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by Atty. Gabriel Ablola 🇵🇭

Tag: Cyber Libel

  • One-Year Deadline for Cyber Libel Cases: Supreme Court Clarifies Prescription Period

    TL;DR

    The Supreme Court has ruled that cyber libel cases in the Philippines must be filed within one year from the date the defamatory online post is discovered by the victim or authorities. This decision clarifies that cyber libel, which is libel committed online, follows the same one-year prescriptive period as traditional libel under the Revised Penal Code. This means individuals have a limited time to file charges after discovering a libelous post online, ensuring cases are pursued promptly and aligning cyber libel with the established legal framework for defamation.

    Time’s Up for Online Slander: Cyber Libel Prescription in the Digital Age

    In the case of Causing v. People, the Supreme Court addressed a crucial question in the realm of cybercrime: how long does one have to file a cyber libel case in the Philippines? This case revolved around Berteni Causing, who was charged with cyber libel for Facebook posts allegedly defaming a Congressman. Causing argued that the charges had prescribed, meaning the time limit for filing the case had expired. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) disagreed, applying a longer prescriptive period. This led Causing to elevate the issue to the Supreme Court, questioning whether cyber libel should be governed by the same prescriptive rules as traditional libel, or if a different, longer period should apply due to its digital nature.

    The heart of the legal debate was whether cyber libel, as defined under the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (RA 10175), is a distinct crime with its own prescriptive period, or simply libel committed through digital means. The RTC initially leaned towards a longer prescriptive period, citing Act No. 3326 and a previous court resolution, Tolentino v. People, which suggested a 15-year period. Causing, on the other hand, contended that cyber libel is fundamentally the same as libel under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), which has a one-year prescriptive period. He argued that RA 10175 merely specifies a computer system as a means of committing libel and increases the penalty, but doesn’t alter the crime’s essential nature or its prescriptive period.

    The Supreme Court sided with Causing, firmly establishing that the prescriptive period for cyber libel is indeed one year, as stipulated for libel in Article 90 of the RPC. The Court emphasized that RA 10175 did not create a new crime of cyber libel. Instead, it recognized the use of computer systems as a modern means of committing the existing crime of libel. The decision explicitly stated that Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175, which defines cyber libel, merely implements Articles 353 and 355 of the RPC in the online context. To underscore this point, the Court quoted its earlier Disini v. Secretary of Justice decision, stating, “cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes ‘similar means’ for committing libel.”

    Building on this principle, the Court clarified that because cyber libel is rooted in the RPC’s definition of libel, the prescriptive period must also be governed by the RPC, specifically Article 90. The Court rejected the application of Act No. 3326, which governs prescription for special laws, because libel is defined and penalized under the RPC. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that even if Act No. 3326 were considered, the principle of favoring the accused in penal statutes dictates that the shorter, one-year prescriptive period under the RPC should prevail. The decision explicitly abandoned the Tolentino ruling, which had suggested a 15-year prescriptive period for cyber libel.

    The Supreme Court also addressed when this one-year period begins to run. Referring to Article 91 of the RPC, the Court affirmed the “discovery rule,” stating that the prescriptive period commences “from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents.” This means the one-year clock starts ticking not necessarily from the date of the libelous post, but from when the victim or relevant authorities become aware of it. This is crucial in the online context, where defamatory posts can remain unnoticed for extended periods.

    Despite clarifying the prescriptive period, the Supreme Court ultimately denied Causing’s petition. The Court reasoned that prescription is a matter of defense that must be proven by the accused. Since the date of discovery was not explicitly stated in the Informations (the formal charges), and Causing did not present evidence to prove the charges had prescribed, the RTC was correct in denying the Motion to Quash. The Court emphasized that unless prescription is evident on the face of the Information, it is the accused’s responsibility to demonstrate that the case is time-barred. The Court did not rule on whether the cyber libel charges against Causing had actually prescribed, leaving this factual determination to the RTC during trial.

    This decision has significant implications for both individuals and the legal system. It provides clarity and finality on a previously ambiguous area of law, ensuring that cyber libel cases are subject to a reasonable and consistent prescriptive period. By aligning cyber libel with traditional libel in terms of prescription, the Supreme Court reinforces the principle that the medium may change, but the fundamental nature of defamation remains the same. This ruling balances the need to protect individuals from online defamation with the principles of timely prosecution and statutory interpretation favoring the accused in criminal matters.

    FAQs

    What is cyber libel? Cyber libel is libel committed through a computer system or other online means. It is essentially the same crime as traditional libel but takes place in the digital realm.
    What is the prescriptive period for cyber libel? The prescriptive period for cyber libel is one year from the date of discovery of the libelous post by the offended party, authorities, or their agents.
    When does the prescriptive period begin? The prescriptive period starts from the day the libelous online post is discovered, not necessarily from the date it was published.
    Does this ruling create a new crime? No, this ruling clarifies that cyber libel is not a new crime but is the same as libel under the Revised Penal Code, just committed using digital technology.
    What law governs cyber libel prescription? Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code govern the prescriptive period for cyber libel, not Act No. 3326.
    What was the Tolentino ruling and how does this case affect it? The Tolentino ruling suggested a 15-year prescriptive period for cyber libel. This case explicitly abandons the Tolentino ruling, establishing a one-year period instead.
    What should I do if I discover a libelous post about me online? Document the post and consult with a lawyer immediately to understand your legal options and ensure you act within the one-year prescriptive period from the date of discovery.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Berteni Cataluña Causing v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 258524, October 11, 2023.

  • Cyber Libel and Retroactivity: Clarifying the Boundaries of Online Defamation Before Cybercrime Law

    TL;DR

    The Supreme Court ruled that a Facebook post made in 2011, before the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, cannot be prosecuted as cyber libel under the Revised Penal Code. The Court emphasized that criminal laws cannot be applied retroactively if they are unfavorable to the accused. This means individuals are not criminally liable for online libel if the act occurred before cyber libel was explicitly defined and penalized by law. However, individuals may still face civil liability for defamatory online posts, even if made before the Cybercrime Act.

    Pre-Cybercrime Postings: Was Facebook Libel in 2011 a Crime?

    This case revolves around a Facebook post from August 3, 2011, where Jannece Peñalosa allegedly defamed Jose Ocampo, Jr. The post contained harsh insults and accusations. An information for libel was filed against Peñalosa. However, the Department of Justice later directed the withdrawal of the information, arguing that “internet libel” was not yet a crime in 2011, as the Cybercrime Prevention Act was enacted in 2012. The trial court initially agreed, dismissing the case, but the Court of Appeals reversed this, stating that libel via Facebook was punishable under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, which covers libel by “similar means” to writing.

    The central legal question became whether posting libelous content on Facebook in 2011, before the Cybercrime Prevention Act, constituted criminal libel under the Revised Penal Code. This hinged on whether Article 355’s “similar means” could be interpreted to include online platforms like Facebook, even before the digital age was explicitly addressed in legislation. The Supreme Court ultimately sided with Peñalosa, reversing the Court of Appeals’ decision and reinstating the trial court’s dismissal.

    The Supreme Court first addressed a procedural issue: whether Ocampo, as the private complainant, had the right to appeal the trial court’s order dismissing the case. The Court clarified that in criminal cases, only the State, represented by the Solicitor General, can appeal the criminal aspect of a dismissal or acquittal. Private complainants are limited to appealing the civil aspect. Since Ocampo’s petition sought the continuation of the criminal case, he lacked the legal standing to file a Petition for Certiorari. The proper remedy against the trial court’s order granting the Motion to Withdraw Information was an appeal, which should have been initiated by the State, not a private individual like Ocampo.

    Moving to the substantive issue of whether the Facebook post was punishable, the Supreme Court analyzed Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code alongside Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act. Article 355 lists “writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means” as mediums for libel. The Court applied the principle of noscitur a sociis, which dictates that ambiguous words should be interpreted in light of associated words. The listed means in Article 355, all pre-digital technologies, suggested that “similar means” at the time of the Revised Penal Code’s enactment in 1932 did not contemplate online platforms.

    The Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 explicitly included “computer systems or any other similar means which may be devised in the future” in its definition of cyber libel, as stated in Section 4(c)(4).

    SECTION 4. Cybercrime Offenses. — The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act: … (c) Content-related Offenses: … (4) Libel. — The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future.

    The Court reasoned that if Article 355 already covered cyber libel, the enactment of Section 4(c)(4) would be superfluous. The need for new legislation indicated that cyber libel was considered a distinct, newly punishable form of libel. Applying Article 355 retroactively to acts committed before the Cybercrime Act would violate the principle of retroactivity of penal laws, which mandates that penal laws cannot be applied retroactively if they are unfavorable to the accused. Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege – there is no crime when there is no law punishing it. Therefore, since Peñalosa’s Facebook post predated the Cybercrime Act, it could not be criminally prosecuted as cyber libel under Article 355.

    The Supreme Court emphasized that while criminal liability was not applicable, Ocampo was not without recourse. He could still pursue a civil action for damages under Articles 19 to 21 of the Civil Code, which address harm caused by defamatory falsehoods. In civil cases, the complainant has more control over the proceedings, unlike in criminal cases where the prosecution takes precedence. This ruling clarifies that while online defamation before the Cybercrime Act may not constitute criminal cyber libel, it could still lead to civil liability and underscores the importance of the non-retroactivity of unfavorable criminal laws.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? Whether a Facebook post made in 2011, before the Cybercrime Prevention Act, could be considered criminal libel under the Revised Penal Code.
    What did the Supreme Court decide? The Supreme Court ruled that the Facebook post was not criminally punishable as cyber libel under the Revised Penal Code because the Cybercrime Prevention Act, which explicitly penalizes cyber libel, was not yet in effect in 2011.
    Why couldn’t Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code be applied? The Court applied the principle of noscitur a sociis, stating that “similar means” in Article 355, when enacted in 1932, did not include online platforms. Applying it to cyber libel retroactively would also violate the principle against retroactive application of unfavorable penal laws.
    What is the principle of noscitur a sociis? It’s a rule of statutory construction where ambiguous words are interpreted by considering the company of words they are associated with. In this case, the “similar means” in Article 355 were associated with pre-digital technologies.
    What is the principle of non-retroactivity of penal laws? Penal laws cannot be applied retroactively if they are unfavorable to the accused. They can only be applied retroactively if they benefit the accused.
    Can the person who was defamed still seek legal recourse? Yes, even though criminal charges were dismissed, the defamed person can still file a civil case for damages under the Civil Code for harm caused by defamatory statements.
    Who has the right to appeal a criminal case dismissal? Only the State, represented by the Solicitor General, can appeal the criminal aspect of a case dismissal or acquittal. Private complainants can only appeal the civil aspect.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Peñalosa v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 230299, April 26, 2023