Tag: Republic Act No. 8799

Resolving Corporate Disputes: The Concurrent Jurisdiction of Courts and the Prevention of Forum Shopping

TL;DR

The Supreme Court’s decision in GD Express Worldwide N.V. vs. Court of Appeals clarifies the handling of intra-corporate disputes when multiple cases involving the same issues are filed in different courts. The ruling emphasizes that while the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) previously held jurisdiction over such disputes, Republic Act No. 8799 transferred this authority to Regional Trial Courts (RTCs), specifically designated Special Commercial Courts (SCCs). The Court held that the transfer of jurisdiction from the SEC to the SCC does not render a case moot, as the core issue of whether concurrent cases should proceed independently, be consolidated, or be suspended remains relevant. Furthermore, the Court underscored that filing a single action, in this case, SEC Case No. 08-97-5746, does not constitute forum shopping, even if its resolution is connected to an ongoing civil case. The Court held that the SCC has the discretion to decide whether to await the outcome of the related civil case, balancing judicial efficiency and fairness to the parties involved.

Corporate Power Plays: When Can a Court Suspend Proceedings to Avoid Conflicting Judgments?

The case of GD Express Worldwide N.V. vs. Court of Appeals revolves around a dispute over the control and management of Pacific East Asia Cargo Airlines, Inc. (PEAC). The disagreement stems from a joint venture agreement between GD Express and Philippine Aerospace Development Corporation (PADC), which later led to a bidding process for PADC’s shares in PEAC. Filchart Airways, Inc. emerged as the highest bidder, but GD Express challenged Filchart’s compliance with the bidding rules, leading to multiple legal battles in different courts. The central legal question is whether the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) – now replaced by Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) or Special Commercial Courts (SCCs) – erred in assuming jurisdiction over a case filed by Filchart during the pendency of a related civil case initiated by GD Express. This situation raises concerns about potential forum shopping and the efficient administration of justice.

The factual backdrop involves a complex web of agreements and transactions. GD Express, a Dutch corporation, sought to enforce the terms of a joint venture agreement that granted it certain rights over PEAC’s management and ownership. Filchart, on the other hand, aimed to nullify certain provisions of this agreement, arguing that they unfairly restricted PADC’s ability to sell its shares. The initial legal action, Civil Case No. 96-1675, was filed by GD Express to compel PADC and Asset Privatization Trust (APT) to comply with the joint venture agreements. Subsequently, Filchart filed SEC Case No. 08-97-5746, seeking the appointment of a management committee to oversee PEAC’s operations and the nullification of certain provisions in the joint venture agreement.

The Supreme Court had to address the jurisdictional complexities arising from these parallel proceedings. While the SEC initially assumed jurisdiction over the intra-corporate dispute, Republic Act No. 8799 transferred this authority to the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs), specifically designated Special Commercial Courts (SCCs). Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799 explicitly states that “the Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court.” This transfer of jurisdiction raised the question of whether the SEC’s actions were valid and whether the pending cases should be consolidated or suspended.

The Court clarified that the transfer of jurisdiction did not render the issue moot. The crucial question remained: should the civil case and the intra-corporate case proceed independently, be consolidated, or should the intra-corporate case be suspended pending the outcome of the civil case? The Court recognized that the prayers for the appointment of a management receiver, the nullification and amendment of PEAC’s articles of incorporation and by-laws, and the recognition of Filchart’s directors were all intra-corporate in nature. However, the Court also noted that not all of Filchart’s claims fell within this category. For example, the action for the nullification of the management contract between PEAC and Amihan was deemed an ordinary contract dispute, cognizable by courts of general jurisdiction.

The Court emphasized the discretion afforded to the SCC in managing these concurrent proceedings. The test for determining whether suspension is appropriate hinges on the relationship between the issues in the two cases. As the Court stated, “The test to determine whether the suspension of the proceedings in the SECOND CASE is proper is whether the issues raised by the pleadings in the FIRST CASE are so related with the issues raised in the SECOND CASE, such that the resolution of the issues in the FIRST CASE would determine the issues in the SECOND CASE.” This approach balances the need for judicial efficiency with the right of parties to have their claims adjudicated fairly.

Addressing the issue of forum shopping, the Court found no evidence of deliberate manipulation by Filchart. The elements of forum shopping require identity of parties, rights asserted, and reliefs prayed for, such that a judgment in one case would amount to res judicata in the other. Since the outcome of the civil case would primarily determine Filchart’s standing to bring the intra-corporate suit, the Court concluded that the filing of SEC Case No. 08-97-5746 did not constitute forum shopping. However, the Court reiterated that the SCC retained the discretion to suspend the intra-corporate proceeding if it believed the civil case’s outcome would significantly impact the causes of action raised in the SEC case. Ultimately, the Court denied the petition, upholding the lower court’s decision and reinforcing the principle of judicial discretion in managing concurrent legal proceedings.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the SEC (now the SCC) erred in assuming jurisdiction over an intra-corporate dispute while a related civil case was pending.
What is an intra-corporate dispute?	An intra-corporate dispute involves conflicts within a corporation, such as issues related to management, shareholder rights, and corporate governance.
What is forum shopping?	Forum shopping is the practice of filing multiple lawsuits involving the same issues in different courts to obtain a favorable judgment.
What is the significance of R.A. No. 8799 in this case?	R.A. No. 8799 transferred jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes from the SEC to the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs), specifically designated Special Commercial Courts (SCCs).
Can a court suspend proceedings in a case?	Yes, a court has the discretion to suspend proceedings to avoid multiplicity of suits, vexatious litigation, and conflicting judgments.
What factors does a court consider when deciding whether to suspend proceedings?	A court considers whether the issues in the pending case are so related that the resolution of the first case would determine the issues in the second case.
What was the final decision of the Supreme Court in this case?	The Supreme Court denied the petition, upholding the lower court’s decision and emphasizing the discretion of the SCC to manage concurrent legal proceedings.

The GD Express case underscores the importance of judicial discretion in managing complex litigation involving related claims in different courts. The decision provides valuable guidance on how courts should balance the need for efficient dispute resolution with the rights of parties to have their claims fully and fairly adjudicated. The ruling clarifies the application of the law in cases involving potential forum shopping and concurrent jurisdiction, ensuring that justice is served without unnecessary duplication of effort.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: GD Express Worldwide N.V. vs. CA, G.R. No. 136978, May 08, 2009

May 8, 2009

Execution of Judgment: Conforming to the Dispositive Portion in Intra-Corporate Disputes

TL;DR

The Supreme Court ruled that a motion for execution of a judgment must substantially conform to the dispositive portion of the decision it seeks to enforce; otherwise, the execution order is invalid. In Lao v. King, the Court found no variance between the trial court’s decision and the subsequent order granting execution, affirming that the order explicitly directed compliance with the original judgment. This means that parties seeking to enforce a judgment must ensure that their motions and the resulting orders align precisely with the court’s specific directives, protecting against overreach and maintaining the integrity of the judicial process. Stakeholders in intra-corporate disputes must diligently ensure alignment between judgments and execution orders to avoid legal challenges.

“As Prayed For”: Ensuring Judgments and Executions Align in Corporate Governance Battles

This case revolves around a dispute among stockholders of Philadelphia School, Inc., where petitioners Lydia Lao, William Chua Lian, Jeffrey Ong, and Henry Sy challenged the execution of a court decision favoring respondent Philip King. The core legal question is whether the trial court’s order granting the motion for execution improperly varied the terms of the original judgment in Civil Case No. Q-01-42972.

The petitioners argued that the execution order sought reliefs not included in the judgment’s dispositive portion, rendering it invalid. They pointed to specific prayers in the respondent’s motion for execution, such as enjoining the petitioners from acting as officers and directing a new election under court supervision, claiming these exceeded the scope of the original ruling. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed, emphasizing that an execution order must indeed conform to the judgment it seeks to enforce. The Court referred to a fundamental legal axiom that an order of execution must substantially conform to the dispositive portion of the decision sought to be executed. The order of execution may not vary, or go beyond, the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. If it does, the order is null and void.

The Court scrutinized the trial court’s decision of September 25, 2002, and its subsequent Order of December 26, 2002, finding no inconsistency between the two. Specifically, the Order explicitly stated that the writ of execution should be issued “in accordance with the disposition of the issues as contained in the judgment of the court.” This directive, according to the Supreme Court, ensured that the execution would adhere strictly to the original judgment’s terms. The alleged variance was deemed a misinterpretation by the petitioners, failing to recognize the clear mandate of conformity.

Building on this, the Supreme Court addressed the petitioners’ claim that the respondent’s motion for execution sought reliefs beyond the judgment’s scope. It found that the reliefs requested in the motion were inherently linked to the dispositions in the trial court’s decision. For instance, the prayer to enjoin the petitioners from acting as officers aligned with the declaration that their acts as alleged officers were null and void. Similarly, the call for a new election, allowing the respondent to vote his 1,200 shares, corresponded with the restoration of his shareholdings and the nullification of the previous election.

Moreover, the Court underscored the significance of Section 4, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799. This rule explicitly provides for the immediate executory nature of decisions and orders in such disputes, unless restrained by an appellate court. This underscores the intent for swift enforcement of judgments in intra-corporate matters. Here is the full provision:

Section 4. Executory nature of decisions and orders. – All decisions and orders issued under these Rules shall immediately be executory. No appeal or petition taken therefrom shall stay the enforcement or implementation of the decision or order, unless restrained by an appellate court. Interlocutory orders shall not be subject to appeal.

The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, reinforcing the principle that execution orders must align with the judgments they seek to enforce, and affirming the immediate executory nature of decisions in intra-corporate disputes. By emphasizing the interconnectedness of the judgment’s dispositions and the motion’s prayers, the Court clarified that seeking enforcement of necessary implications is permissible and does not constitute a prohibited variance. This ruling upholds the integrity of judicial decisions and ensures their effective implementation in resolving corporate conflicts.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether the trial court’s order granting the motion for execution improperly varied the terms of the original judgment in an intra-corporate dispute.
What is the significance of the dispositive portion?	The dispositive portion of a court decision is the specific part that orders the actions to be taken; any execution order must substantially conform to it.
What did the petitioners argue in this case?	The petitioners argued that the respondent’s motion for execution prayed for reliefs not included in the dispositive portion of the original judgment.
How did the Supreme Court rule on the alleged variance?	The Supreme Court found no variance, stating that the execution order explicitly directed compliance with the original judgment’s dispositions.
What does Section 4, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules state?	Section 4, Rule 1, provides that decisions and orders in intra-corporate controversies are immediately executory unless restrained by an appellate court.
What was the final decision of the Supreme Court?	The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, upholding the validity of the execution order.
What is the practical implication of this ruling?	Parties must ensure their motions for execution align precisely with the court’s specific directives in the original judgment to avoid legal challenges.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Lao v. King reinforces the vital principle of aligning execution orders with the dispositive portions of court judgments, particularly in intra-corporate disputes. This ensures that judicial decisions are implemented effectively and consistently, preventing any overreach in the enforcement process.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

August 31, 2006

Navigating Corporate Disputes: The Shifting Sands of Jurisdiction and Procedural Compliance

TL;DR

The Supreme Court’s decision in Hikoi Suzuki v. Diana De Guzman clarifies the importance of adhering to procedural rules in legal proceedings and highlights the shifting jurisdiction between the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Regional Trial Courts (RTC) concerning intra-corporate disputes. The Court emphasized that while procedural rules exist to ensure justice, a blatant disregard of these rules cannot be justified. Ultimately, the case was remanded to the RTC due to Republic Act No. 8799, which transferred jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes from the SEC to the RTC. This ruling serves as a reminder to legal practitioners to diligently observe procedural requirements while remaining abreast of legislative changes affecting jurisdictional mandates.

Auctioning Shares and Jurisdictional Shifts: Who Decides Corporate Fights?

The case revolves around a dispute within Suzuki Beach Hotel, Inc. (SBHI) following a public auction of shares owned by Diana de Guzman due to unpaid subscriptions. The central legal question is whether the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had jurisdiction over the case, especially considering subsequent legislative changes that transferred such jurisdiction to the Regional Trial Courts (RTC). This question unfolded amidst procedural challenges, including non-compliance with rules on material dates and certification of non-forum shopping.

The factual backdrop reveals that Diana de Guzman, along with Editha Taborda, were incorporators of SBHI. Following a resolution by Hikoi Suzuki, Ramon del Rosario, and Takayuki Sato, acting as the Board of Directors, de Guzman’s shares were auctioned off due to unpaid subscriptions. This action led de Guzman to file a petition with the SEC, questioning the validity of the auction. The petitioners then argued that the SEC lacked jurisdiction because de Guzman was no longer a stockholder. The SEC initially denied the motion to dismiss, asserting its jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A.

The Court of Appeals (CA) initially dismissed the petition filed by Suzuki, et al., due to procedural deficiencies. These included failing to properly indicate material dates, submitting uncertified documents, and a defective certification of non-forum shopping. The CA also held that the SEC correctly assumed jurisdiction because the case involved an intra-corporate dispute. However, the Supreme Court (SC) disagreed with the CA’s assessment of jurisdiction given the changes in law.

The Supreme Court addressed the procedural issues by emphasizing the mandatory nature of compliance with the Rules of Court. It noted that while some leniency may be granted in exceptional cases, there must be a reasonable attempt to comply with the rules. Regarding the substantial issue of jurisdiction, the Court acknowledged that at the time the CA rendered its decision, the SEC still had jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes under Section 5 of P.D. 902-A. However, Republic Act No. 8799 (RA 8799), which took effect during the pendency of the case, transferred this jurisdiction to the Regional Trial Courts.

Crucially, Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799 states:

“The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court…”

The Supreme Court underscored that jurisdiction is conferred by law and cannot be determined by the courts or parties themselves. The Court thus held that the CA should have considered the effect of R.A. No. 8799, which divested the SEC of jurisdiction over the intra-corporate dispute. Given this jurisdictional shift, the Supreme Court reversed the CA’s decision and remanded the case to the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 72, which had been designated to handle such cases.

This decision highlights the critical interplay between procedural compliance and substantive legal changes. Even though the petitioners initially failed to comply with procedural rules, the supervening change in jurisdiction necessitated a reassessment of the case’s proper venue. It also underscores the principle that parties cannot waive or stipulate on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, as it is conferred by law. Thus, while the Court emphasized that negligence of counsel binds the client, it also recognized that the ends of justice required a reassessment in light of a change in the law that affected the court’s jurisdiction.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was determining the correct jurisdiction (SEC or RTC) over an intra-corporate dispute, especially after the enactment of Republic Act No. 8799, which transferred jurisdiction to the RTC.
Why did the Court of Appeals initially dismiss the petition?	The CA dismissed the petition due to procedural deficiencies, including failure to indicate material dates, uncertified documents, and a defective certification of non-forum shopping.
What is the significance of Republic Act No. 8799 in this case?	R.A. No. 8799 transferred jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes from the SEC to the Regional Trial Courts, which ultimately led the Supreme Court to remand the case to the RTC.
What does ‘intra-corporate dispute’ mean?	An intra-corporate dispute refers to conflicts arising within a corporation, such as those between stockholders, members, or between these individuals and the corporation itself, concerning their rights and obligations.
What are the ‘material dates’ that must be indicated in a petition for certiorari?	Material dates include the date of receipt of the judgment, the date of filing a motion for reconsideration (if any), and the date of receipt of the denial of that motion.
Who should sign the certification of non-forum shopping?	The certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by the plaintiff or principal party, not just their counsel, to attest to the fact that they have not filed similar actions in other courts or tribunals.
What was the effect of the petitioners’ failure to comply with procedural rules?	Generally, failure to comply with procedural rules is a ground for dismissal; however, the Supreme Court still addressed the jurisdictional issue due to the significant change in the law caused by R.A. No. 8799.

This case serves as a crucial reminder that understanding jurisdictional shifts and adhering to procedural rules are paramount in legal practice. The Supreme Court’s decision underscores the importance of staying informed about legislative changes and their impact on court jurisdiction. This will prevent procedural missteps and ensure that cases are properly filed in the correct venue, facilitating a more efficient and just resolution of disputes.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Hikoi Suzuki, et al. v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 146979, July 27, 2006

July 27, 2006

Jurisdictional Shift: RTC Authority Over Intra-Corporate Disputes After R.A. 8799

TL;DR

The Supreme Court ruled that Republic Act No. 8799, also known as The Securities Regulation Code, transferred jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to the Regional Trial Courts (RTC). This decision meant that cases like this, which were not yet pending final resolution by the SEC, would now be heard by the RTC. The practical effect is a shift in venue and procedure for resolving business-related legal conflicts, impacting how companies navigate legal challenges. The Court set aside the appellate court’s decision and remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings.

The Automotive Alliance: When Corporate Law Gets a Tune-Up

The case of Transfarm & Co., Inc. v. Daewoo Corporation arose from a joint venture agreement gone sour, questioning which court had the power to decide the fate of this automotive alliance. Transfarm and Daewoo Corporation entered into an agreement to produce and distribute Daewoo cars in the Philippines, leading to the creation of Transdaewoo Automotive Manufacturing Company (TAMC). When disputes arose, the central question became whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) or the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had jurisdiction over the case. This jurisdictional battle took a turn when Republic Act No. 8799, The Securities Regulation Code, shifted the legal landscape, prompting the Supreme Court to weigh in on the matter.

Initially, Transfarm and TAMC filed a complaint against Daewoo and Daewoo Motor Co., Ltd. (DMCL) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City. Daewoo and DMCL sought to dismiss the case, arguing it was an intra-corporate dispute falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The RTC denied this motion, leading to a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals sided with Daewoo, declaring that the SEC had jurisdiction and ordering the dismissal of the complaint. The enactment of Republic Act No. 8799 during the appeal process significantly altered the jurisdictional framework.

Republic Act No. 8799, specifically Section 5.2, played a pivotal role in reshaping the jurisdictional landscape. The law explicitly states:

“5.2. The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided, That the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending cases involving intra-corporate disputes submitted for final resolution which should be resolved within one (1) year from the enactment of this Code. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending suspension of payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June 2000 until finally disposed.”

The Supreme Court emphasized that statutes regulating court jurisdiction and procedures are generally applicable to pending actions. Since the case was not pending final resolution by the SEC, the amendatory law rendered it cognizable by the RTC. This interpretation aligns with the principle that procedural laws have retroactive application unless they create new rights or take away vested ones. The Court anchored its decision on the principle that procedural laws apply retroactively unless they affect substantive rights.

The Court’s decision reflects a broader understanding of how legislative changes impact ongoing legal proceedings. Statutes concerning jurisdiction are generally construed to apply to actions pending at the time of their passage. This approach ensures that the legal process adapts to evolving legislative intent and policy considerations. The ruling underscores the importance of considering legislative changes when determining the proper forum for resolving disputes. This decision clarifies that cases not yet under final resolution by the SEC now fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC. This affects the procedural path and potential outcomes for similar corporate disputes.

The implications of this decision are significant for companies involved in intra-corporate disputes. The shift in jurisdiction from the SEC to the RTC affects the procedural rules, the expertise of the adjudicating body, and the potential for appeals. Litigants must now navigate the RTC system, which may have different procedures and timelines compared to the SEC. The Supreme Court’s decision effectively recalibrates the jurisdictional boundaries for intra-corporate disputes, aligning them with the legislative intent expressed in Republic Act No. 8799. This ensures that cases are heard in the appropriate forum, promoting efficient and effective resolution of business-related legal challenges.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was determining whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) or the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had jurisdiction over an intra-corporate dispute between Transfarm and Daewoo, particularly in light of Republic Act No. 8799.
What is Republic Act No. 8799?	Republic Act No. 8799, also known as The Securities Regulation Code, is a law that transferred jurisdiction over certain cases, including intra-corporate disputes, from the SEC to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court.
How did R.A. 8799 affect the jurisdiction of the SEC?	R.A. 8799 removed the SEC’s jurisdiction over most intra-corporate disputes, transferring it to the RTC, except for cases already submitted for final resolution within one year of the law’s enactment and pending suspension of payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June 2000 until finally disposed.
What did the Court decide in this case?	The Court ruled that because R.A. 8799 transferred jurisdiction to the RTC and the case was not yet under final resolution by the SEC, the RTC had jurisdiction over the dispute. The appellate court’s decision was set aside, and the case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.
What does “remanded” mean in this context?	“Remanded” means the case was sent back to the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City for further proceedings, implying that the RTC must now take up the case and continue with the legal process.
Are statutes regulating court jurisdiction applied retroactively?	Yes, statutes regulating court jurisdiction and procedures are generally construed to be applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of the passage of said enactments, unless they create new rights or take away vested rights.
What was the original basis for the dispute between Transfarm and Daewoo?	The dispute arose from a joint venture agreement between Transfarm and Daewoo for the delivery, assembly, production, and distribution of Daewoo cars in the Philippines, which eventually led to disagreements and legal action.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Transfarm & Co., Inc. v. Daewoo Corporation clarifies the jurisdictional shift brought about by Republic Act No. 8799. This ruling emphasizes the importance of adapting legal proceedings to legislative changes and ensures that intra-corporate disputes are resolved in the appropriate forum.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Transfarm & Co., Inc. vs. Daewoo Corporation, G.R. No. 140453, October 17, 2000

October 17, 2000