Tag: Partnership Law

  • Bad Faith in Trademark Registration: Prior Use by Partnership Prevails Over Partner’s Individual Claim

    TL;DR

    The Supreme Court affirmed that a partner cannot register a trademark for a partnership’s business in their own name if the mark is already in use by the partnership. Even though Manuel Zulueta filed his trademark application first, his application was rejected because he acted in bad faith by attempting to register the ‘CYMA & Logo’ mark, which was already being used by the Cyma Greek Taverna partnership he was part of. The Court emphasized that prior use of a trademark by another entity, especially a partnership, can invalidate a later application by an individual partner acting in bad faith, even under the ‘first-to-file’ rule. This decision clarifies that trademark registration should reflect actual ownership and use, preventing individuals from unjustly claiming partnership assets as their own.

    Trademark Tussle: When Partnership and Personal Claims Collide Over ‘CYMA’

    This case, Manuel T. Zulueta v. Cyma Greek Taverna Co., revolves around a trademark dispute between a partner, Manuel Zulueta, and the partnership he co-founded, Cyma Greek Taverna Company. Zulueta sought to register the trademark “CYMA & LOGO” in his name, claiming it was his creation. However, the partnership opposed, arguing that the mark belonged to the business and was already in use since 2005. The Intellectual Property Office (IPOPHL) and the Court of Appeals sided with the partnership, denying Zulueta’s application. The central legal question is whether Zulueta, as a partner, could validly register the trademark in his individual capacity, despite the partnership’s prior and continuous use of the mark. This case highlights the interplay between partnership law and intellectual property rights, particularly concerning trademark ownership and the concept of bad faith in trademark registration.

    The Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines (IPC) operates on a “first-to-file” rule, generally granting trademark rights to the first applicant. However, this rule is not absolute. The Supreme Court clarified that the first-to-file rule does not automatically grant registration if the application is tainted with bad faith. Bad faith in trademark registration arises when an applicant is aware of prior creation, use, or registration of an identical or similar mark by another party and still proceeds with the application. In this case, Zulueta, as a partner, was undeniably aware that the “CYMA” mark was already in use by the Cyma Greek Taverna partnership. The Court emphasized this point, stating:

    Applying the foregoing in the instant case, the Court notes that although it was not categorically stated, the IPOPHL’s factual findings show that Zulueta’s trademark application was made in bad faith. As a partner, Zulueta, was without a doubt aware of the prior use of the trademark by the partnership…

    The IPOPHL-BLA, IPOPHL-ODG, and the Court of Appeals consistently ruled against Zulueta, emphasizing that Cyma Partnership had established prior and continuous use of the trademark. Even though Zulueta filed his application earlier, the partnership had been using the mark since 2005 for its restaurant business. This prior use, coupled with Zulueta’s knowledge as a partner, constituted bad faith, making his application unregistrable. The Court underscored that trademark law aims to protect not only the business’s goodwill but also consumers from confusion. Allowing Zulueta to register the mark individually would not only disregard the partnership’s established rights but could also mislead the public regarding the origin of the restaurant services.

    Furthermore, the Court highlighted the separate juridical personality of partnerships. A partnership is a distinct legal entity from its partners. Therefore, even if Zulueta had certain rights within the partnership, these rights did not automatically translate to individual ownership of the partnership’s trademark. The Court stated that “partnerships have a separate juridical personality from its partners; thus, whether Zulueta has rights to Cyma Partnership does not affect his rights to the Cyma trademark.” This principle reinforces that partnership assets, including trademarks, belong to the partnership itself, not to individual partners unless explicitly agreed upon otherwise.

    The decision also touches upon the evidentiary value of a trademark registration certificate. Section 138 of the IPC states that a certificate of registration is prima facie evidence of ownership and the exclusive right to use the mark. Cyma Partnership had obtained a valid Certificate of Registration for “CYMA GREEK TAVERNA AND LOGO.” This registration, while subsequent to Zulueta’s application, was deemed valid because Zulueta’s prior application was rejected due to bad faith. The Court effectively prioritized the partnership’s actual use and ownership over Zulueta’s bad-faith first filing. This ruling underscores that the first-to-file rule is not a shield for applicants acting in bad faith, especially when seeking to appropriate trademarks already in use by entities they are associated with, such as partnerships.

    In essence, Zulueta v. Cyma Greek Taverna Co. serves as a crucial reminder that trademark registration in the Philippines, while generally governed by the first-to-file rule, is subject to principles of good faith and actual use. An applicant cannot claim priority solely based on an earlier filing date if their application is tainted by bad faith, particularly when they are aware of prior use by another entity, such as a partnership they are a part of. The case reinforces the importance of ethical conduct in trademark applications and protects the rights of entities that have legitimately established and used their trademarks in commerce.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether Manuel Zulueta, a partner, could register the trademark “CYMA & LOGO” in his name when the mark was already being used by the Cyma Greek Taverna partnership.
    What is the ‘first-to-file’ rule in trademark law? The ‘first-to-file’ rule generally grants trademark rights to the first person or entity to file a trademark application. However, this rule is not absolute and can be superseded by other considerations like bad faith.
    What is ‘bad faith’ in trademark registration? Bad faith in trademark registration occurs when an applicant is aware of prior use or registration of a similar mark by someone else but still applies for registration, attempting to misappropriate the mark.
    Why was Zulueta’s trademark application rejected? Zulueta’s application was rejected because the IPOPHL and the courts found that he acted in bad faith. As a partner, he was aware of Cyma Partnership’s prior use of the “CYMA” mark.
    Did Cyma Partnership’s later trademark application succeed? Yes, Cyma Partnership’s later application for “CYMA GREEK TAVERNA AND LOGO” was successful because they were the legitimate users of the mark, and Zulueta’s prior application was invalidated due to bad faith.
    What is the practical implication of this ruling? This ruling emphasizes that actual use and good faith are crucial in trademark registration, even under the first-to-file system. It prevents individuals from unjustly claiming trademarks belonging to entities like partnerships.
    Does this case mean prior use always trumps the first-to-file rule? Not always, but prior use is a significant factor in determining bad faith. If an applicant files in bad faith knowing of prior use by another, their application can be denied despite being filed first.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: MANUEL T. ZULUETA, PETITIONER, VS. CYMA GREEK TAVERNA CO., RESPONDENT., G.R. No. 205699, January 23, 2023

  • Upholding Procedural Rules: Solidary Liability in Joint Venture Agreements for Condominium Projects

    TL;DR

    The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of J. Tiosejo Investment Corp.’s (JTIC) appeal due to its failure to comply with procedural rules regarding the timely filing of its petition for review. JTIC sought to overturn a ruling holding it solidarily liable with Primetown Property Group, Inc. (PPGI) for the rescission of contracts to sell condominium units to Spouses Ang, due to the non-completion of a joint venture project. The Court emphasized that procedural rules are essential for the orderly administration of justice and that non-compliance cannot be excused by heavy workload. Furthermore, the Court found JTIC liable based on the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) and partnership law, as the JVA bound JTIC to contracts entered into by PPGI, and partners are solidarily liable for the obligations of the partnership.

    Frozen in Time: When a Missed Deadline Costs More Than Just Time

    This case examines the consequences of failing to adhere to procedural deadlines in legal appeals, specifically concerning the enforcement of solidary liability within a joint venture agreement for a condominium development project. At the heart of the matter is the question of whether procedural lapses can be excused in the pursuit of substantive justice, especially when significant financial liabilities are at stake for the parties involved.

    The case revolves around a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) between J. Tiosejo Investment Corp. (JTIC) and Primetown Property Group, Inc. (PPGI) for the development of The Meditel condominium. JTIC contributed the land, while PPGI was responsible for the development. PPGI entered into contracts to sell condominium units and parking spaces to Spouses Benjamin and Eleanor Ang. When the project stalled, the Spouses Ang sought to rescind the contracts and recover their payments. They filed a complaint against both PPGI and JTIC before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).

    The HLURB Arbiter ruled in favor of the Spouses Ang, declaring the contracts rescinded and ordering JTIC and PPGI to refund the payments with interest, along with damages, attorney’s fees, and an administrative fine. JTIC appealed to the HLURB Board of Commissioners, which modified the decision to grant JTIC’s cross-claim against PPGI, requiring PPGI to reimburse JTIC for any amounts it had to pay the Spouses Ang. JTIC then appealed to the Office of the President (OP), but its appeal was dismissed for being filed out of time. Subsequently, JTIC filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA), which was also dismissed for the same reason.

    The Supreme Court (SC) addressed two primary issues: whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition based on procedural technicalities, and whether the CA erred in affirming the OP’s decision, which held JTIC solidarily liable with PPGI. Regarding the procedural issue, the SC emphasized that the right to appeal is a statutory privilege that must be exercised within the prescribed manner and period. The Court noted that JTIC had already been granted an extension by the CA but failed to meet the extended deadline. Excuses like heavy workload were deemed insufficient to justify non-compliance with procedural rules. The Court reiterated that procedural rules are crucial for the effective administration of justice and should not be disregarded lightly.

    Building on this principle, the SC also addressed the substantive issue of JTIC’s liability. The Court found that JTIC was indeed solidarily liable with PPGI based on the express terms of the JVA and the principles of partnership law. Article VIII, Section 1 of the JVA stated that JTIC would comply with any covenants entered into by PPGI with third parties regarding the condominium units. Moreover, the Court recognized that a joint venture is a form of partnership, and under Article 1824 of the Civil Code, all partners are solidarily liable for the obligations of the partnership.

    “In any case, the Owner shall respect and strictly comply with any covenant entered into by the Developer and third parties with respect to any of its units in the Condominium Project. To enable the owner to comply with this contingent liability, the Developer shall furnish the Owner with a copy of its contracts with the said buyers on a month-to-month basis.”

    Therefore, even though JTIC claimed it was not privy to the contracts between PPGI and the Spouses Ang, the JVA and partnership law principles bound JTIC to those contracts. Consequently, the Court upheld the HLURB’s decision holding JTIC solidarily liable for the refund, damages, attorney’s fees, and administrative fine.

    This case underscores the importance of adhering to procedural rules in legal proceedings and the potential consequences of failing to do so. It also clarifies the extent of liability of parties involved in joint ventures, particularly concerning obligations to third parties. By affirming the lower courts’ decisions, the Supreme Court sent a clear message that procedural compliance is not a mere technicality but an integral part of the legal process. Furthermore, it reinforced the principle of solidary liability in partnerships and joint ventures, ensuring that all partners are accountable for the obligations of the business.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing JTIC’s petition for review due to its failure to file the petition within the prescribed period, and whether JTIC was solidarily liable with PPGI.
    Why was JTIC’s appeal dismissed? JTIC’s appeal was dismissed because it failed to file its petition for review within the extended period granted by the Court of Appeals. The Court did not consider heavy workload a sufficient excuse.
    What is solidary liability? Solidary liability means that each partner is individually liable for the entire debt or obligation of the partnership. The creditor can demand full payment from any one of the partners.
    How did the Joint Venture Agreement affect JTIC’s liability? The JVA contained a clause that required JTIC to comply with any covenants entered into by PPGI with third parties. This provision was interpreted as binding JTIC to the contracts PPGI made with the Spouses Ang.
    What is the significance of this case for joint ventures? This case highlights the importance of carefully drafting joint venture agreements, especially regarding liability to third parties. It also clarifies that partners in a joint venture can be held solidarily liable for the obligations of the venture.
    What does Article 1824 of the Civil Code state? Article 1824 of the Civil Code provides that all partners are solidarily liable with the partnership for everything chargeable to the partnership, including loss or injury caused to a third person or penalties incurred due to any wrongful act or omission of any partner.
    What was the outcome of the HLURB case? The HLURB ruled in favor of the Spouses Ang, declaring the contracts to sell rescinded and ordering JTIC and PPGI to refund the payments with interest, along with damages, attorney’s fees, and an administrative fine.

    In conclusion, the J. Tiosejo Investment Corp. v. Spouses Ang case serves as a critical reminder of the importance of adhering to procedural rules and the implications of solidary liability in joint venture agreements. Compliance with deadlines and a clear understanding of contractual obligations are essential for mitigating legal risks.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: J. TIOSEJO INVESTMENT CORP. VS. SPOUSES BENJAMIN AND ELEANOR ANG, G.R. No. 174149, September 08, 2010

  • Joint Venture Agreement Rescission: Determining Rights to Property Improvements After Fraudulent Breach

    TL;DR

    In a dispute over a failed real estate joint venture, the Supreme Court affirmed that rescission of the agreement due to fraudulent acts by one party allows the injured party to regain possession of the land and its improvements. This decision emphasizes that while the return of property is a consequence of rescission, it does not automatically entitle the breaching party to reimbursement for improvements made. The breaching party may still be entitled to a share in the net partnership assets after proper accounting and settlement of liabilities, ensuring that no unjust enrichment occurs and the rights of all parties, including creditors, are protected during the winding up of the joint venture’s affairs.

    When a Promise Crumbles: Who Gets the Garden After a Joint Venture Turns Sour?

    This case revolves around a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) between Primelink Properties and the Lazatin siblings to develop land in Tagaytay into a residential subdivision. Primelink was responsible for development, while the Lazatins contributed the land. When the Lazatins accused Primelink of failing to meet obligations and committing fraudulent acts, they sought to rescind the JVA.

    The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of the Lazatins, ordering the rescission of the JVA and the return of the land, including all improvements, to the Lazatins. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed this decision. The central legal question is whether, upon rescission of the JVA, Primelink is entitled to reimbursement for the value of the improvements it made on the Lazatins’ land before the rescission.

    The Supreme Court approached the issue by analyzing the nature of a joint venture under Philippine law. Citing the case of Aurbach v. Sanitary Wares Manufacturing Corporation, the Court reiterated that a joint venture is akin to a partnership and should be governed by the laws on partnership. This perspective is crucial because it defines the rights and obligations of each party upon the dissolution of the joint venture.

    Since the RTC rescinded the JVA due to Primelink’s breach, this effectively dissolved the partnership. Under Article 1832 of the New Civil Code, dissolution terminates all authority of any partner to act for the partnership, except for actions necessary to wind up the partnership affairs or complete unfinished transactions. This winding-up process involves administering the assets of the partnership to settle its obligations.

    The Court emphasized that the transfer of the land and its improvements to the Lazatins was specifically for winding up the partnership affairs. The properties remained partnership assets, subject to the rights and obligations of all parties involved. Primelink’s demand for immediate reimbursement was premature because the partnership accounts needed to be settled first.

    The Supreme Court highlighted the rights of parties when dissolution is caused by one party’s wrongful actions, as stipulated in Article 1837 of the New Civil Code. The Court also noted the rights of the injured party under Article 1838 of the same Code:

    (1) To a lien on, or right of retention of, the surplus of the partnership property after satisfying the partnership liabilities to third persons for any sum of money paid by him for the purchase of an interest in the partnership and for any capital or advances contributed by him;

    (2) To stand, after all liabilities to third persons have been satisfied, in the place of the creditors of the partnership for any payments made by him in respect of the partnership liabilities; and

    (3) To be indemnified by the person guilty of the fraud or making the representation against all debts and liabilities of the partnership.

    These provisions ensure that the injured party is protected and that the breaching party does not benefit from its wrongful actions without first settling its obligations. The Court made it clear that Article 1839 of the New Civil Code provides guidance:

    Art. 1839. In settling accounts between the partners after dissolution, the following rules shall be observed, subject to any agreement to the contrary:

    (1) The assets of the partnership are:

    (a) The partnership property,

    (b) The contributions of the partners necessary for the payment of all the liabilities specified in No. 2.

    (2) The liabilities of the partnership shall rank in order of payment, as follows:

    (a) Those owing to creditors other than partners,

    (b) Those owing to partners other than for capital and profits,

    (c) Those owing to partners in respect of capital,

    (d) Those owing to partners in respect of profits.

    Until the partnership accounts are properly settled, it remains impossible to determine what each party is entitled to receive. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s decision, emphasizing that the Lazatins were entitled to regain possession of their land and the improvements made upon it, but only as part of the process of winding up the affairs of the dissolved joint venture.

    The case serves as a reminder of the complexities involved in dissolving a joint venture and the importance of adhering to the legal framework governing partnerships. Parties entering into such agreements must be aware of their rights and obligations, especially in the event of a breach leading to dissolution. The ruling underscores that rescission is not merely a return to the status quo, but a process that must ensure fairness and protect the interests of all parties involved, including creditors and third parties.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether Primelink, the developer in a joint venture, was entitled to reimbursement for improvements made on the Lazatins’ land after the JVA was rescinded due to Primelink’s fraudulent breach.
    What is the legal nature of a joint venture in the Philippines? The Supreme Court has ruled that under Philippine law, a joint venture is a form of partnership and is thus governed by the laws on partnership.
    What happens to partnership assets upon dissolution? Upon dissolution, the partnership continues until the winding up of partnership affairs is completed, which involves administering the assets to terminate the business and discharge obligations.
    Are partners immediately entitled to reimbursement after dissolution? No, partners are not immediately entitled to reimbursement; the partnership accounts must be settled first to determine each party’s share in the net partnership assets after all liabilities have been paid.
    What rights does a party have when a partnership is dissolved due to another partner’s wrongful conduct? The injured party has the right to a lien on the surplus of the partnership property, the right to stand in the place of creditors for payments made, and the right to be indemnified against all debts and liabilities of the partnership.
    Why was Primelink’s demand for reimbursement considered premature? Primelink’s demand was premature because the winding-up process, including the settlement of accounts, had not yet occurred to determine the net assets available for distribution.
    What is the significance of Article 1839 of the New Civil Code in this case? Article 1839 provides the rules for settling accounts between partners after dissolution, specifying how assets should be applied to liabilities and how partners should contribute to cover any remaining debts.

    In conclusion, this case clarifies the process for settling property rights after a joint venture is rescinded due to a partner’s fraudulent actions. The Supreme Court’s decision ensures that the winding-up process is fair and protects the rights of all parties involved, preventing unjust enrichment and adhering to the principles of partnership law.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Primelink Properties and Development Corporation vs. Ma. Clarita T. Lazatin-Magat, G.R. NO. 167379, June 27, 2006

  • Partnership Disputes: Determining a Partner’s Share When Records Are Unavailable

    TL;DR

    The Supreme Court affirmed that a partner is entitled to their share of a business, even if the business records needed to calculate that share are lost or destroyed. The Court ruled that when original documents are unavailable, alternative methods of determining the partner’s share must be used. This means the court can consider other evidence, like testimonies or secondary documents, to fairly assess what the partner is owed. The destruction of records does not nullify a partner’s right to their share; it simply requires a different approach to calculating it. This decision ensures fairness and prevents a party from escaping their obligations by claiming records were lost.

    Burning Questions: How to Calculate a Partner’s Share After a Fire?

    The case of Heirs of Kishinchand Hiranand Dialdas v. Court of Appeals and Nari Asandas revolves around a dispute over a deceased partner’s share in a business called Expocraft International. After Kishinchand Dialdas’ death, his heirs sought to claim his one-third share of the business from Nari Asandas. The court initially ordered an audit of Expocraft’s books to determine the exact amount owed to Dialdas’ heirs. However, Asandas claimed the business records were destroyed in a fire, making the ordered audit impossible. The central legal question became: how should a partner’s share be determined when the primary records for calculating it are unavailable?

    The trial court, faced with the absence of business records, attempted to determine Dialdas’ share based on the heirs’ submitted computation. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed this decision, arguing that Asandas should be given the opportunity to present his own evidence. The appellate court ordered the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. This decision highlighted the importance of allowing both parties to present evidence when determining a partner’s share. It also emphasized that the destruction of records, even if proven, did not eliminate the obligation to compensate the partner.

    The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals’ decision to remand the case. The Court emphasized that the right to a partner’s share, once established, cannot be defeated simply because the initial method of calculating it becomes impossible. The loss of business records does not render the judgment void or conditional. Instead, it necessitates the use of alternative methods to determine the partner’s share. The Court cited the principle that when the execution of a decision becomes impossible due to changed circumstances, the court should admit evidence of such changes and modify the judgment accordingly.

    The Supreme Court noted that the trial court erred by relying solely on the heirs’ computation without allowing Asandas to present his own evidence. This violated Asandas’ right to due process. The Court clarified that while Asandas initially objected to the trial court’s jurisdiction, he was still entitled to an opportunity to present evidence once the court asserted its authority to determine Dialdas’ share. This ruling reinforces the principle of fairness and the importance of allowing all parties to be heard in a legal dispute.

    The Court outlined the procedure the trial court should follow on remand. First, Asandas must prove that a fire actually occurred and that the fire destroyed the relevant business documents. If the trial court is convinced that the documents were indeed destroyed without bad faith on Asandas’ part, secondary evidence may be presented. This secondary evidence will then be used to determine the amount corresponding to Dialdas’ one-third share. However, if the trial court finds that there was no fire or that the loss of documents was not satisfactorily explained, it must weigh the evidence accordingly, considering the principle that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. This approach balances the need to determine Dialdas’ share fairly with the need to prevent Asandas from benefiting from the alleged destruction of records.

    This case illustrates the principle that a partner’s right to their share is a fundamental aspect of partnership law. Even when circumstances make it difficult to calculate that share, the courts must find a way to ensure that the partner receives what they are entitled to. The Supreme Court’s decision provides a clear framework for how to proceed in such cases, emphasizing the importance of due process, fairness, and the use of alternative methods when original records are unavailable. This framework ensures that partners are protected and that their rights are not easily defeated by unforeseen events or alleged destruction of records.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was how to determine a deceased partner’s share in a business when the business records were allegedly destroyed by fire.
    Did the Supreme Court nullify the original trial court decision? No, the Supreme Court did not nullify the original decision establishing the right to a share. It only affirmed the need to determine the specific amount through additional evidence.
    What kind of evidence can be used if the original business records are missing? Secondary evidence, such as testimonies, copies of documents, or expert opinions, can be used to determine the partner’s share.
    What happens if the court finds that the business records were intentionally destroyed? If the court finds that the records were intentionally destroyed, it will likely draw an adverse inference against the party responsible for the destruction.
    Why was the case remanded to the trial court? The case was remanded to allow both parties to present evidence and for the court to make a fair determination of the partner’s share based on all available information.
    Does this decision mean a partner can never receive their share if records are lost? No, this decision clarifies that the loss of records does not eliminate the right to a share; it simply requires the use of alternative methods to calculate it.
    What is the significance of this case for partnerships? This case highlights the importance of maintaining accurate business records and underscores that partners are still entitled to their share even if records are unavailable.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Heirs of Kishinchand Hiranand Dialdas v. Court of Appeals and Nari Asandas provides crucial guidance on how to resolve partnership disputes when business records are missing. The Court’s emphasis on fairness, due process, and the use of alternative methods ensures that partners receive their rightful share, even in challenging circumstances.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Heirs of Dialdas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112563, June 28, 2001