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by Atty. Gabriel Ablola 🇵🇭

Tag: RA 9700

  • Can DARAB Cancel a CLOA If There’s No Tenant?

    Dear Atty. Gab,

    Musta Atty! I hope you can shed some light on a very confusing situation I’m facing regarding a piece of land I inherited from my father in Batangas. It’s about 5 hectares, and for years, we’ve used it mainly for family gatherings and weekend relaxation, with some fruit trees but definitely not large-scale farming. Recently, I discovered that a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA), registered under OCT No. CLOA 0-1234, was issued a few years ago to a Mr. Andres Santiago over a significant portion of this property. I was never notified about any application process.

    Mr. Santiago has never been our tenant, nor has he ever worked the land under any agreement with my family. He just claims he’s a qualified beneficiary. Believing this was wrong, I filed a petition with the local DARAB office (Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator) to cancel his CLOA, arguing that the land isn’t primarily agricultural and he has no right to it. However, my case was dismissed recently. The decision mentioned something about DARAB not having jurisdiction because there’s no ‘agrarian dispute’ or landlord-tenant relationship between me and Mr. Santiago. I’m utterly confused. I thought DARAB was the body that handled CLOA cancellations. If they don’t have jurisdiction, then who does? Where do I go now to fight for my property? It feels unjust that someone can get a title to my land without due process and I can’t even challenge it in the supposed right venue. Any guidance would be greatly appreciated.

    Respectfully,
    Jose Garcia

    Dear Jose,

    Thank you for reaching out. I understand your frustration and confusion regarding the dismissal of your petition to cancel the CLOA issued to Mr. Santiago. It’s a common point of confusion, but the distinction between the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and the DAR Secretary is crucial in agrarian law matters.

    In essence, the DARAB’s power, while including CLOA cancellations, is primarily anchored on the existence of an agrarian dispute. This term specifically refers to controversies related to ‘tenurial arrangements’ – like tenancy or leasehold – over agricultural lands. If there’s no such relationship between the parties, the issue often falls outside DARAB’s scope. Matters concerning the administrative implementation of agrarian reform laws, including the issuance or cancellation of CLOAs where no tenancy relationship exists, generally fall under the authority of the DAR Secretary. Recent legislation has further solidified the Secretary’s exclusive jurisdiction over such cancellation cases.

    Navigating CLOA Cancellations: Understanding Jurisdictional Boundaries

    The core of your issue lies in understanding which government body has the authority, or jurisdiction, to hear your case for CLOA cancellation. While the DARAB Rules of Procedure in effect when your petition might have been initially assessed allowed it to handle certain CLOA cancellations, this power was not absolute. Its authority is fundamentally tied to the presence of an ‘agrarian dispute’.

    Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, defines an agrarian dispute as:

    “any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers’ associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under the said Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.” (Section 3(d), R.A. No. 6657)

    This definition highlights that the controversy must stem from a tenurial arrangement. This refers to the relationship established between a landowner and a tenant, lessee, or farmworker concerning the use and cultivation of agricultural land. Simply owning land where a CLOA was issued does not automatically create an agrarian dispute cognizable by DARAB.

    For a tenurial relationship to exist, several elements typically need to concur, including consent between the parties for the purpose of agricultural production, personal cultivation by the tenant/lessee, and sharing of harvests. Based on your description – that Mr. Santiago was never your tenant and never worked the land under any agreement – it appears a tenurial arrangement is absent. Without this crucial element, there is no ‘agrarian dispute’ as legally defined, and consequently, the DARAB correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction.

    The principle is that the DARAB’s jurisdiction over CLOA cancellation is limited. As clarified in jurisprudence:

    “[…] for the DARAB to have jurisdiction in such cases, they must relate to an agrarian dispute between landowner and tenants to whom CLOAs have been issued by the DAR Secretary. The cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of the CLOAs by the DAR in the administrative implementation of agrarian reform laws, rules and regulations to parties who are not agricultural tenants or lessees are within the jurisdiction of the DAR and not the DARAB.“

    Therefore, your situation, involving a challenge to a CLOA issued administratively by the DAR to someone with whom you have no tenancy relationship, falls under the administrative functions of the DAR itself, specifically the Office of the DAR Secretary. This aligns with the DARAB Rules which state that “matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of R.A. No. 6657… shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the DAR Secretary.”

    Furthermore, this distinction was made even clearer by Republic Act No. 9700, which amended the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Effective July 1, 2009, it explicitly vests exclusive and original jurisdiction over CLOA cancellation cases with the DAR Secretary:

    “All cases involving the cancellation of registered emancipation patents, certificates of land ownership award, and other titles issued under any agrarian reform program are within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Secretary of the DAR.” (Section 9, R.A. No. 9700, amending Section 24 of R.A. No. 6657)

    This legislative amendment removes any ambiguity. Regardless of when the CLOA was issued, the proper venue for initiating its cancellation, especially where no agrarian dispute exists, is the Office of the DAR Secretary. The dismissal by the DARAB, therefore, was likely a procedural step directing you to the correct forum, rather than a judgment on the merits of your claim regarding ownership or the land’s classification.

    Practical Advice for Your Situation

    • Validate the Jurisdictional Dismissal: Accept that the DARAB likely acted correctly in dismissing the case based on lack of jurisdiction due to the absence of an agrarian dispute (tenancy relationship).
    • Gather Evidence: Compile all documents proving your ownership (e.g., title, tax declarations inherited), evidence of the land’s actual use (photos, affidavits showing non-agricultural primary use), and any proof demonstrating the lack of notice during the CLOA application process.
    • File with the DAR Secretary: Prepare and file a formal Petition for Cancellation of the CLOA and its derivative title directly with the Office of the DAR Secretary. Frame your arguments around the lack of qualification of the beneficiary, the land potentially not being suitable for CARP (if applicable), and the denial of due process (lack of notice).
    • Consult DAR Procedures: Familiarize yourself or your counsel with DAR Administrative Order No. 06, Series of 2000 (Rules of Procedure for Agrarian Law Implementation Cases) or subsequent relevant issuances that govern proceedings before the DAR Secretary.
    • Argue Land Classification/Exemption: If applicable, formally raise the issue that the land is not primarily devoted to agriculture or may be exempt from CARP coverage (e.g., used for residential/recreational purposes) within your petition to the DAR Secretary, as this falls under the Secretary’s administrative functions.
    • Assert Lack of Tenancy: Clearly state and provide evidence that no tenancy or leasehold relationship ever existed between your family and Mr. Santiago.
    • Seek Legal Counsel: Engage a lawyer experienced in agrarian law and administrative proceedings before the DAR Secretary to guide you through the process, ensuring your petition is correctly filed and argued.

    I understand this process adds another layer to your struggle, but understanding the correct legal pathway is essential. Filing your petition with the DAR Secretary is the appropriate next step to challenge the CLOA issued over your property based on the grounds you’ve mentioned.

    Hope this helps!

    Sincerely,
    Atty. Gabriel Ablola

    For more specific legal assistance related to your situation, please contact me through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This correspondence is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please schedule a formal consultation.

  • Agrarian Dispute vs. Forcible Entry: Clarifying Jurisdiction in Land Possession Cases Under CARP

    TL;DR

    In a forcible entry case involving agricultural land awarded under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), the Supreme Court affirmed that jurisdiction lies with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), not the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC). The Court clarified that when a possession dispute is intrinsically linked to agrarian reform implementation, particularly concerning beneficiaries of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs), it falls under the DARAB’s exclusive jurisdiction. This ruling underscores that even in possessory actions, the agrarian nature of the dispute takes precedence, ensuring specialized agrarian bodies handle land disputes involving farmers and CARP beneficiaries, thus maintaining the integrity of agrarian reform laws.

    Whose Land, Whose Court? When Forcible Entry Meets Agrarian Justice

    The case of Dayrit v. Norquillas grapples with a fundamental question of jurisdiction: When a forcible entry action concerns land covered by agrarian reform, which court holds authority – the regular MCTC tasked with ejectment cases, or the specialized DARAB responsible for agrarian disputes? Angelina Dayrit, claiming prior possession based on her original land titles, filed a forcible entry complaint against Jose Norquillas and others, who entered the land by virtue of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) issued under CARP. Dayrit argued for the MCTC’s jurisdiction, emphasizing the summary nature of forcible entry cases focused on physical possession. Norquillas countered that the dispute was agrarian, falling under the DARAB’s domain due to their rights as CARP beneficiaries. This legal tug-of-war reached the Supreme Court, requiring a definitive stance on jurisdictional boundaries in agrarian-related land disputes.

    The Supreme Court, in its decision, firmly sided with the DARAB’s jurisdiction. The Court meticulously dissected the legal framework, contrasting the general jurisdiction of first-level courts over forcible entry cases under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 with the specialized jurisdiction of the DARAB as mandated by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), as amended by Republic Act No. 9700. Section 33 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act indeed grants MTCs exclusive original jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases. However, Section 50 of CARL, as amended, vests the DAR with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, including all matters involving CARP implementation. This includes controversies relating to the terms and conditions of land transfer to agrarian reform beneficiaries.

    The pivotal amendment introduced by RA 9700, Section 50-A, explicitly states that “[n]o court or prosecutor’s office shall take cognizance of cases pertaining to the implementation of the CARP” if an agrarian element is alleged and one party is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant. In such instances, an automatic referral to the DAR for jurisdictional determination is mandated. This amendment, the Court emphasized, reinforces the DARAB’s exclusive jurisdiction in agrarian disputes and is retroactively applicable to pending cases.

    The Court distinguished this case from David v. Cordova, where MCTC jurisdiction was upheld in a forcible entry case involving public agricultural land. In David, the dispute was deemed not agrarian, lacking the essential elements of a tenurial relationship or CARP implementation issue. Conversely, in Dayrit, the respondents’ entry was directly linked to the CLOAs issued under CARP, making the possession issue inseparable from agrarian reform implementation. The Court clarified that David does not establish a blanket rule for MCTC jurisdiction over all ejectment cases involving agricultural land. The crucial factor is whether the dispute is agrarian in nature.

    Furthermore, the Supreme Court addressed potential confusion arising from the summary nature of ejectment proceedings, as highlighted in David. While acknowledging the need for swift resolution in forcible entry cases to maintain public order, the Court asserted that this consideration cannot override the explicit statutory mandate granting DARAB jurisdiction over agrarian disputes. The Court emphasized that the underlying philosophy of ejectment suits—preventing breaches of peace—must be balanced with the legislative intent to entrust agrarian matters to specialized agrarian tribunals.

    In Dayrit, both requisites for automatic referral, as outlined in Chailese Development Company, Inc. v. Dizon, were met: (1) respondents consistently alleged the agrarian nature of the case, citing their CLOAs; and (2) respondents’ status as farmers and CARP beneficiaries was evident and undisputed. Therefore, the MCTC lacked jurisdiction, and the Court affirmed the CA’s dismissal of the forcible entry complaint. The ruling underscores that when possessory disputes arise directly from CARP implementation and involve agrarian reform beneficiaries, the DARAB is the proper forum, ensuring specialized expertise in resolving such conflicts.

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was determining the proper jurisdiction – MCTC or DARAB – over a forcible entry case involving agricultural land awarded to CARP beneficiaries.
    What did the Supreme Court rule? The Supreme Court ruled that the DARAB, not the MCTC, has jurisdiction because the case constitutes an agrarian dispute directly related to the implementation of CARP.
    Why did the DARAB have jurisdiction? Because the respondents’ possession stemmed from CLOAs issued under CARP, making the forcible entry case an agrarian dispute under RA 6657, as amended by RA 9700.
    What is the significance of RA 9700 in this case? RA 9700, particularly Section 50-A, reinforced the DARAB’s exclusive jurisdiction over agrarian disputes and mandated the automatic referral of cases with agrarian elements from regular courts to the DAR.
    How does this ruling affect landowners and farmers? It clarifies that disputes over possession of CARP-covered lands, especially involving CLOA holders, are primarily agrarian disputes to be resolved by the DARAB, not regular courts in ejectment proceedings.
    What is the ‘automatic referral’ mechanism? Section 50-A of RA 9700 requires judges to automatically refer cases to the DAR if there’s an allegation of agrarian nature and one party is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant, for the DAR to determine if an agrarian dispute exists.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Dayrit v. Norquillas, G.R. No. 201631, December 07, 2021

  • Just Compensation in Agrarian Reform: Valuing Land at the Time of Taking

    TL;DR

    In this case, the Supreme Court clarified that when determining just compensation for land acquired under agrarian reform, the valuation should be based on the land’s fair market value at the time of ‘taking’ – when the landowner was deprived of its use, typically when emancipation patents are issued to farmer beneficiaries. The Court emphasized that while guidelines from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) are considered, courts are not strictly bound by them and must ensure just compensation is judicially determined, reflecting fairness to both landowners and farmer beneficiaries. The case was remanded to the trial court to re-evaluate the land’s value based on the correct legal principles and time of taking.

    Retroactive Revaluation: When Old Land Reform Claims Meet New Rules

    The case of Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Apolonio Kho revolves around a parcel of land in Negros Oriental, placed under the Operation Land Transfer Program decades ago, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27. Apolonio Kho, the landowner, rejected the initial valuations offered by Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). The legal saga continued through administrative proceedings and eventually reached the Regional Trial Court (RTC) acting as a Special Agrarian Court. A crucial twist emerged with the enactment of Republic Act No. 9700 in 2009, amending the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), and the subsequent issuance of new valuation guidelines by the DAR. The central legal question became: should the revaluation of Apolonio Kho’s land be governed by these new rules, or by the regulations in place at the time the land acquisition process began?

    The RTC and the Court of Appeals (CA) had affirmed a valuation based on the Commissioners’ report, which utilized guidelines from DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 2010, issued under RA 9700. However, the Supreme Court pointed out a critical detail: DAR AO 2, series of 2009, the implementing rules of RA 9700, stipulated a cut-off – the new law and its rules would not apply to cases where claim folders were received by LBP before July 1, 2009. In Apolonio Kho’s case, the claim folders were submitted to LBP in 1993 and 1997, predating this cut-off. Therefore, the Supreme Court reasoned, the lower courts erred in applying DAR AO 1, series of 2010.

    The Court reiterated the principle that just compensation must be determined at the time of taking. In agrarian reform cases, taking occurs when the landowner is deprived of the use and benefit of the property, often marked by the issuance of emancipation patents to farmer beneficiaries. In this instance, the taking happened on May 27, 2002. Consequently, the valuation should reflect the fair market value of the land at that time, considering factors outlined in Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended prior to the amendments introduced by RA 9700. These factors include:

    (a) the acquisition cost of the land,
    (b) the current value of like properties,
    (c) the nature and actual use of the property, and the income therefrom,
    (d) the owner’s sworn valuation,
    (e) the tax declarations,
    (f) the assessment made by government assessors,
    (g) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the property, and
    (h) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, if any.

    While acknowledging the DAR’s role in setting valuation guidelines, the Supreme Court emphasized the judiciary’s ultimate authority in determining just compensation. The Court clarified that Special Agrarian Courts are not slaves to the DAR formulas. They must exercise judicial discretion, ensuring fairness and equity. As the Court stated,

    [T]he RTC, acting as a SAC, is reminded that it is not strictly bound by the different formula created by the DAR if the situations before it do not warrant their application. To insist on a rigid application of the formula goes beyond the intent and spirit of the law, bearing in mind that the valuation of property or the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the courts, and not with administrative agencies.

    However, any deviation from the DAR guidelines must be clearly justified by the RTC. In this case, because the lower courts did not properly apply the cut-off rule and potentially used an incorrect valuation date and guidelines, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the RTC. The RTC was instructed to re-evaluate the just compensation based on evidence of land values at the time of taking in 2002, using the factors in Section 17 of RA 6657 (pre-RA 9700 amendment) as primary considerations, while retaining the discretion to deviate from DAR formulas if warranted, with proper justification. Regarding legal interest, the Court adjusted the rate to 12% per annum from the taking in 2002 until June 30, 2013, and 6% per annum thereafter until full payment, aligning with prevailing jurisprudence and BSP-MB Circular No. 799.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was determining the correct legal framework and valuation date for just compensation in an agrarian reform case, particularly whether new amendments to agrarian reform laws should apply retroactively to cases initiated before the amendments took effect.
    What is ‘just compensation’ in agrarian reform? Just compensation refers to the fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained by the landowner due to the taking of property for agrarian reform. It should be determined at the time of taking and consider various factors to ensure fairness.
    What does ‘time of taking’ mean in this context? ‘Time of taking’ is the point when the landowner is effectively deprived of the use and benefit of their land, often when emancipation patents are issued to farmer beneficiaries, transferring ownership. In this case, it was May 27, 2002.
    Are courts bound by DAR’s land valuation formulas? No, while courts consider DAR’s guidelines, they are not strictly bound by them. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function, and courts must exercise their discretion to ensure fairness, justifying any deviations from DAR formulas.
    What is the significance of RA 9700 and DAR AO 1, series of 2010? RA 9700 amended the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, and DAR AO 1 (2010) provided new valuation rules under this amendment. However, DAR AO 2 (2009) set a cut-off, stating these new rules wouldn’t apply to claims received by LBP before July 1, 2009.
    What was the Supreme Court’s ruling? The Supreme Court ruled that the lower courts erred in applying the new valuation rules retroactively. It remanded the case, directing the RTC to re-evaluate just compensation based on the land’s value at the time of taking (2002) and using the legal framework prior to RA 9700 amendments.
    What is the current legal interest rate for unpaid just compensation? As per this ruling and prevailing jurisprudence, legal interest is 12% per annum from the time of taking until June 30, 2013, and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013, until fully paid.

    This case underscores the critical importance of adhering to the correct legal framework and valuation principles in agrarian reform cases. It clarifies that just compensation must be determined at the time of taking, and while DAR guidelines are relevant, courts retain the final say in ensuring equitable compensation. The ruling provides crucial guidance for landowners and farmer beneficiaries alike, emphasizing the need for a fair and judicially determined valuation process.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Apolonio Kho, G.R No. 214901, June 15, 2016