Tag: Gambling Law

  • Enforceability of Gambling Debts: When Illegal Agreements Taint Casino Winnings

    TL;DR

    The Supreme Court ruled that gambling debts arising from an illegal agreement between a junket operator and the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) are unenforceable. This means a gambler cannot legally compel PAGCOR to redeem gambling chips obtained under such an arrangement. The Court emphasized that PAGCOR’s charter does not allow it to share its gambling franchise with other entities, and any agreements doing so are void. This decision protects PAGCOR from being held liable for debts incurred through illegal gambling operations and reinforces the principle that courts will not enforce agreements that violate the law. For gamblers, this ruling highlights the risk of participating in gaming activities arranged through junket operators when the legality of those arrangements is questionable, as they may have no legal recourse to recover their winnings.

    Chasing Fortune: Can Casino Chips Trump an Illegal Gambling Deal?

    This case centers on Yun Kwan Byung, a Korean national, and his attempt to redeem US$2.1 million in gambling chips from the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). Byung claimed he accumulated these chips at Casino Filipino, managed and operated by PAGCOR. However, PAGCOR argued that Byung was a “junket player” brought in by ABS Corporation under a special arrangement. The core legal question is whether PAGCOR is liable for the gambling debts of players who participated in games arranged by junket operators, especially when the agreement between PAGCOR and the junket operator is deemed illegal.

    The facts reveal that PAGCOR launched a Foreign Highroller Marketing Program to attract foreign players. ABS Corporation, a Korean-based group, availed of this program, entering into a Junket Agreement with PAGCOR. Under this agreement, ABS Corporation would bring in foreign players to designated gaming tables at Casino Filipino. PAGCOR provided ABS Corporation with separate junket chips, and ABS Corporation was responsible for paying the winnings and collecting debts from its players. A crucial clause in the agreement stated that ABS Corporation would hold PAGCOR harmless from any liability arising from the arrangement. Adding a layer of complexity, PAGCOR posted notices in English and Korean stating that the gaming room was operated exclusively by ABS Corporation, and ABS was solely accountable for the playing chips.

    The trial court found that the Junket Agreement was void because PAGCOR had essentially shared its franchise with ABS Corporation, violating its charter. Presidential Decree No. 1869, which governs PAGCOR, does not authorize the agency to lease portions of its gambling tables to private entities. Specifically, Section 13 outlines how PAGCOR can utilize foreign currencies in its casinos, but it does not allow for the delegation of its franchise to private parties. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed this decision, emphasizing that the notices posted by PAGCOR served as a warning to players that special rules applied to certain gaming areas, even if the agreement giving rise to those rules was void.

    Building on this, the Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s ruling, stating that courts will not enforce debts arising from illegal gambling. While gambling is generally prohibited in the Philippines, PAGCOR is granted a franchise to operate casinos. However, this franchise cannot be shared or delegated to other entities. The Supreme Court cited Senator Jaworski v. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., emphasizing that PAGCOR acted beyond its authority when it passed on or shared its franchise. This is rooted in the principle that a legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state and cannot be exercised at will.

    The Court also addressed the applicability of Republic Act No. 9487 (RA 9487), which amended PAGCOR’s charter and granted it the power to enter into special agreements with third parties. However, the Court clarified that RA 9487 could not be applied retroactively to this case, as the Junket Agreement was entered into before the amendment. Thus, the gambling activity participated in by Byung remained illegal. Since the Junket Agreement violated PAGCOR’s charter, gambling between the junket player and the junket operator under such an agreement is illegal and may not be enforced by the courts, as noted in Article 2014 of the Civil Code.

    Furthermore, the Supreme Court rejected Byung’s claims of implied agency and agency by estoppel. For an agency to exist, there must be representation – the agent acts for and on behalf of the principal. In this case, PAGCOR did not hold out ABS Corporation as its agent. Instead, PAGCOR posted notices warning players that they were playing under special rules. The Court found that the intention of the parties negates the existence of an implied agency or an agency by estoppel. The players brought in by ABS Corporation were covered by a different set of rules in acquiring and encashing chips. The players used a different kind of chip than what was used in the regular gaming areas of PAGCOR, and that such junket players played specifically only in the third floor area and did not mingle with the regular patrons of PAGCOR. Finally, the Court affirmed that a void contract cannot be ratified. Since the Junket Agreement was void from the beginning, PAGCOR could not have ratified the acts of ABS Corporation.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether PAGCOR was liable for gambling debts incurred by a player who participated in games arranged by a junket operator under an illegal agreement.
    Why was the Junket Agreement deemed illegal? The Junket Agreement was deemed illegal because it violated PAGCOR’s charter by allowing ABS Corporation to operate gaming tables, effectively sharing PAGCOR’s exclusive franchise.
    What is a junket operator in this context? A junket operator is a third party that brings in foreign players to casinos under special arrangements, often involving different rules and chips.
    What does it mean that courts will not enforce illegal gambling debts? It means that if a gambling activity is illegal, a court will not assist a winner in collecting their winnings or a loser in recovering their losses.
    Did RA 9487 change the legal landscape for PAGCOR? Yes, RA 9487 amended PAGCOR’s charter to allow it to enter into special agreements, but it did not apply retroactively to this case.
    What is implied agency, and why did it not apply here? Implied agency arises from the actions of the principal. It did not apply because PAGCOR did not hold out ABS Corporation as its agent or mislead the public into believing an agency existed.
    What is agency by estoppel, and how does it differ from implied agency? Agency by estoppel is based on apparent authority, where the principal’s conduct leads a third party to believe that an agent has authority. It differs from implied agency in that no agency relationship exists at all.

    In conclusion, this case underscores the importance of adhering to the limitations of a legislative franchise and the principle that courts will not enforce illegal agreements. It serves as a warning to both gambling operators and players to ensure that all gaming activities comply with the law. This ruling reinforces the regulatory framework governing PAGCOR and provides clarity on the enforceability of gambling debts in the Philippines.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Yun Kwan Byung vs. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 163553, December 11, 2009

  • Franchise Integrity: PAGCOR’s Authority and the Limits of Delegation in Gambling Operations

    TL;DR

    The Supreme Court ruled that the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) cannot delegate its legislative franchise to operate gambling activities to another entity, specifically Sports and Games Entertainment Corporation (SAGE). The Court emphasized that PAGCOR’s authority, granted under Presidential Decree No. 1869, does not allow it to transfer or share its franchise with other corporations. This decision invalidated the “Grant of Authority and Agreement” between PAGCOR and SAGE, preventing SAGE from operating Internet gambling based solely on PAGCOR’s franchise. Individuals and entities seeking to engage in gambling operations must obtain their own legislative franchise, ensuring strict adherence to the terms and conditions set by the state.

    Can PAGCOR Pass the Dice? Unpacking the Limits of Gambling Franchise Delegation

    This case revolves around the question of whether PAGCOR, a government-owned corporation authorized to operate gambling activities, can grant another entity, SAGE, the authority to operate Internet gambling under its franchise. Senator Robert S. Jaworski challenged PAGCOR’s decision, arguing that it exceeded its legislative mandate by allowing SAGE to operate Internet gambling. The core legal issue is whether PAGCOR can delegate its franchise rights to another entity, or if SAGE requires its own legislative franchise to legally operate online gambling activities.

    At the heart of this dispute is the interpretation of Presidential Decree No. 1869, PAGCOR’s legislative franchise. Section 10 of P.D. No. 1869 grants PAGCOR the authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming pools, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines. However, the decree makes no explicit mention of Internet gambling, leading to the question of whether PAGCOR’s franchise extends to online activities. The petitioner argued that the Internet’s international nature transcends the territorial limitations of PAGCOR’s franchise, and that online gambling does not fall within the enumerated gambling activities authorized by P.D. No. 1869.

    Respondents PAGCOR and SAGE contended that the grant of authority was within PAGCOR’s powers to manage and operate gambling activities. However, the Court emphasized that a legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state, subject to strict control and administration. The Court cited the principle that a grantee must not perform its activities arbitrarily and whimsically but must abide by the limits set by its franchise and strictly adhere to its terms and conditionalities. Moreover, the Court underscored that while PAGCOR is allowed to enter into operator’s and/or management contracts, it cannot relinquish or share its franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity.

    The Court found that PAGCOR acted beyond its authority by essentially passing on or sharing its franchise to SAGE. The grant of authority to SAGE allowed it to actively participate, partake, and share in PAGCOR’s franchise to operate a gambling activity. This action violated the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest, which means that a delegated power cannot be further delegated unless expressly authorized. Since PAGCOR’s charter does not explicitly authorize it to delegate its franchise, the Court held that SAGE must obtain its own legislative franchise to legally operate online Internet gambling.

    In its ruling, the Supreme Court drew a parallel with the Lim v. Pacquing case, which clarified that an entity without a legislative franchise to operate a specific gambling activity cannot do so even with a local government permit. This reaffirms the principle that a legislative franchise is a prerequisite for operating gambling activities, and that entities cannot rely on another’s franchise without explicit authorization. The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition, declaring the “Grant of Authority and Agreement to Operate Sports Betting and Internet Gaming” executed by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE as NULL and VOID.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central question was whether PAGCOR could delegate its legislative franchise to operate gambling activities to SAGE, allowing SAGE to operate Internet gambling under PAGCOR’s franchise.
    What is a legislative franchise? A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to corporations, allowing them to engage in specific activities, subject to government control and regulation.
    What is the principle of “delegata potestas delegare non potest”? This legal principle means that a delegated power cannot be further delegated unless expressly authorized by the original delegating authority.
    Why did the Supreme Court rule against PAGCOR? The Court ruled that PAGCOR exceeded its authority by granting SAGE the right to operate Internet gambling under its franchise, as PAGCOR’s charter did not explicitly authorize it to delegate its franchise.
    What is the implication of this ruling for online gambling operations? Entities seeking to operate online gambling must obtain their own legislative franchise, rather than relying on another entity’s franchise.
    What was the basis of Senator Jaworski’s legal standing in this case? Although initially challenged, the Court recognized Senator Jaworski’s legal standing due to the case’s significant public interest and potential impact on society.
    What was the final decision of the Supreme Court? The Supreme Court declared the “Grant of Authority and Agreement” between PAGCOR and SAGE as null and void, preventing SAGE from operating Internet gambling based solely on PAGCOR’s franchise.

    This ruling reinforces the importance of adhering to the terms and conditions of legislative franchises and highlights the limits of delegation in the context of gambling operations. It sets a clear precedent that entities must obtain their own franchises to legally engage in such activities, safeguarding the state’s control and regulation over gambling.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Jaworski vs. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 144463, January 14, 2004

  • PAGCOR’s Franchise: Restrictions on Delegation and the Constitutionality of Presidential Decrees

    TL;DR

    The Supreme Court dismissed the petition questioning the constitutionality of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) charter and its grant of franchises to other entities. The Court held that challenges to Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1869’s constitutionality, issued during martial law, were raised too late, as previous decisions had already settled the validity of presidential decrees issued during that period. Furthermore, the Court reiterated its stance from Del Mar and Jaworski, clarifying that PAGCOR cannot delegate its franchise to operate gambling activities to other entities like SAGE, BELLE, and FILGAME, thus agreements doing so are void. This decision clarifies that while PAGCOR has a valid franchise, it must operate gambling activities itself, without associating with other corporations to share its franchise.

    Can PAGCOR Pass the Dice? Questioning Delegated Gambling Powers

    This case revolves around a special civil action for prohibition filed by Ramon A. Gonzales, challenging the creation of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) and its subsequent “grant of franchises” to several corporations. These included Sports and Games Entertainment Corporation (SAGE) for internet gambling, Best World Gaming and Entertainment Corporation (BEST WORLD) for computerized bingo, and Belle Jai-alai Corporation (BELLE) and Filipinas Gaming Entertainment Totalizator Corporation (FILGAME) for jai-alai operations. The core legal question is whether PAGCOR’s charter, Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1869, is constitutional and whether PAGCOR can legally delegate its franchise to other entities.

    Gonzales, acting as a citizen, taxpayer, and member of the Philippine Bar, initiated the suit, arguing that PAGCOR’s operations and agreements with other corporations were unlawful. The respondents, PAGCOR, SAGE, BEST WORLD, BELLE, and FILGAME, filed their respective comments, setting the stage for a legal showdown. Prior to this case, the Supreme Court, in Del Mar v. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., et al., had already enjoined PAGCOR, BELLE, and FILGAME from operating jai-alai games together, declaring their agreement invalid. This earlier decision plays a crucial role in shaping the current case.

    As the case progressed, several procedural issues arose. BEST WORLD stated it had been shut down by PAGCOR and DILG. The original petitioner, Gonzales, passed away. Attorneys Manuel B. Imbong and Jo Aurea M. Imbong sought to be substituted as petitioners, claiming to represent the class of Filipino citizens, taxpayers, and members of the Philippine Bar. PAGCOR and SAGE opposed this substitution, arguing that the movants were neither legal representatives nor heirs of Gonzales and that the case was a personal action that did not survive his death. This question of legal standing became a pivotal point in the proceedings.

    The Supreme Court addressed the issue of substitution, citing Bonilla v. Barcena, which states that the survival of an action depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. If the cause of action affects primarily property rights, the action survives; if it is primarily personal, it does not. In this case, the Court found that Gonzales’ interest was personal and non-transferable, as he claimed to be vindicating his rights as a citizen, taxpayer, and member of the bar. However, even considering the motion for substitution as a motion for intervention, the Court ultimately dismissed the petition.

    The Court addressed the substantive issues, noting that the question of whether PAGCOR could delegate its franchise had been settled in the Del Mar and Jaworski cases. In Jaworski v. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., the Court explicitly stated that PAGCOR could not grant a “veritable franchise” to another entity, such as SAGE. The principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest (what has been delegated cannot be delegated) applies, meaning PAGCOR cannot delegate its power unless expressly authorized by its charter.

    Regarding the constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court found that the challenges came too late. The issues surrounding the effectivity of Proclamation 1081 (declaring martial law), the validity of the 1973 Constitution, and the former President’s legislative powers had been settled in cases like Javellana v. Executive Secretary and Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile. The Court emphasized that its power is limited to adjudicating actual controversies and determining whether a government entity acted with grave abuse of discretion. It is not within the Court’s power to rewrite history.

    Moreover, Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution states that all existing laws and decrees not inconsistent with the Constitution remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked. Since the petitioner failed to demonstrate any inconsistency between P.D. 1869 and the Constitution, the Court denied the prayer to enjoin PAGCOR from continuing its operations. While the Court acknowledged that the petitioner’s prayer to enjoin the enforcement of agreements between PAGCOR and other entities had been granted in other cases, the petition itself was ultimately dismissed.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether PAGCOR’s charter, P.D. 1869, was constitutional and if PAGCOR could legally delegate its franchise to operate gambling activities to other corporations.
    Why was the challenge to P.D. 1869 dismissed? The challenge was dismissed because the issues surrounding the validity of presidential decrees issued during martial law had already been settled in previous Supreme Court decisions, and the petitioner did not demonstrate any inconsistency between P.D. 1869 and the current Constitution.
    What is the meaning of delegata potestas delegare non potest in this context? This legal principle means that PAGCOR, as a delegated authority, cannot further delegate its franchise to operate gambling activities to other entities unless expressly authorized by its charter.
    What was the outcome of the agreements between PAGCOR and other corporations like SAGE, BELLE, and FILGAME? The Supreme Court declared that PAGCOR cannot delegate its franchise to other entities, and agreements attempting to do so are void, effectively prohibiting these corporations from operating under PAGCOR’s franchise.
    Who attempted to substitute the original petitioner after his death, and why was it denied? Attorneys Manuel B. Imbong and Jo Aurea M. Imbong attempted to substitute the original petitioner. The Court found that their interest was based on their own individual interests, not inherited from the deceased, and that a Motion for Intervention, even if considered, would not change the outcome of the case.
    What is the practical implication of this ruling for PAGCOR? PAGCOR retains its franchise to operate gambling activities, but it must do so directly, without delegating its powers to other corporations or entering into agreements that effectively share its franchise.

    In conclusion, this case reinforces the limitations on PAGCOR’s authority to delegate its franchise and reaffirms the validity of presidential decrees issued during martial law, provided they are not inconsistent with the current Constitution. The decision underscores the importance of adhering to established legal precedents and the principle that delegated powers cannot be further delegated without express authorization.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Ramon A. Gonzales vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 144891, May 27, 2004

  • PAGCOR’s Authority: The Limits of Franchise and Gambling Operations in the Philippines

    TL;DR

    The Supreme Court ruled that the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) does not have the legislative franchise to operate and manage jai-alai games. While PAGCOR’s charter allows it to manage gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreational activities, it does not explicitly grant it the right to operate jai-alai. This decision underscores that PAGCOR’s authority is limited to what is expressly stated in its legislative franchise, thus protecting the plenary legislative power of Congress, particularly in matters concerning public morals and gambling activities. This ruling prevents PAGCOR, Belle Jai Alai Corporation, and Filipinas Gaming Entertainment Totalizator Corporation from managing or operating jai-alai games under their existing agreements.

    Can PAGCOR Extend Its Gambling Reach to Jai-Alai? A Franchise Fight Unfolds

    The central question in this case revolves around whether the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was authorized to manage and operate jai-alai under its existing franchise. This legal battle emerged from two consolidated petitions that questioned PAGCOR’s authority, highlighting concerns about the scope of its powers and the potential infringement on the legislative prerogative to grant franchises. The petitioners, acting as taxpayers and members of the House of Representatives, sought to prevent PAGCOR from engaging in jai-alai operations, sparking a debate over statutory interpretation, legislative intent, and the limits of delegated authority.

    The legal foundation of PAGCOR lies in Presidential Decree No. 1869, which consolidated previous decrees related to its franchise and powers. Section 10 of this decree grants PAGCOR the authority to “operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming pools, i.e., basketball, football, lotteries, etc.” PAGCOR contended that this broad language included jai-alai, relying on opinions from the Secretary of Justice, Solicitor General, and Government Corporate Counsel. However, the petitioners argued that the franchise should be strictly construed, and that jai-alai, not being explicitly mentioned, fell outside PAGCOR’s authorized scope.

    The Supreme Court, in its analysis, emphasized that a franchise is a special privilege of public concern, derived from sovereign power and inherently legislative. It can be delegated through an agency, but only under clear and valid conditions prescribed by Congress. Historical context further revealed that before PAGCOR, a separate entity, the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation, held the franchise for jai-alai operations. This historical separation, the Court reasoned, indicated that PAGCOR’s creation was not intended to include jai-alai.

    “Acts of incorporation, and statutes granting other franchises or special benefits or privileges to corporations, are to be construed strictly against the corporations; and whatever is not given in unequivocal terms is understood to be withheld.”

    The Court pointed out that P.D. No. 1869 mainly focused on the operation of gambling casinos, detailing rules and regulations specific to casinos, such as tax exemptions, foreign exchange utilization, and labor law exemptions for casino employees. These details were conspicuously absent for jai-alai. Moreover, the tax treatment of jai-alai operations differed significantly from that of gambling casinos, as evidenced by Letters of Instruction and the Tax Reform Act of 1997, which imposed amusement taxes on jai-alai but not on casinos.

    The ruling also addressed the argument that Section 11 of P.D. 1869, which grants PAGCOR the right to operate “gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming pools, i.e., basketball, football, lotteries, etc.,” impliedly included jai-alai. The Court rejected this interpretation, stating that a statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood in multiple senses. Given the absence of the term “jai-alai” in the law, a literal reading could not unerringly reveal the legislative intent. Moreover, the Court gave weight to the fact that PAGCOR’s charter was granted during martial law, necessitating stricter scrutiny than a franchise granted by a real Congress with rigorous deliberations.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court sided with the petitioners, emphasizing that PAGCOR’s legislative franchise did not extend to the operation and management of jai-alai games. The ruling underscores the principle that franchises are to be strictly construed against the grantee, and that any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of limiting the powers claimed. The Court upheld the legislative prerogative of Congress and affirmed its role as the guardian of public morals, preventing an overreach of delegated authority in the context of gambling activities.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether PAGCOR’s legislative franchise included the right to manage and operate jai-alai games. The Supreme Court ruled it did not, as PAGCOR’s charter primarily focused on gambling casinos and lacked specific provisions for jai-alai operations.
    What is a legislative franchise? A legislative franchise is a special privilege conferred by the government, granting a corporation or individual the right to operate a business or provide a service. It’s a privilege of public concern, subject to government control in the interest of the public.
    Why did the Court construe PAGCOR’s franchise strictly? The Court construed PAGCOR’s franchise strictly because it involved gambling, which is an activity affecting public morals. Laws granting the right to exercise police power are interpreted narrowly, with any doubts resolved against the grant.
    What was the significance of the historical context? The historical context was significant because it showed that jai-alai operations were previously governed by a separate franchise. This separation suggested that PAGCOR’s creation was not intended to include jai-alai.
    How did the Court interpret Section 11 of P.D. No. 1869? The Court rejected a broad interpretation of Section 11, which lists various activities PAGCOR can engage in. It found the language ambiguous and concluded that jai-alai, not being explicitly mentioned, was not included in PAGCOR’s franchise.
    What is the implication for PAGCOR and similar entities? The implication is that PAGCOR and similar entities must operate within the strict confines of their legislative franchises. They cannot expand their operations beyond what is expressly stated in their charters.
    What was the basis for the petitioners’ legal standing? The petitioners, as members of the House of Representatives, had legal standing because they argued that PAGCOR’s actions infringed on the legislature’s exclusive power to grant franchises. Their office conferred a right to participate in the exercise of that power.

    This decision clarifies the boundaries of PAGCOR’s authority and reinforces the importance of adhering to the precise terms of a legislative franchise. It serves as a reminder that entities operating under special privileges must act within the defined scope of their powers, particularly when dealing with activities that have significant social and moral implications.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Del Mar vs. PAGCOR, G.R No. 138298, November 29, 2000