Tag: Quasi-Judicial Functions

  • Can I Sue the DENR Directly for Granting a Mining Permit to My Competitor?

    Dear Atty. Gab,

    Musta Atty! My name is Ricardo Cruz, and I operate a small-scale mining cooperative in Agusan del Sur. For years, we have responsibly worked on a small parcel of land, providing a livelihood for dozens of families in our community. Last year, a huge corporation from Manila, MegaMines Inc., suddenly applied for a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) that covers the exact area we are operating in, plus a much larger surrounding territory.

    We believe their application is fraudulent and that they don’t meet the legal qualifications. We immediately filed a formal protest with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau Panel of Arbitrators (MGB-POA), presenting evidence of discrepancies in their documents and their lack of a proper community development plan. We thought the process would stop their application until our protest was heard.

    To our shock and dismay, we just found out that last month, the DENR Secretary went ahead and approved MegaMines’ MPSA, granting them the rights to our area. It feels like our protest was completely ignored. We are devastated and angry. We believe the DENR Secretary committed a grave error by approving the MPSA while our valid protest was still pending. My partners and I want to go straight to the Court of Appeals and file a case to have this MPSA declared null and void. Is this the correct and most effective legal step to take to protect our livelihood? We feel like the system is railroading us, and we need to act fast.

    Hoping for your guidance.

    Sincerely,
    Ricardo Cruz

    Dear Ricardo,

    Thank you for reaching out. I understand your frustration and the sense of urgency you feel in protecting your cooperative’s livelihood. The situation you described, where a government agency seems to have disregarded your pending protest, is indeed distressing.

    Before you proceed to the Court of Appeals, it is crucial to understand the specific legal pathways for challenging the actions of an administrative body like the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The power of the DENR Secretary to grant a mining agreement is considered an administrative function, not a judicial one. This distinction is critical because it dictates the proper procedure for appeal. Filing a case in court prematurely, without first going through the required administrative steps, will likely result in the dismissal of your case, not on its merits, but on procedural grounds. Let’s delve into the principles that govern this process.

    Navigating the Administrative Maze: Challenging a DENR Mining Agreement

    The core of your issue lies in understanding the nature of the DENR Secretary’s power and the legal doctrines that govern challenges against it. When the DENR Secretary evaluates and approves a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA), this action is classified as an administrative function. It is an exercise of the department’s mandate to manage and supervise the country’s natural resources on behalf of the state. This is different from a quasi-judicial function, which involves settling disputes between opposing parties and determining their rights and liabilities.

    Jurisprudence clarifies this distinction well. A government agency exercises a quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function when it makes decisions that determine the rights of adversarial parties, similar to what a court does. As the Supreme Court has noted:

    A government agency performs adjudicatory functions when it renders decisions or awards that determine the rights of adversarial parties, which decisions or awards have the same effect as a judgment of the court.

    In your case, the DENR’s approval of MegaMines Inc.’s MPSA was not a resolution of your dispute with them. Rather, it was a determination that, in the DENR’s view, MegaMines met the requirements for the agreement. Because this is an administrative act, the law requires you to follow a specific path of remedies before you can seek help from the courts. This brings us to two vital legal principles: the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

    The doctrine of primary jurisdiction dictates that when a matter requires the special knowledge, experience, and technical expertise of an administrative agency, the courts will defer to that agency to resolve the issue first. The DENR and its specialized bureaus, like the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), are the primary government bodies with the expertise in mining laws and regulations. Therefore, any issue concerning the validity or cancellation of an MPSA must first be brought before them.

    The doctrine of primary jurisdiction instructs that if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the courts is had.

    Building on this, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies commands that you must use all available appeal processes within the administrative agency’s structure before you can elevate the matter to a court. A premature resort to the courts is a fatal flaw that can lead to the outright dismissal of your case for lacking a cause of action. The logic is to provide the agency a chance to correct its own errors and to prevent the courts from being overburdened with issues that an administrative body is better equipped to handle.

    The doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first made with the administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the controversy may be elevated to a court of justice for review. A premature invocation of a court’s intervention renders the complaint without cause of action and dismissible.

    In practical terms, this means that your first step is not the Court of Appeals. Since the DENR Secretary approved the MPSA, the power to review and potentially cancel it also lies with the DENR Secretary. If your request is denied, the decision of a Cabinet Secretary is appealable to the Office of the President. You must exhaust this entire administrative ladder before a court will entertain your petition.

    Practical Advice for Your Situation

    • Do not file a petition directly with the Court of Appeals. This would be a premature action and is likely to be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
    • File a formal Petition for Cancellation. Your immediate legal remedy is to file a verified petition directly with the Office of the DENR Secretary, asking for the cancellation of MegaMines Inc.’s MPSA. Attach all the evidence you have regarding the alleged fraud and non-qualification.
    • Continue your protest with the MGB-POA. The issues you raised in your protest before the MGB Panel of Arbitrators, such as conflicting mining rights and qualifications, are within their jurisdiction to hear. Do not abandon this proceeding.
    • Prepare for an appeal to the Office of the President. If the DENR Secretary denies your petition for cancellation, your next step is to file an appeal with the Office of the President pursuant to Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987.
    • Consolidate all your evidence. Use this time to gather and organize all documents, affidavits, and other proof to support your claims that MegaMines’ application was fraudulent and that they are unqualified. This evidence will be crucial for all administrative proceedings.
    • Seek a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) if applicable. Depending on the facts, you might explore petitioning the proper body for environmental reliefs if MegaMines’ impending operations pose a threat of grave and irreparable injury to the environment.
    • Document everything. Keep meticulous records of all filings, communications, and official receipts from the DENR and other relevant agencies. A clear paper trail is invaluable.

    While the path through administrative agencies can feel slow and frustrating, it is the required legal process. Following these steps ensures that should you eventually need to go to court, your case will be ripe for judicial review and will be decided on its merits, not dismissed on a technicality.

    Hope this helps!

    Sincerely,
    Atty. Gabriel Ablola

    For more specific legal assistance related to your situation, please contact me through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This correspondence is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please schedule a formal consultation.

  • Judicial Ethics and Impeachment: Defining the Scope of Disciplinary Actions Against Constitutional Officers

    TL;DR

    The Supreme Court ruled that impeachable officers who are also members of the Bar cannot be disbarred without first undergoing impeachment proceedings. This decision emphasizes the constitutional protection afforded to certain high-ranking officials, ensuring they are not subjected to disciplinary actions that bypass the impeachment process. The ruling clarifies the relationship between administrative disciplinary measures and the constitutional process of impeachment, highlighting that the latter takes precedence for specific officials. This safeguards the independence of constitutional officers while delineating the appropriate mechanisms for addressing misconduct allegations.

    When Can Lawyers in Power Be Disbarred?

    This case revolves around a disbarment complaint filed against Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra and Romeo A. Brawner of the Commission on Elections (Comelec). The complainant, Atty. Rodante D. Marcoleta, alleged that the commissioners exhibited partiality and misconduct in resolving a party-list dispute. The central question is whether members of constitutional bodies, who are also lawyers, can be subjected to disbarment proceedings without first being impeached.

    The dispute stemmed from the 2007 National and Local Elections, where competing factions within the Alagad party-list group each submitted lists of nominees. The Comelec’s First Division initially favored Diogenes S. Osabel’s faction, a decision penned by Commissioner Borra and concurred by Commissioner Brawner. This decision was later reversed by the Comelec En Banc, reinstating Marcoleta’s group, only to be ultimately affirmed by the First Division after failing to obtain the necessary majority vote in the En Banc. Marcoleta then filed a disbarment complaint, alleging manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross inexcusable negligence on the part of Borra and Brawner.

    The complainant argued that the respondents deliberately delayed the resolution of the case to ensure Alagad won a seat in the House of Representatives, thereby subverting the will of the voters who supported Marcoleta. Furthermore, the complaint highlighted alleged inconsistencies in the Comelec’s resolutions, claiming that the respondents misrepresented facts and disregarded relevant legal principles. Marcoleta also filed a supplemental complaint against Brawner, accusing him of tampering with the record of proceedings. The respondents countered that disbarment was not the appropriate remedy and that, as impeachable officers, they were insulated from such complaints.

    In addressing the issue, the Supreme Court referenced previous pronouncements in Jarque v. Ombudsman, In Re: Raul M. Gonzales, and Cuenco v. Fernan, establishing the principle that an impeachable officer who is a member of the Bar cannot be disbarred without first being impeached. The Court clarified that the constitutional requirement for a majority of Comelec members to be lawyers does not preclude the appointment of a full complement of lawyers. Since both respondents were lawyers at the time the complaint was filed, they were considered impeachable officers subject to the constitutional impeachment process.

    The Court acknowledged that while Commissioner Brawner’s death rendered the case against him moot, the complaint against Commissioner Borra required further examination. However, the Court noted that the disbarment complaint was primarily based on the issuance of the Omnibus Resolution penned by Borra while he was a member of the Comelec’s First Division. The Court dismissed the argument that the delay in resolving the controversy invalidated the resolution, emphasizing that prescribed periods are generally directory, especially considering the Comelec’s heavy caseload and logistical challenges. Moreover, the Court found that the grounds cited for disbarment were essentially allegations of errors in judgment or grave abuse of discretion, which are more appropriately addressed through judicial appeal rather than administrative disciplinary action.

    The Court also addressed the complainant’s invocation of Section 58 of Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code, which states that Comelec members shall be subject to the canons of judicial ethics. The Court clarified that this provision applies to the Comelec’s quasi-judicial functions, which, while judicial in nature, do not involve the exercise of functions of a judge. The Court emphasized that the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary applies specifically to courts of law and does not extend to quasi-judicial officers like Comelec members, who are governed by their own codes of conduct. Even under the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court found no specific incidents or sufficient evidence to establish that Borra engaged in dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct as a lawyer. The acts complained of pertained to his duties as a Comelec commissioner.

    The Court also found nothing irregular in the release of retirement benefits to Borra, as it was in line with the Office of the Ombudsman’s Memorandum Circular No. 10, series of 1995, which leaves the determination of whether to release retirement benefits to the discretion of the head of the concerned agency. Finally, the Court noted the complainant’s selective targeting of Borra and Brawner, despite other commissioners also being signatories to the questioned resolutions. Building on this principle, the Court emphasized that the disbarment complaint lacked merit and was therefore dismissed.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? Whether a member of the Commission on Elections (Comelec), who is also a lawyer, can be disbarred without first being impeached.
    What was the basis of the disbarment complaint? The complainant alleged that the Comelec Commissioners exhibited partiality and misconduct in resolving a party-list dispute.
    What did the Supreme Court rule regarding impeachable officers? The Supreme Court ruled that an impeachable officer who is also a member of the Bar cannot be disbarred without first being impeached.
    Why was the complaint against Commissioner Brawner dismissed? The complaint against Commissioner Brawner was dismissed because he passed away, rendering the case moot.
    What are quasi-judicial functions? Quasi-judicial functions are those that are judicial in nature but do not involve the exercise of the functions of a judge. The Comelec’s functions fall into this category.
    What is the relevance of the Omnibus Election Code in this case? Section 58 of Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code states that Comelec members shall be subject to the canons of judicial ethics, which is relevant to their quasi-judicial functions.
    What was the basis for dismissing the complaint against Commissioner Borra? The complaint was dismissed because the alleged errors were considered errors of judgment, which should be addressed through judicial appeal, and because there was no evidence of dishonest or deceitful conduct as a lawyer.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision reinforces the constitutional safeguards afforded to impeachable officers, ensuring that the impeachment process takes precedence over administrative disciplinary measures like disbarment. This ruling protects the independence of constitutional bodies while providing clarity on the appropriate mechanisms for addressing allegations of misconduct.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Rodante D. Marcoleta v. Resurreccion Z. Borra and Romeo A. Brawner, A.C. No. 7732, March 30, 2009

  • Demolition Notices and Due Process: Ensuring Fairness in Property Disputes

    TL;DR

    The Supreme Court held that a city mayor, when issuing demolition notices, exercises quasi-judicial functions, requiring due process. This means that before a local government can demolish a structure deemed illegal, the affected party must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. The ruling emphasizes that even in cases of illegal construction, individuals have the right to present their side and be afforded fair treatment under the law. This decision protects property owners from arbitrary actions by local authorities and reinforces the importance of procedural fairness in administrative proceedings.

    Home is Where the Hearing Is: When Can the City Demolish Your House?

    The case of City Engineer of Baguio v. Baniqued revolves around Rolando Baniqued’s fight to prevent the demolition of his house in Baguio City. The city government, acting on a complaint, issued a demolition notice stating that Baniqued’s structure was built without a permit, violating building codes and anti-squatting laws. Baniqued argued that the demolition was being carried out without due process, as he was not given a chance to respond to the complaint or participate in any investigation. This case tests the extent to which local governments can order demolitions without judicial intervention and highlights the importance of procedural safeguards in protecting property rights.

    Baniqued filed a complaint for prohibition with a request for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City. He contended that the demolition was being pursued without due process and in an arbitrary manner. Baniqued claimed he was never given a copy of the complaint against him, nor was he summoned to answer it or allowed to participate in the investigation conducted by the City Engineer’s Office. He argued that a court order was necessary before his house could be demolished, citing Article 536 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, he invoked Section 28 of Republic Act 7279, which requires adequate relocation before demolition, and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1096, which allows demolition only for dangerous or ruinous structures, with criminal prosecution as the alternative remedy.

    The RTC initially dismissed Baniqued’s complaint, stating that the city officials were acting in an executive capacity, not a judicial or quasi-judicial one. The Court of Appeals (CA), however, reversed the RTC’s decision, asserting that the mayor exercises quasi-judicial functions when hearing controversies involving property rights. The CA emphasized that Baniqued’s complaint stated a valid cause of action, warranting a determination of whether court action was necessary before his eviction from the property. This difference in opinion highlighted a core legal question: When can local governments demolish structures without prior judicial action?

    The Supreme Court (SC) affirmed the CA’s decision, holding that Baniqued correctly availed of the remedy of prohibition. The SC clarified that prohibition is a legal remedy to prevent lower courts, tribunals, officers, or persons from exceeding their jurisdiction. While the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies generally requires parties to exhaust all administrative options before seeking judicial intervention, the SC recognized exceptions to this rule, including cases where there is an urgent need for judicial intervention or where irreparable damage will be suffered. In Baniqued’s case, the SC found that the threat of imminent demolition justified immediate judicial intervention, making the distinction between a notice of demolition and an order of demolition immaterial, as Baniqued reasonably felt threatened by the impending action.

    The Court also addressed the argument that Baniqued’s complaint failed to specifically allege that the city officials acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. The SC clarified that while such allegations are relevant, their absence does not automatically warrant dismissal, especially when the allegations in the complaint, when taken as a whole, indicate that the act complained of was indeed done without or in excess of jurisdiction. Furthermore, the SC emphasized that the city mayor, in issuing demolition notices, exercises quasi-judicial functions, as these actions involve determining property rights and requiring notices and opportunities for hearings, in line with the constitutional guarantee of due process.

    The Supreme Court’s decision underscores the principle that even in cases of illegal construction, individuals are entitled to due process. Local governments must ensure that affected parties are given adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard before any demolition is carried out. This ruling aims to strike a balance between the state’s power to enforce building codes and anti-squatting laws and the individual’s right to protect their property. The case serves as a reminder that procedural fairness is essential in administrative proceedings and that the courts will intervene to protect individuals from arbitrary or oppressive government actions. It protects not just homes, but also fundamental rights.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the City Engineer of Baguio and the City Mayor acted with due process when issuing a demolition notice to Rolando Baniqued, whose house was allegedly built without a permit.
    What is a writ of prohibition? A writ of prohibition is a legal remedy used by a superior court to prevent an inferior court, tribunal, officer, or person from acting beyond their legal jurisdiction.
    What does ‘exhaustion of administrative remedies’ mean? The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires a party to pursue all available administrative channels before seeking judicial intervention, but there are exceptions.
    Under what circumstances can a party bypass administrative remedies? A party can bypass administrative remedies when the issue is purely legal, the administrative body is in estoppel, the act is patently illegal, there is urgent need for judicial intervention, or irreparable damage will be suffered.
    What are quasi-judicial functions? Quasi-judicial functions involve actions by public administrative officers or bodies that require investigating facts, holding hearings, and drawing conclusions to form a basis for official action.
    Did the Supreme Court rule on the legality of Baniqued’s house? No, the Supreme Court did not rule on the legality of Baniqued’s house. It remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether Baniqued was entitled to a writ of prohibition.
    What is the main takeaway from this case? The main takeaway is that local governments must respect due process when issuing demolition notices, ensuring that affected individuals have notice and an opportunity to be heard.

    In conclusion, the City Engineer of Baguio v. Baniqued case reinforces the importance of due process in administrative proceedings, particularly those affecting property rights. It serves as a check on the power of local governments to ensure fairness and protect individuals from arbitrary actions. The ruling underscores that procedural safeguards must be followed even in cases of alleged illegal construction.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: City Engineer of Baguio v. Baniqued, G.R. No. 150270, November 26, 2008

  • NTC Collegiality: Majority Rule Prevails in Telecommunications Regulation

    TL;DR

    The Supreme Court affirmed that the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) is a collegial body, requiring decisions to be made by a majority vote of its three members. This ruling prevents a single commissioner from unilaterally dictating NTC policy and ensures that all members participate in quasi-judicial functions. This means that orders issued solely by the commissioner, without the concurrence of at least one other commissioner, are invalid. The decision upholds the principle of collective decision-making within the NTC, safeguarding against potential abuse of power and promoting a more balanced approach to telecommunications regulation. This ruling supports fairness and transparency in the telecommunications industry by ensuring that significant decisions are made with the consensus of the commission.

    One Voice or Many?: Ensuring Fair Play in Telecommunications Regulation

    The core of this case revolves around a fundamental question: Is the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) a body where decisions require the consensus of its members, or can a single commissioner act unilaterally? This issue arose when Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc. (BellTel) sought a provisional authority to operate telecommunications services. While two of the three NTC commissioners supported BellTel’s application, Commissioner Kintanar alone opposed it, effectively stalling the approval process. This impasse triggered a legal battle, ultimately reaching the Supreme Court, to determine whether the NTC operates as a collegial body or under a single commissioner’s authority.

    The petitioners, including Commissioner Kintanar, argued that Executive Order No. 546, which created the NTC, did not explicitly define it as a collegial body. They claimed that the commissioner had the sole authority to sign and validate NTC orders, resolutions, and decisions. This position was supported by past practices where only the commissioner’s vote was considered decisive. However, the Supreme Court rejected this argument, emphasizing the importance of collective decision-making in quasi-judicial bodies like the NTC. The Court noted that the NTC’s structure, comprising a commissioner and two deputy commissioners, inherently suggests a commission intended to function as a collective.

    The Supreme Court underscored that the NTC’s historical evolution and existing rules of procedure support its designation as a collegial body. The Court highlighted that the Board of Communications (BOC), the NTC’s predecessor, operated under rules requiring the concurrence of at least two members for valid decisions. Moreover, the Court referred to the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company versus National Telecommunications case, where it applied Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure and Practice of BOC which explicitly supports the idea of collegiality. These established procedures, the Court reasoned, continued to govern the NTC’s operations even after its establishment under Executive Order No. 546. This historical continuity reinforced the Court’s conclusion that the NTC was designed to function as a body where decisions require a majority vote.

    The Court also addressed the issue of memorandum circulars that seemingly contradicted the collegial nature of the NTC. Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93, issued by a former commissioner, were found to be in conflict with the underlying principles of Executive Order No. 546. These circulars, which effectively centralized decision-making power in the hands of a single commissioner, were deemed invalid ab initio for being contrary to law. The Supreme Court emphasized that administrative regulations derive their validity from the statutes they are meant to implement, and any regulation that contravenes the law is void. The Court clarified that nullifying these circulars was not a collateral attack but a necessary step to ensure the NTC’s compliance with the law.

    The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals’ decision, asserting the NTC’s collegial nature. It affirmed that a majority vote is required for the NTC to validly decide any case or incident within its jurisdiction. This ruling promotes transparency and ensures that decisions are made with the input of multiple commissioners, preventing potential abuses of power. The Court also addressed concerns about the alleged illegal procurement of a draft order, stating that this issue, while serious, did not detract from the central legal question of the NTC’s collegiality. The Court found that the absence of proof of any illegality in the preparation or procurement of said working draft, the claim of petitioners carries no weight and ultimately, the primary issue is the need for the NTC to operate as a collegial body.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) is a collegial body requiring a majority vote for decisions, or whether the Commissioner alone can make decisions.
    What does it mean for the NTC to be a collegial body? Being a collegial body means that decisions of the NTC must be made by a majority vote of its members, ensuring that no single member can unilaterally dictate the commission’s actions.
    What was the role of Commissioner Kintanar in this case? Commissioner Kintanar asserted that he had the sole authority to sign and validate NTC orders, which was challenged as contrary to the principles of a collegial body.
    What were Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93? These were circulars issued by a former commissioner that were deemed invalid because they contradicted the collegial nature of the NTC by centralizing decision-making power in a single individual.
    What was the main argument against the NTC being a collegial body? The main argument was that Executive Order No. 546, which created the NTC, did not explicitly state that it was a collegial body, implying that the Commissioner could act alone.
    How did the Supreme Court use the history of the NTC in its decision? The Supreme Court looked at the NTC’s predecessor, the Board of Communications, which operated under rules requiring the concurrence of at least two members for valid decisions, and concluded that this practice should continue.
    What practical effect does this ruling have on telecommunications regulation? This ruling ensures that decisions are made with the input of multiple commissioners, promoting transparency and preventing potential abuses of power in the regulation of the telecommunications industry.

    This Supreme Court decision reinforces the importance of collective decision-making within the NTC, ensuring a more balanced and transparent regulatory environment for the telecommunications industry. By affirming the NTC’s collegial nature, the ruling safeguards against potential abuse of power and promotes fairness in the commission’s quasi-judicial functions.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: GMCR, INC. vs. BELL TELECOMMUNICATION PHILIPPINES, INC., G.R. NO. 126496, APRIL 30, 1997