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by Atty. Gabriel Ablola 🇵🇭

Tag: Livestock Farms

  • Livestock Farms and Agrarian Reform: Protecting Established Industries from Land Redistribution

    TL;DR

    The Supreme Court ruled that land exclusively dedicated to livestock raising since before June 15, 1988, is exempt from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). This decision protects long-standing livestock farms from being reclassified as agricultural land subject to redistribution. The court emphasized that livestock farms are considered industrial, not agricultural, and therefore fall outside the scope of agrarian reform, safeguarding the property rights of established livestock producers.

    Pasture or Plough: When Does Land Reform Reach the Farm Gate?

    This case, Heirs of Ramon Arce, Sr. v. Department of Agrarian Reform, centers on whether a 76.39-hectare property in Montalban, Rizal, used for livestock raising since the 1950s, should be covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The Heirs of Ramon Arce, Sr. argued that their land was used for pasture and feed production for their livestock, making it exempt from CARP. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), however, sought to include the land under CARP, leading to a legal battle that ultimately reached the Supreme Court, forcing a determination of whether the land was agricultural and subject to redistribution, or industrial and exempt.

    The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), enacted through Republic Act No. 6657, aims to redistribute agricultural land to landless farmers. However, the law explicitly excludes lands classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial, or industrial. Section 3(c) of RA 6657 defines “agricultural land” as land devoted to agricultural activity. The pivotal question here is whether livestock raising qualifies as an “agricultural activity” under CARP.

    The Supreme Court, in line with established jurisprudence, particularly the landmark case of Luz Farms v. The Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, reiterated that livestock farms are not covered by CARP. That case declared provisions of the CARL unconstitutional when they included lands devoted to livestock. The Constitutional Commission of 1986 never intended to include livestock in the agrarian reform program, classifying it as industrial rather than agricultural activity.

    it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include the livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program of the government.

    The Court examined the factual findings of the DAR, the Office of the President (OP), and the Court of Appeals (CA), noting inconsistencies that warranted a deeper look into the evidence. The DAR initially denied the Heirs’ petition for exclusion from CARP coverage, citing an ocular inspection report indicating the absence of livestock on the property. The OP, however, reversed this decision, finding that the land was indeed used for livestock raising. The Court of Appeals sided with the DAR, prompting the Heirs to elevate the case to the Supreme Court. Because of these conflicting opinions, the SC had to step in to provide guidance.

    A critical aspect of the case was the transfer of some of the Arce’s livestock to a facility in Novaliches, Quezon City, due to a liver fluke infestation. The DAR argued that this transfer demonstrated that the land was no longer used for livestock purposes. However, the Supreme Court sided with the Arce Heirs, underscoring that the transfer was temporary and for health reasons, as recommended by the Philippine Carabao Center-Department of Agriculture (PCC-DA). The court emphasized that the younger livestock remained on the property, and the land continued to be used for growing napier grass to feed the livestock. The Heirs of Arce were able to provide ample proof of this.

    The Court emphasized the importance of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer’s (MARO) findings, which supported the Heirs’ claim that the land was used for livestock farming. The MARO’s ocular inspection found large cattle on the property, and the DAR Provincial Office (DARPO) also recommended granting the petition for exclusion from CARP coverage. The Court found the MARO’s report to be much more compelling than that of Ucag of DAR Region IV-A, whose assessment was done without notifying the Heirs.

    The Supreme Court also addressed the issue of SAMANACA’s attempt to intervene in the case. The Court denied their motion, stating that SAMANACA’s members had never been in possession of the subject lands or been tenants, farmers, or tillers. SAMANACA did not provide compelling evidence they were qualified beneficiaries. This lack of a direct and immediate legal interest in the outcome of the case disqualified them from intervening.

    The Court highlighted that the feedlot operation adopted by the petitioners, where animals are confined and fed on a cut-and-carry basis, is a recognized method of livestock raising. The land’s use for growing napier grass to feed the livestock further supported the argument that it was dedicated to livestock production, not agriculture in the traditional sense. Additionally, the Court pointed out that the land’s topography, with slopes exceeding 18%, made it unsuitable for traditional agriculture, further solidifying its classification as non-agricultural.

    The Supreme Court concluded that the land had been exclusively devoted to livestock raising since before the enactment of CARP. Therefore, it was exempt from agrarian reform. The decision underscores the importance of preserving the original intent of the Constitution to exclude livestock farms from agrarian reform and protecting established industries from land redistribution.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? Whether land used for livestock raising since before the enactment of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) should be covered by CARP and redistributed to landless farmers.
    What did the Supreme Court decide? The Supreme Court ruled that the land was exempt from CARP because it was dedicated to livestock raising, which is considered an industrial activity, not agriculture, and therefore outside the scope of agrarian reform.
    Why was the land initially placed under CARP coverage? The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) initially placed the land under CARP coverage based on an ocular inspection report that claimed there were no livestock on the property.
    What evidence did the Heirs of Ramon Arce, Sr. present to support their claim? The Heirs presented certificates of ownership of large cattle, photos of livestock grazing on the property, and reports from the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) and DAR Provincial Office (DARPO) confirming the land’s use for livestock raising.
    What is a “feedlot operation” and why was it important in this case? A “feedlot operation” is a method of livestock raising where animals are confined and fed on a cut-and-carry basis. It was important because it demonstrated that the land was being used to support livestock production, even though the animals were not freely grazing on the entire property.
    Why was SAMANACA’s attempt to intervene in the case denied? SAMANACA’s attempt to intervene was denied because its members had never been in possession of the land or been tenants, farmers, or tillers, and they failed to provide sufficient evidence that they were qualified beneficiaries.
    What is the significance of the date June 15, 1988, in this case? June 15, 1988, is the date the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) took effect. The Court considered whether the land was used for livestock raising prior to this date in determining whether it qualified for an exemption.

    This decision reinforces the principle that lands genuinely and continuously dedicated to livestock raising before the enactment of CARP are protected from agrarian reform. This provides security to established livestock farmers and clarifies the boundaries of agrarian reform in the Philippines.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Heirs of Ramon Arce, Sr. v. Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 228503, July 25, 2018

  • Livestock Farms and Agrarian Reform: Upholding Constitutional Limits on Land Coverage

    TL;DR

    The Supreme Court affirmed that livestock farms are exempt from agrarian reform coverage, upholding the Constitutional Commission’s intent. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) cannot regulate or impose retention limits on land exclusively devoted to livestock, swine, and poultry-raising. This decision protects landowners engaged in livestock farming from being subjected to land redistribution under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), ensuring their properties are not included in agrarian reform programs. The ruling reinforces the principle that administrative agencies cannot expand their powers beyond constitutional and statutory limits, safeguarding private property rights in the livestock industry.

    Cattle Country: When Agrarian Reform Can’t Fence In Livestock Farms

    The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) sought to include portions of a Masbate cattle ranch under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). The Sutton family, who had inherited and devoted their land exclusively to cow and calf breeding since 1948, contested this move. The heart of the matter was whether DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribed retention limits for livestock farms, was constitutional, especially given the Supreme Court’s prior ruling in Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR, which excluded livestock farms from agrarian reform.

    This case revolves around the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which attempted to regulate land used for livestock raising by prescribing retention limits. The DAR argued that it issued the A.O. under its rule-making power, aiming to prevent landowners from evading agrarian reform by converting agricultural lands to livestock farms. However, administrative agencies’ powers are not without limits. Administrative rules must be authorized by law and consistent with the Constitution. They cannot expand or modify the scope of authority granted by Congress or the Constitution.

    The Supreme Court found that DAR A.O. No. 9 overstepped its bounds. The 1987 Constitutional Commission’s deliberations clearly indicated an intent to exclude lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine, and poultry-raising from agrarian reform. As the Court emphasized in Luz Farms, these activities are industrial rather than agricultural. This distinction is crucial because it places livestock farming outside the purview of agrarian laws designed for crop or tree farming. The Court highlighted the significant industrial investment in livestock operations, including specialized structures and equipment, further solidifying its classification as an industrial endeavor.

    The Court referred to the case of Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR, which reiterated that the term “agricultural land” does not include lands classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial, or industrial. The CARL, under Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657, covers public and private agricultural lands, but this definition excludes lands already designated for non-agricultural uses. Just as undeveloped residential lots in Natalia Realty were exempt from agrarian reform, so too are lands devoted to livestock raising, as they are considered industrial.

    The Supreme Court also addressed the DAR’s concern that landowners might convert agricultural lands to livestock farms to evade agrarian reform. The Court noted that this concern did not apply to the Suttons, who had been in the cattle-breeding business since 1948, well before the enactment of the CARL. The CARL prohibits the conversion of agricultural lands for non-agricultural purposes after the law’s effectivity. Since there was no change in the Suttons’ business interest, the DAR’s concern was unfounded. Furthermore, Congress amended the CARL through R.A. No. 7881, explicitly excluding lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry, and swine-raising from the definition of “agricultural activity” and “commercial farming.” This amendment aligned agrarian laws with the Constitutional Commission’s intent to exclude livestock farms.

    In summary, the Court reinforced the principle that administrative rules must align with the Constitution. They cannot expand or modify the Constitution’s provisions. In this case, DAR’s attempt to regulate livestock farms through A.O. No. 9 was unconstitutional because it broadened the scope of agrarian reform beyond what the 1987 Constitution intended. When an administrative order conflicts with the Constitution, the Constitution prevails. Therefore, the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals’ decision, affirming that DAR A.O. No. 9 was unconstitutional and that the Suttons’ land was exempt from agrarian reform.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, which prescribed retention limits for land used for livestock raising, and whether it conflicted with the Constitution’s intent and prior Supreme Court rulings.
    What did the Supreme Court decide? The Supreme Court ruled that DAR A.O. No. 9 was unconstitutional because it exceeded the scope of agrarian reform as intended by the 1987 Constitution, affirming that livestock farms are exempt from agrarian reform.
    Why was DAR A.O. No. 9 considered unconstitutional? The A.O. was unconstitutional because it attempted to regulate livestock farms, which the Constitutional Commission intended to exclude from agrarian reform, and because it conflicted with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Luz Farms.
    What was the significance of the Luz Farms case? The Luz Farms case established that livestock, swine, and poultry-raising are industrial activities, not agricultural, and therefore not subject to agrarian reform, setting a precedent for excluding such farms from the CARL’s coverage.
    How did R.A. No. 7881 affect this issue? R.A. No. 7881 amended the CARL to explicitly exclude lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry, and swine-raising from the definition of “agricultural activity” and “commercial farming,” aligning the law with the Constitution’s intent.
    What is the practical implication of this ruling for landowners? Landowners engaged in livestock, swine, and poultry-raising are protected from having their lands subjected to land redistribution under the CARL, ensuring their properties remain outside the agrarian reform program’s coverage.

    This case clarifies the boundaries of agrarian reform, ensuring that administrative agencies respect constitutional limitations on their powers. By reaffirming the exclusion of livestock farms from agrarian reform, the Supreme Court protects property rights and reinforces the importance of aligning administrative regulations with constitutional intent.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM VS. DELIA T. SUTTON, G.R. NO. 162070, October 19, 2005