementing agency must pay based on the current relevant zonal valuation, and in this case, the Republic failed to do so. Because the prepayment was insufficient, the Court ruled that the Court of Appeals correctly set aside the Writ of Possession.

    The Republic argued that setting aside the Writ of Possession was akin to an injunction, prohibited by Republic Act No. 8975. The Supreme Court dismissed this argument, clarifying that reversing an improperly issued Writ of Possession is not an injunction. An injunction is a separate legal remedy to restrain certain actions. In contrast, setting aside the Writ was a consequence of the Republic’s failure to comply with the preconditions of Republic Act No. 8974. The Court reiterated that compliance with Section 4 is a prerequisite for the issuance of a Writ of Possession, and non-compliance justifies its reversal.

    This case serves as a significant reminder to government agencies of their strict obligations under Republic Act No. 8974. It reinforces the principle that while the government has the power of eminent domain, this power is not absolute and must be exercised within the bounds of the law, particularly concerning just compensation. The decision protects landowners by ensuring they receive proper preliminary payment before the government can take possession of their property for infrastructure projects, upholding both efficiency in project implementation and the constitutional right to just compensation.

    FAQs

    What is Republic Act No. 8974? It is the law that governs the acquisition of right-of-way, site, or location for national government infrastructure projects through expropriation. It aims to expedite project implementation while ensuring fair treatment of property owners.
    What is a Writ of Possession in expropriation cases? It is a court order that allows the government or implementing agency to take possession of the private property being expropriated, even before the final determination of just compensation.
    What is the required prepayment under Republic Act No. 8974? The law requires the implementing agency to immediately pay the property owner 100% of the Bureau of Internal Revenue’s (BIR) current relevant zonal valuation of the property, plus the value of improvements, upon filing the expropriation complaint and before obtaining a Writ of Possession.
    What is zonal valuation? Zonal valuation is the BIR’s determined fair market value of real properties per square meter in different zones or areas in the Philippines, used for tax purposes and also as a basis for preliminary compensation in expropriation cases under Republic Act No. 8974.
    What is the difference between provisional value and just compensation? Provisional value, based on zonal valuation, is the preliminary payment required for the government to take possession. Just compensation is the final, judicially determined fair market value of the property, which may be higher or lower than the provisional value.
    Why was the Writ of Possession set aside in this case? The Writ of Possession was set aside because the Supreme Court found that the Republic failed to pay the correct provisional value based on the accurate BIR zonal valuation of the property, thus not complying with the requirements of Republic Act No. 8974.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Republic of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Gabriel Q. Fernandez, G.R No. 175493, March 25, 2015

  • Public Use or Private Loss? NPC’s Duty in Eminent Domain

    TL;DR

    When the government initiates expropriation for public use but later abandons the project, this Supreme Court decision clarifies that the expropriation case isn’t automatically dismissed. The National Power Corporation (NPC) sought to withdraw its expropriation case after finding an alternative site. The Court ruled that while withdrawal is allowed if the public purpose no longer exists, it’s not absolute. If the initial expropriation order is final, possession was taken, and the landowner suffered prejudice, the case continues to resolve just compensation. This ruling protects landowners from potential abuse of eminent domain by ensuring that once an expropriation process has significantly progressed and caused impact, the government cannot simply walk away without addressing just compensation and potential damages.

    Eminent Domain in Flux: When Public Projects Change Course

    Imagine the government wants to build a power substation on your land. Expropriation proceedings begin, but years later, the project shifts, and your land is no longer needed. Can the government simply withdraw the case, leaving you in legal limbo? This is the core of the dispute in National Power Corporation v. Posada. NPC, tasked with a substation project, initiated expropriation only to later seek withdrawal when an alternative site became available. The Supreme Court was asked to decide if NPC could simply withdraw its petition and what the legal repercussions would be for the landowners who had been subjected to the expropriation process.

    The legal framework for expropriation in the Philippines balances the state’s power of eminent domain with the constitutional right to private property. Expropriation, the taking of private property for public use, is governed by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and Republic Act No. 8974, especially for national infrastructure projects. These laws ensure that expropriation is only for public use and with just compensation. The process has two phases: first, determining the government’s authority and the propriety of expropriation, and second, setting the just compensation. This case primarily concerns the first phase and the implications of project abandonment after initial court proceedings.

    The facts unfolded as follows: NPC started expropriation for a substation project in Catanduanes, offering P500 per square meter, which landowners contested. The trial court affirmed NPC’s right to expropriate and formed a commission to assess just compensation. NPC deposited a provisional amount and obtained a Writ of Possession, though this writ was later recalled due to non-compliance with payment requirements under R.A. 8974. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision, and NPC then sought to withdraw its Supreme Court appeal, citing a change in project plans. The landowners agreed to the withdrawal of the appeal but opposed the dismissal of the original expropriation complaint, seeking a final resolution on just compensation.

    The Supreme Court began its analysis by reiterating the two-phase nature of expropriation. It emphasized that R.A. 8974, applicable to national infrastructure projects, provides stricter guidelines than Rule 67, particularly regarding immediate payment to landowners before possession. Section 4 of R.A. 8974 mandates “immediate payment to the owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the improvements and/or structures.” This “immediate payment” requirement was crucial in the Court’s assessment of whether the Writ of Possession was properly issued in the first place.

    The Court found that the trial court erred in initially granting the Writ of Possession based on a deposit rather than actual payment to the landowners, as required by R.A. 8974, citing Republic v. Gingoyon which underscored that “the law plainly requires direct payment to the property owner, and not a mere deposit with the authorized government depositary. Without such direct payment, no writ of possession may be obtained.” Furthermore, the valuation of improvements should have been determined by the implementing agency (NPC), not the court-appointed commissioners, for the purpose of issuing a Writ of Possession under R.A. 8974.

    Addressing NPC’s argument that the recall of the Writ of Possession was an injunction prohibited by R.A. 8975, the Court clarified the distinction. Recalling an improperly issued writ is a corrective action, not an injunction. Injunctive writs are separate remedies, and R.A. 8975’s prohibition on lower courts issuing injunctions against national government projects does not prevent courts from correcting their own procedural errors. The recall of the writ simply rectified the initial mistake of issuing it without full compliance with R.A. 8974.

    On the issue of withdrawal, the Court acknowledged the general principle that a plaintiff may withdraw an action if the public purpose for expropriation ceases to exist. However, this right is not absolute, especially after the proceedings have progressed significantly. Drawing from National Housing Authority v. Heirs of Guivelondo and related cases, the Court outlined exceptions to the dismissal rule. Dismissal is not automatic if the order of condemnation is final, possession has been taken, and the landowner has been prejudiced. In this case, while possession was not validly taken, the initial order of condemnation from the trial court had become final. Crucially, the landowners had been subjected to years of expropriation proceedings and uncertainty.

    The Supreme Court ultimately granted NPC’s Motion to Withdraw its Petition for Review, effectively making the Court of Appeals’ decision final. However, recognizing the potential prejudice to the landowners and the finality of the trial court’s condemnation order, the Court remanded the case to the trial court. The trial court was tasked to determine if the landowners had suffered prejudice due to the expropriation proceedings. NPC now bears the burden to justify its withdrawal before the trial court, and landowners can claim for damages incurred since the expropriation began. This nuanced approach ensures fairness and prevents government agencies from initiating expropriation lightly and abandoning it without accountability.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether the National Power Corporation (NPC) could withdraw its expropriation case after initiating proceedings and if such withdrawal automatically dismissed the case, especially given the procedural stage reached and potential prejudice to landowners.
    What did the Supreme Court rule? The Supreme Court ruled that while NPC could withdraw its appeal, the withdrawal didn’t automatically dismiss the expropriation case in the trial court. The case was remanded to determine if landowners suffered prejudice, and NPC needed to justify its withdrawal to the trial court.
    What is the significance of R.A. 8974 in this case? R.A. 8974, governing expropriation for national infrastructure projects, requires immediate payment to landowners before a Writ of Possession can be issued. The Court emphasized NPC’s failure to comply with this requirement, highlighting that a mere deposit is insufficient.
    What is the difference between provisional value and just compensation? Provisional value, based on zonal valuation, is a preliminary amount paid for immediate possession. Just compensation is the final, judicially determined fair market value of the property. R.A. 8974 requires immediate payment of provisional value, but just compensation is determined later.
    Can the government withdraw an expropriation case? Yes, generally, if the public purpose no longer exists, but withdrawal isn’t absolute. If the condemnation order is final, possession was taken, and landowners are prejudiced, dismissal is not automatic, and the court retains jurisdiction to resolve just compensation and damages.
    What does ‘prejudice to the landowner’ mean in this context? Prejudice refers to the harm or damage landowners may have suffered due to the expropriation proceedings, even if possession was not fully taken. This could include legal expenses, emotional distress, restrictions on property use, and lost opportunities during the pendency of the case.
    What is the next step after the Supreme Court’s decision? The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court. NPC must formally move to withdraw the expropriation complaint there, justifying the withdrawal. The trial court will then assess if the landowners suffered prejudice and decide on the dismissal and potential damages.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. SOCORRO T. POSADA, G.R. No. 191945, March 11, 2015

  • Eminent Domain: Just Compensation Requires Full Market Value, Not Just Easement Fee

    TL;DR

    The Supreme Court ruled that when the government, through the National Power Corporation (NPC), expropriates private property for power transmission lines, the owner is entitled to the full fair market value of the land, not merely an easement fee. This means landowners must receive compensation that reflects the actual value of their property, acknowledging the significant restrictions placed on its use due to the presence of transmission lines. The just compensation should be determined based on the property’s value at the time the expropriation complaint was filed, ensuring fair treatment for property owners affected by government infrastructure projects.

    Power Lines and Property Rights: What’s Fair When the Government Comes Knocking?

    The National Power Corporation (NPC) sought to acquire an easement of right-of-way over Benjamin Ong Co’s land for its Lahar Affected Transmission Line Project. This case highlights a common conflict: the government’s need for infrastructure development versus the individual’s right to just compensation for their property. The legal question at the heart of the dispute centered on whether NPC should pay the full market value of the land or only an easement fee, essentially a smaller percentage of the land’s value, given that the land was not fully taken but rather subjected to an easement.

    NPC based its argument on Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, which stipulates that only an easement fee equivalent to 10% of the market value should be paid to affected property owners when land is traversed by transmission lines. However, the Supreme Court considered the impact of Republic Act No. 8974, which governs the acquisition of right-of-way for national government infrastructure projects. The court acknowledged that the Lahar Project qualified as such a project, bringing R.A. No. 8974 into play. The key consideration was whether this later law superseded the earlier provision limiting compensation to an easement fee.

    The Supreme Court emphasized that R.A. No. 8974 intended to streamline expropriation proceedings for national government infrastructure projects. Building on this principle, the Court cited its previous ruling in Republic v. Gingoyon, noting that R.A. No. 8974 supersedes the deposit system under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court with a scheme of “immediate payment” in these specific cases. The Court further clarified that the standard of just compensation is a substantive matter falling within the legislature’s power to fix, as it did through R.A. No. 8974. Therefore, the determination of just compensation in this case must adhere to the standards set forth in R.A. No. 8974.

    The Court firmly rejected the notion that a mere easement fee was sufficient compensation in this case. It recognized that the presence of transmission lines significantly restricts the landowner’s use of the property.

    “The construction of the transmission lines will definitely have limitations and will indefinitely deprive the owners of the land of their normal use.”

    This position aligns with previous rulings where the Court required full market value payment even when the taking was technically an easement. Despite the easement, the property owner is still significantly restricted in how they can use their land. Thus, full compensation is more appropriate.

    Regarding the date for reckoning just compensation, the Court clarified that it should be the date of filing the expropriation complaint, as provided in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.

    “[J]ust compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.”

    This principle ensures fairness and prevents either party from unfairly benefiting from fluctuations in property value during the expropriation process. While exceptions exist, none applied in this specific case. The Court emphasized that determining just compensation is ultimately a judicial function. The lower court must use the standards set forth in Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 8974 to arrive at a fair and accurate valuation of the property.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether the landowner should receive the full market value of their property or only an easement fee for the right-of-way acquired by the National Power Corporation (NPC) for power transmission lines.
    What is an easement fee? An easement fee is a percentage of the land’s value paid when the government acquires the right to use a portion of private property for a specific purpose, such as running power lines, without taking full ownership.
    What is R.A. No. 8974? R.A. No. 8974 is a law that facilitates the acquisition of right-of-way for national government infrastructure projects, aiming to expedite the process and ensure fair compensation for affected property owners.
    How does R.A. No. 8974 affect the determination of just compensation? R.A. No. 8974 mandates that property owners receive the full market value of their land when it is expropriated for national government projects, superseding earlier provisions that limited compensation to easement fees in certain cases.
    When is the value of the property determined for just compensation purposes? The value of the property is determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the expropriation complaint, whichever comes first, according to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
    Why did the Court order a new set of commissioners to be appointed? The Court ordered a new set of commissioners because the conflicting appraisals submitted by the original commissioners were not both reckoned as of the date of filing of the complaint, which is required for an accurate determination of just compensation.
    What factors should be considered when determining just compensation? According to Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 8974, factors to consider include the land’s classification and use, developmental costs, owner-declared value, current selling price of similar lands, disturbance compensation, size, shape, location, tax declaration, and zonal valuation.

    In conclusion, this case reaffirms the principle that just compensation in eminent domain cases involving national infrastructure projects requires paying the full market value of the expropriated property, not just an easement fee. This decision balances the government’s need for development with the protection of individual property rights, ensuring that landowners are fairly compensated for the restrictions placed on their property due to government projects.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: National Power Corporation vs. Benjamin Ong Co, G.R. No. 166973, February 10, 2009

  • Expropriation and Just Compensation: Ensuring Timely Payment in Government Acquisitions

    TL;DR

    The Supreme Court affirmed that the government must make a preliminary payment of just compensation to PIATCO before taking possession of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Terminal 3 (NAIA 3), in accordance with Republic Act No. 8974. This decision emphasizes the importance of timely compensation in expropriation cases, even when there are disputes over who ultimately owns the compensation. The ruling underscores that the government’s obligation to compensate property owners justly and promptly cannot be sidelined by conflicting claims from third parties. This decision ensures that private entities are justly compensated for their investments before the government takes over critical infrastructure projects.

    NAIA 3 Saga: Prioritizing Just Compensation Amidst Conflicting Claims

    This case revolves around the Republic of the Philippines’ attempt to take over the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Terminal 3 (NAIA 3) and the ensuing dispute over just compensation to Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO). The central legal question is whether the government can take possession of the NAIA 3 facilities before fully paying PIATCO, especially considering claims from other entities, such as Takenaka Corporation and Asahikosan Corporation, who assert significant liens on the terminal due to unpaid bills.

    The Republic of the Philippines, represented by Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), and the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), sought reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s decision requiring prior payment to PIATCO before the government could take over NAIA 3. The government argued that Republic Act No. 8974, which governs the expropriation, does not apply to NAIA 3 because it is not a right-of-way, site, or location. They also raised concerns about potential liens from Takenaka and Asahikosan, claiming these entities were unpaid for their work on the terminal. According to the government, paying PIATCO directly could result in the Republic expropriating a terminal with outstanding liens exceeding its actual value.

    The Supreme Court rejected these arguments, emphasizing that any claims by Takenaka and Asahikosan against PIATCO or NAIA 3 had not been judicially established. The court reiterated that the conclusive ruling in Agan v. PIATCO required PIATCO to be justly compensated before the government could take over the facilities. The court pointed out that Republic Act No. 8974 mandates prior payment to the owner before the government can acquire possession of expropriated property. This requirement is consistent with the principles and laws governing expropriation cases, ensuring that property owners are not deprived of their rights without due compensation.

    The Court clarified that the provisional nature of the initial payment does not negate the government’s obligation to make it. The purpose of this initial payment is to enable the government to obtain a writ of possession over the expropriated property, while the final amount of just compensation can be determined later. This approach balances the government’s need to acquire the property for public use with the property owner’s right to just compensation. The court also noted that Takenaka and Asahikosan could pursue their claims through other judicial avenues, as their claims involved factual issues that needed to be established by the appropriate trier of facts.

    Furthermore, the Supreme Court addressed the argument that Republic Act No. 8974 could not repeal Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which governs expropriation proceedings. The Court held that the determination of appropriate standards for just compensation is a substantive matter within the legislature’s province. While Rule 67 does contain matters of substance, the creation of property rights is a matter for the legislature to enact, not for the courts to decide. To hold otherwise would lead to the absurd situation where the judicial branch could shield laws from repeal simply by absorbing their provisions into the rules of procedure.

    The Court also denied the motions for intervention filed by Takenaka, Asahikosan, and Representative Salacnib Baterina, because these motions were filed after the promulgation of the Court’s decision, violating Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The court noted that none of the movants claimed to be unaware of the case’s pendency. Moreover, the legal interest required for intervention had not been sufficiently established. The claims of Takenaka and Asahikosan were not yet judicially proven, and Representative Baterina’s concerns about the disbursement of public funds were not applicable, as the funds in question came from the Manila International Airport Authority, a corporate entity with a separate legal personality.

    In sum, the Supreme Court affirmed its decision, emphasizing the importance of prior payment of just compensation in expropriation cases. The ruling underscores the government’s obligation to justly compensate property owners before taking possession of their property, even amidst conflicting claims from third parties. This decision promotes fairness and equity in expropriation proceedings, ensuring that property owners are not deprived of their rights without due process.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the government could take possession of NAIA 3 before paying PIATCO just compensation, especially with claims from other entities.
    What did the Supreme Court rule? The Supreme Court ruled that the government must make a preliminary payment of just compensation to PIATCO before taking possession of NAIA 3, as required by Republic Act No. 8974.
    Why were the motions for intervention denied? The motions for intervention were denied because they were filed after the Court’s decision was already promulgated, violating procedural rules.
    What is the significance of Republic Act No. 8974 in this case? Republic Act No. 8974 mandates prior payment to the owner before the government can acquire possession of expropriated property, ensuring timely compensation.
    What happens to the claims of Takenaka and Asahikosan? The Court stated that Takenaka and Asahikosan could pursue their claims through other judicial avenues, as their claims involved factual issues to be established.
    What is just compensation in the context of expropriation? Just compensation refers to the fair market value of the property at the time of taking, ensuring the owner is not unfairly deprived of their property’s value.
    Can the government take property without paying compensation? No, the government cannot take private property without paying just compensation, as guaranteed by the Constitution.

    This case reinforces the principle that just compensation must be provided promptly in expropriation cases, safeguarding property rights and ensuring fairness in government acquisitions. The decision serves as a reminder of the government’s duty to balance public interest with the protection of individual rights.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GINGOYON, G.R. NO. 166429, February 01, 2006