Tag: Fishpond Lease Agreement

  • Can I Improve an Inherited Fishpond in a Mangrove Area?

    Dear Atty. Gab,

    Musta Atty! My name is Ricardo Cruz. I am writing to you today from our small hometown in Busuanga, Palawan. My family has a coastal property that my Lolo Emilio has been taking care of since the 1970s. It has a small, traditional fishpond or punong, which has provided a little extra for our family for decades. My Lolo was even able to secure a tax declaration for the property back in the day, which we have faithfully kept updated.

    Since my Lolo passed away, the fishpond fell into disrepair. I recently decided to revive it, hoping to make it more productive. I started by clearing some of the overgrown shrubs and a few wild-growing trees that were not the typical bakawan (mangrove). I also reinforced the old earthen dikes with some rocks and dug a deeper channel to improve water flow. I was doing all of this in good faith, thinking I was just improving my family’s property.

    However, last week, someone from the local environment office visited and told me to stop all work immediately. He mentioned something about a Fisheries Code and said that what I was doing might be illegal conversion of a mangrove area. I am completely baffled. How can it be a conversion when it has been a fishpond for over 50 years? I am not trying to destroy anything; I am rehabilitating it. Does my family’s long-term possession and the tax declaration not give me the right to improve my own land? I would be grateful for your guidance on this matter.

    Respectfully yours,
    Ricardo Cruz

    Dear Ricardo,

    Thank you for reaching out. I understand your confusion and concern, especially when you are acting with the good intention of reviving a family livelihood. Your situation highlights a common but critical point of conflict between traditional land use and modern environmental regulations.

    The core of the issue lies in the special protection our laws afford to certain ecosystems, such as mangrove forests. Under Philippine law, these areas are generally considered public land and are inalienable, regardless of long-term occupation or the existence of a tax declaration. The law that governs this is Republic Act No. 8550, or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998. This law is very strict about any activity that alters the natural state of a mangrove forest. Even if an area was previously used as a fishpond, any new improvements or alterations without the proper government permit, specifically a Fishpond Lease Agreement (FLA), can be considered a violation. Let’s delve into the specifics.

    Understanding ‘Conversion’ in Protected Mangrove Zones

    Your main question is how your rehabilitation efforts could be considered “conversion.” The law does not define this term in a highly technical way; instead, its plain and ordinary meaning is used. Conversion is simply the act of changing something from one form or state to another. In the context of a mangrove forest, any activity that alters its natural structure and form falls under this definition. This includes cutting trees (regardless of species), excavating, constructing dikes, or installing outlets. Even if your intention is merely to “rehabilitate” an old fishpond, these physical alterations constitute conversion in the eyes of the law.

    The Philippine Fisheries Code is explicit in its prohibition:

    It shall be unlawful for any person to convert mangroves into fishponds or for any other purposes.

    Violation of the provision of this section shall be punished by imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and/or a fine of Eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00): Provided, That if the area requires rehabilitation or restoration as determined by the court, the offender should also be required to restore or compensate for the restoration of the damage.
    (Section 94, Republic Act No. 8550)

    This provision is strict. It does not only prohibit converting a pristine mangrove forest into a new fishpond; it also makes it unlawful to convert it “for any other purposes.” This means that even if you argue the area was already a fishpond, your acts of reinforcing dikes, clearing vegetation, and digging a new channel still alter the ecosystem, which is what the law seeks to prevent.

    Furthermore, the law’s definition of mangroves is very broad, covering more than just the familiar bakawan trees. It is defined as:

    …a community of intertidal plants including all species of trees, shrubs, vines and herbs found on coasts, swamps, or border of swamps.
    (Section 4, paragraph 52, R.A. No. 8550)

    This means clearing any vegetation within that designated coastal zone, not just a specific type of tree, can be part of the prohibited act of conversion.

    You also mentioned that you were acting in good faith. Unfortunately, this defense is unlikely to prosper. Violations of the Fisheries Code, being a special law, are considered malum prohibitum (plural: mala prohibita). This is a legal term for acts that are considered wrong simply because a law prohibits them. Unlike crimes that are inherently evil like theft or murder (known as mala in se), the intent or motive of the offender in a malum prohibitum case is immaterial. The only thing the prosecution needs to prove is that you committed the prohibited act. Your good intention to rehabilitate the fishpond, therefore, cannot absolve you from potential criminal liability.

    Finally, let’s address the tax declaration. While it feels like a strong proof of right, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a tax declaration is not conclusive evidence of ownership. This is especially true for lands that are part of the public domain, such as forests, mineral lands, and mangrove areas, which are legally classified as inalienable and not subject to private appropriation. In fact, under Presidential Decree No. 705, a public officer who issues a tax declaration over forest land without proper certification that it is alienable and disposable can be held criminally liable. Therefore, your tax declaration cannot serve as a shield against prosecution under environmental laws. The only instrument that could authorize your activities is a Fishpond Lease Agreement (FLA) issued by the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR).

    Practical Advice for Your Situation

    • Halt All Activities: Immediately cease all clearing, digging, and construction work on the property. Continuing the work after being warned by a government official could aggravate your situation.
    • Verify the Land’s Classification: Visit the local Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) to formally inquire about the official classification of the land your family occupies. Request for a certification or a map that indicates its status.
    • Do Not Rely on the Tax Declaration: Understand that the tax declaration does not grant you the right to develop or alter the land if it is classified as a mangrove forest. It is primarily for tax assessment purposes and cannot defeat the state’s title over inalienable land.
    • Inquire About a Fishpond Lease Agreement (FLA): Ask the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) if the area is open for an FLA application. This is the legal instrument that allows a private person to utilize public land for fishpond purposes. If your grandfather’s fishpond was never covered by one, it has likely been operating outside the legal framework.
    • Be Mindful of Your Statements: Any admission you make, whether verbal or in writing, to government officials can be used against you. Under our rules of evidence, a judicial admission requires no proof and can be conclusive.
    • A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge [the] fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. An admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to such party…
      (Jurisprudence on Section 4, Rule 129, Rules of Court)

    • Gather All Historical Documents: Compile all records related to the property, including the old tax declarations, any previous permits (if any), and old photographs that show the state of the fishpond through the years. These may not be a perfect defense but could be useful in negotiating with the authorities.
    • Consult a Lawyer Formally: Your situation involves complex environmental laws. I strongly recommend seeking formal legal counsel to help you communicate with the DENR and BFAR and to properly represent your interests.

    I know this is not the news you were hoping for, but understanding the legal landscape is the first step in protecting yourself and finding a lawful path forward. The state’s policy is to protect these vital ecosystems, and the laws are designed to be strict to achieve that end.

    Hope this helps!

    Sincerely,
    Atty. Gabriel Ablola

    For more specific legal assistance related to your situation, please contact me through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This correspondence is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please schedule a formal consultation.

  • Navigating Fishpond Leases: When Administrative Discretion Oversteps Corporate Disputes

    TL;DR

    The Supreme Court affirmed that while the Department of Agriculture (DA) has authority over fishpond lease agreements, it cannot use this power to resolve internal corporate disputes. The DA’s denial of Eno Fishpond Corporation’s lease transfer application, based on a shareholder conflict rather than compliance with regulations, was deemed an overreach of administrative discretion. This ruling clarifies that regulatory bodies must stick to their mandated areas and not interfere in corporate governance matters that should be resolved in the proper courts, ensuring fair and predictable application processes for fishpond leases.

    Fishponds and Feuds: How Far Can Regulators Wade into Family Corporate Battles?

    This case revolves around a family squabble that found its way into the realm of fishpond lease agreements. The central question: how far can the Department of Agriculture (DA) extend its regulatory authority over fishpond leases when an application becomes entangled with internal corporate disputes? The Republic, representing the DA and its Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), sought to overturn a Court of Appeals decision that limited the DA’s power to interfere in what the appellate court viewed as an intra-corporate matter. At the heart of this legal battle were respondents Eno Fishpond Corporation, Cabral Fishpond Industry Corporation, and Editha A. Cabral, embroiled in a dispute over the transfer of fishpond lease rights.

    The factual narrative began with BFAR leasing two 50-hectare fishponds to Cabral Fishpond Industry Corporation. Editha Cabral, as the majority shareholder following her husband’s death, later assigned her shares to Paterno Belarmino. Subsequently, Cabral Corporation assigned its leasehold rights to Eno Corporation, controlled by one of Editha’s daughters. This transfer triggered a protest from Editha, claiming it occurred without her consent, leading to DA Case No. 99-439-F. Initially, the DA sided with Editha, denying Eno’s application. However, Editha later withdrew her protest, stating she had resolved her issues with her daughters and now supported the transfer. This reversal prompted Belarmino to intervene, claiming the withdrawal would negatively impact his shares. The Undersecretary then admitted Belarmino’s motion for intervention, further complicating the matter.

    The Court of Appeals (CA) ultimately reversed the DA’s decisions, asserting that the DA had overstepped its jurisdiction by delving into intra-corporate matters. The CA allowed Editha to withdraw her protest and directed the DA to act on Eno’s application based on its merits. The Republic, however, argued that nullifying the lease transfer and denying Editha’s withdrawal were necessary incidents to the DA’s power to oversee fishpond lease agreements. The Supreme Court disagreed. The court emphasized that while the DA has the power to enforce laws and regulations governing the use of fishery resources, this power is not unlimited. The BFAR, as a regulatory body, must exercise its discretion within the parameters set by law, specifically referring to compliance with Fisheries Administrative Order (FAO) No. 60.

    FAO No. 60 outlines specific conditions for approving lease transfers, such as the size of the area, the extent of improvements made, and the transferee’s assumption of obligations. The Supreme Court found that Undersecretary Drilon’s decision to deny Eno’s application was based on the dilution of Belarmino’s shareholdings, a consideration not within the scope of FAO No. 60. The court held that the DA’s focus should have been on whether Eno Corporation met the regulatory requirements for the lease transfer, rather than getting entangled in the corporate squabbles among the stockholders of Cabral Fishpond Industry Corporation. The Court emphasized that disputes among shareholders should be addressed in a different forum, such as the regular courts, which have jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies. This approach contrasts with using administrative powers to resolve what are essentially private disputes.

    Building on this principle, the Supreme Court highlighted that the DA’s actions should be predictable and based on clear standards. The standards in FAO No. 60 provide predictability in the action of BFAR on a pending application for transfer of leasehold rights. Compliance with the requirements of FAO No. 60 entitles the applicant to reasonably expect the approval of his application unless some other provision of law says otherwise. This ensures that regulatory decisions are transparent and fair, preventing arbitrary or whimsical exercises of discretion. By focusing on the regulatory requirements rather than the private interests of the parties involved, the DA can maintain the integrity of the fishpond lease process. The Supreme Court thus affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, reinforcing the principle that administrative bodies must stay within their defined jurisdiction and not use their powers to resolve matters that fall under the purview of other legal forums.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the Department of Agriculture (DA) exceeded its jurisdiction by denying a fishpond lease transfer based on internal corporate disputes rather than regulatory compliance.
    What is Fisheries Administrative Order (FAO) No. 60? FAO No. 60 outlines the conditions for approving fishpond lease transfers, including the size of the area, improvements made, and the transferee’s obligations.
    Why did the DA deny Eno Corporation’s application? The DA denied Eno’s application due to concerns about the dilution of a shareholder’s value in Cabral Corporation, rather than Eno’s compliance with regulatory requirements.
    What did the Court of Appeals decide? The Court of Appeals reversed the DA’s decision, stating that the DA had overstepped its jurisdiction by involving itself in intra-corporate matters.
    What was the Supreme Court’s ruling? The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, holding that the DA’s discretion must be confined within the parameters set by law, specifically FAO No. 60.
    What is the significance of this ruling? The ruling clarifies the limits of administrative discretion, ensuring that regulatory bodies focus on regulatory compliance rather than resolving private corporate disputes.
    Where should corporate disputes be resolved? Corporate disputes should be resolved in the regular courts, which have jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies.

    In conclusion, this case serves as a reminder that administrative bodies must exercise their powers within the bounds of their defined jurisdiction. It reinforces the principle that regulatory decisions should be based on objective standards and not influenced by private disputes. This ensures fairness and predictability in administrative processes, promoting confidence in the regulatory framework.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Republic vs. Eno Fishpond, G.R. NO. 154475, September 30, 2005

  • Finality of Administrative Decisions: The Serondo Case on Fishpond Lease Agreements

    TL;DR

    The Supreme Court ruled that the spouses Serondo could not challenge the fishpond lease agreement (FLA) granted to Jose Gulmatico because the prior administrative decisions had become final and they lacked standing to question those decisions via certiorari. The Court emphasized that the proper recourse for the Serondos, who acquired the property after the finality of the Fisheries Commission’s orders, was to appeal the Office of the President’s decision to the Court of Appeals, not to file a new action for certiorari. This decision underscores the importance of respecting the finality of administrative determinations and adhering to the correct procedural avenues for appeal.

    From Fishpond Feud to Legal Dead End: Understanding Administrative Finality

    This case revolves around a disputed fishpond area, tracing back to conflicting claims between Jose Gulmatico and Carmen Claro. Claro, who initially took over the area from spouses Suison, filed a fishpond application, which was later rejected. Gulmatico then filed his application, which was eventually approved, leading to a Fishpond Lease Agreement (FLA). The Serondo spouses later purchased the fishpond from Burgas, who had acquired it from Claro. The central legal question is whether the Serondos could challenge the validity of Gulmatico’s FLA, despite the prior administrative decisions favoring Gulmatico, and whether they pursued the correct legal remedy.

    The Supreme Court’s decision hinged on the principle of finality of administrative decisions and the procedural impropriety of the Serondos’ actions. The Court noted that the Philippine Fisheries Commission (PFC) and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) had already ruled on the matter, rejecting Claro’s application and approving Gulmatico’s. These decisions, having become final, could no longer be collaterally attacked. Moreover, the Court highlighted that the Serondos were not parties to the original administrative proceedings, which meant they lacked the standing to file a complaint for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court. As the Court stated, “Finality having ineluctably set in the aforementioned PFC and BFAR orders of May 19, 1972 and October 24, 1977… the MAF did not err in dismissing petitioner-appellant’s petition for cancellation of FLA No., 3536 issued in favor of respondent-appellee.”

    Building on this principle, the Court emphasized that the Serondos’ proper remedy was to appeal the decision of the Office of the President to the Court of Appeals, as provided under Section 9(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. This statute governs appeals from decisions of the Office of the President. The Serondos erred in seeking certiorari from the Regional Trial Court. This procedural misstep was fatal to their case, as it disregarded the established hierarchy of judicial review. The court stated that the ruling of the Office of the President did not involve “actions and decisions of the Director of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and the Secretary of Agriculture” affecting “fishing and fisheries,” and therefore Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 applied.

    Furthermore, the Court addressed the factual question of whether the fishpond area had been properly classified as available for fishpond development. The Secretary of Natural Resources issued BFD No. 4-1764 on May 3, 1984, certifying portions of public forest lands in Escalante, Negros Occidental, for fishpond development. However, the determination of whether the specific area in question was included within this classification was a factual issue, which the Court declined to review. The Court also pointed out that the Serondos should have verified Claro’s rights to the property before purchasing it from Burgas. The failure to conduct due diligence barred them from claiming good faith. This underscores the importance of conducting thorough investigations before acquiring property rights, especially when dealing with public lands and administrative permits.

    In essence, the Court’s decision reinforces the importance of adhering to established legal procedures and respecting the finality of administrative rulings. It serves as a reminder that parties seeking to challenge administrative actions must do so through the proper channels and within the prescribed timeframes. Moreover, it highlights the need for due diligence in property transactions, particularly when dealing with rights derived from government permits and licenses. The Serondo case illustrates the consequences of failing to observe these principles.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the Serondo spouses could challenge the fishpond lease agreement granted to Jose Gulmatico through a complaint for certiorari, given prior administrative decisions and their lack of standing.
    Why did the Supreme Court deny the Serondos’ petition? The Supreme Court denied the petition because the prior administrative decisions had become final, the Serondos lacked standing, and they pursued the wrong legal remedy (certiorari instead of appealing to the Court of Appeals).
    What is the principle of finality of administrative decisions? The principle of finality of administrative decisions means that once an administrative agency has made a final determination on a matter within its jurisdiction, that decision is binding and cannot be collaterally attacked.
    What was the proper legal remedy for the Serondos? The proper legal remedy for the Serondos was to appeal the decision of the Office of the President to the Court of Appeals, as provided under Section 9(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
    What is the significance of BFD No. 4-1764 in this case? BFD No. 4-1764 is significant because it certified portions of public forest lands in Escalante, Negros Occidental, as available for fishpond development, raising the factual issue of whether the specific area in dispute was included.
    Why did the Court emphasize the Serondos’ lack of due diligence? The Court emphasized the Serondos’ lack of due diligence because they failed to verify Claro’s rights to the property before purchasing it, barring them from claiming good faith in their acquisition.
    What does this case illustrate about challenging government permits? This case illustrates that parties seeking to challenge government permits must do so through the proper legal channels and within the prescribed timeframes, and that they must conduct due diligence before acquiring rights based on those permits.

    The Serondo case serves as a crucial reminder for those dealing with property rights derived from administrative permits and licenses. Understanding the principles of administrative finality and the importance of due diligence can prevent costly legal battles and ensure the protection of one’s interests.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: SPS. MILLER AND ADELIE SERONDO v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 126828, January 30, 2002

  • License Cancellation Prevails Over Possessory Rights: Exploring Administrative Authority

    TL;DR

    The Supreme Court affirmed that the cancellation of a fishpond lease agreement by an administrative agency takes precedence over a prior court decision regarding possessory rights. Calixto Sañado’s fishpond lease was canceled by the Office of the President due to violations of the lease terms. While a lower court initially ordered the restoration of the fishpond area to Sañado, the appellate court correctly reversed this decision, recognizing the supervening event of the license cancellation. This ruling underscores that administrative decisions concerning licenses are binding and that courts must acknowledge them, even if they alter previously established possessory rights. This case reinforces the principle that licenses are privileges subject to governmental regulation and enforcement, and their cancellation nullifies any related possessory claims.

    Fishpond Feud: When Administrative Authority Trumps Possessory Claims

    This case revolves around a dispute over a fishpond, where Calixto Sañado, holding a fishpond lease agreement, clashed with Simeon Nepomuceno regarding possession and rights to the property. The central legal question is whether a subsequent administrative decision canceling Sañado’s lease agreement overrides a prior court order granting him possessory rights. The complexities arise from the interplay between judicial and administrative authority, specifically concerning the enforcement of regulations governing natural resources.

    The facts of the case are as follows. Calixto Sañado was initially granted a fishpond permit. He then entered into a “Contract of Fishpond Development and Financing” with Simeon Nepomuceno, where Nepomuceno would develop the fishpond at his own expense, with a profit-sharing agreement to follow. However, the Director of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources later recommended converting the ordinary fishpond permit into a 25-year fishpond lease agreement. Subsequently, Nepomuceno waived his rights to Edgar Chu.

    Crucially, while a case regarding the fishpond’s possession was ongoing in the courts, the Minister of Agriculture and Food issued an order canceling Sañado’s Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 3090, which was later affirmed by the Office of the President. The cancellation was based on violations of the fishpond lease agreement, including transferring or subletting rights without government approval and failing to meet development requirements. This administrative decision became a pivotal point in the legal battle.

    The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the Office of the President’s decision, characterizing it as an exercise of quasi-judicial power by the Executive Department. The Court referenced Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, noting that courts must take judicial notice of matters relative to the executive department. The court stated that the enforcement of laws, such as Presidential Decree No. 704 affecting fishing and fisheries, falls within the executive department’s essential function. The court also noted the policy of judicial non-interference, stating that Courts should not interfere with actions of the executive branch on administrative matters addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies. This policy is especially applicable in the grant of licenses, permits, and leases, or the approval, rejection, or revocation of applications therefor.

    The Court underscored that the reasons for the lease cancellation, namely, unauthorized transfer of rights and failure to develop the area, were valid and logical grounds. Moreover, the decision highlighted that Sañado did not challenge the subsequent order that gave Nepomuceno priority in applying for the area. The appellate court rightly recognized that the cancellation of the lease agreement rendered the issue of possessory rights moot. A crucial aspect was the timing: although the trial court’s decision preceded the Office of the President’s ruling, the case was still under appeal, making the administrative decision a supervening event that could not be ignored.

    The Supreme Court ruled that the July 31, 1989 decision of the Office of the President is a substantial supervening event which drastically changed the circumstances of the parties to the subject fishpond lease agreement. For to award possession to petitioner is futile since he has lost the fishpond license. This ruling aligns with the principle established in Baluyot vs. Guiao, which states that a judgment includes not only what appears on its face but also what is necessarily included or necessary thereto. In this context, the cancellation of Sañado’s license inherently eliminated his right to possess the fishpond area.

    Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s decision highlights the supremacy of administrative actions concerning licenses and permits. It reinforces the principle that licenses are privileges, not vested rights, and are subject to governmental regulation. Consequently, any legal claims dependent on a canceled license are rendered invalid. This case serves as a significant reminder of the power and reach of administrative authority in regulating natural resources and the importance of complying with the terms and conditions of licenses and permits.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether an administrative decision canceling a fishpond lease agreement overrides a prior court decision regarding possessory rights.
    Why was Sañado’s fishpond lease agreement canceled? The lease agreement was canceled due to violations, including unauthorized transfer of rights and failure to meet development requirements, as outlined by fisheries regulations.
    What is the significance of the Office of the President’s decision? The Office of the President’s decision was considered an exercise of quasi-judicial power by the Executive Department, which courts must take judicial notice of.
    How did the Court of Appeals address the trial court’s decision? The Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s decision, recognizing that the cancellation of the lease agreement rendered the issue of possessory rights moot.
    What is the impact of this ruling on license holders? This ruling reinforces that licenses are privileges, not vested rights, and are subject to governmental regulation, thus their cancellation nullifies any related possessory claims.
    What is a supervening event in the context of this case? A supervening event is a significant occurrence that happens after a trial court’s decision but before the appellate court’s decision, which can drastically change the circumstances of the case. In this case, the Office of the President’s decision was the supervening event.

    This case clarifies the relationship between administrative and judicial authority in the context of regulatory enforcement. The decision reinforces the principle that licenses are privileges subject to governmental regulation, and their cancellation nullifies any related possessory claims, ensuring compliance with regulatory requirements.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: CALIXTO SAÑADO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 108338, April 17, 2001