Category: Gaming Law

  • Procedural Hurdles in Constitutional Challenges: Examining Justiciability and Hierarchy of Courts in POGO Regulation

    TL;DR

    The Supreme Court dismissed petitions challenging the constitutionality of PAGCOR’s regulations on Philippine Offshore Gaming Operations (POGOs), not on the merits of online gambling regulation itself, but due to procedural deficiencies. The Court emphasized the doctrines of hierarchy of courts and justiciability. Petitioners failed to demonstrate sufficient legal standing or an actual case warranting direct recourse to the Supreme Court, bypassing lower courts. This ruling underscores that even cases with significant public interest must adhere to established procedural rules for judicial review, ensuring the Supreme Court’s role as the final, not the first, arbiter of legal disputes. The decision does not validate or invalidate POGO regulations but reinforces the importance of proper legal procedure in constitutional challenges.

    When Procedure Prevails: Navigating the Labyrinth of Judicial Review in POGO Regulation

    In a trio of consolidated cases, the Supreme Court was asked to rule on the constitutionality of the Rules and Regulations for Philippine Offshore Gaming Operations (RR-POGO), issued by the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). Petitioners argued that PAGCOR exceeded its authority by regulating online offshore gaming, contending that PAGCOR’s mandate, rooted in Presidential Decree No. 1869 and Republic Act No. 9487, did not extend to internet-based gambling, especially those catering to foreign players. They sought to nullify the RR-POGO and permanently stop its implementation. However, the Court sidestepped the substantive issue of PAGCOR’s regulatory reach, focusing instead on whether the petitions were properly brought before it.

    The Court meticulously examined the procedural aspects of the petitions, particularly the remedies of certiorari and prohibition invoked by the petitioners. While acknowledging its expanded judicial power to review acts of government instrumentalities for grave abuse of discretion, even in the exercise of quasi-legislative functions, the Court underscored that this power is not boundless. It reiterated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, which mandates that direct resort to the Supreme Court is disfavored when lower courts possess concurrent jurisdiction. This doctrine ensures the Supreme Court remains the court of last resort, preserving its capacity to address the most critical legal questions. Exceptions exist for issues of transcendental importance, but petitioners were found to have insufficiently justified a direct recourse, failing to demonstrate compelling reasons for bypassing the Court of Appeals.

    Building on the procedural analysis, the Supreme Court delved into the concept of justiciability, a cornerstone of judicial review. Justiciability requires the presence of an actual case or controversy, legal standing of the challenging party, and ripeness of the constitutional question. The Court found the petitions wanting in establishing an actual case or controversy. Petitioners failed to demonstrate a direct and concrete injury resulting from the RR-POGO’s implementation, or how their legally demandable rights were infringed. The Court emphasized that abstract disagreements or hypothetical grievances are insufficient grounds for judicial intervention. Furthermore, the element of ripeness was absent, as petitioners did not show an immediate adverse effect on their rights.

    The petitioners’ claim of taxpayer standing, arguing against the unnecessary government expenses from RR-POGO implementation, was also rejected. The Court clarified that taxpayer standing requires demonstrating illegal disbursement of public funds or a direct injury resulting from the challenged act, beyond a general public interest. Similarly, the invocation of transcendental importance was deemed insufficient. The Court outlined a three-factor test for transcendental importance, requiring consideration of the funds involved, a clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibitions, and the lack of other parties with more direct interest. These elements were conspicuously absent, as the RR-POGO was not a tax disbursement measure, no specific constitutional or legal violation was substantiated, and the directly affected POGO operators were not petitioners.

    In essence, the Supreme Court’s decision underscores the primacy of procedural rules in constitutional litigation. While the petitions raised significant questions about the scope of PAGCOR’s regulatory authority in the evolving landscape of online gaming, the Court refrained from addressing these substantive issues due to the petitioners’ failure to adhere to established procedural prerequisites for judicial review. The dismissal serves as a reminder that access to the Supreme Court’s expanded judicial power is not automatic and requires a clear demonstration of both procedural and substantive justiciability. The Court’s role is to settle actual controversies involving legally demandable rights, within the framework of a hierarchical judicial system, and not to issue advisory opinions on abstract legal questions.

    FAQs

    What was the main reason the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions? The petitions were dismissed primarily on procedural grounds, specifically due to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and lack of justiciability. The Court found that the petitioners should have first sought recourse from lower courts and failed to demonstrate a sufficient actual case or legal standing to warrant direct Supreme Court intervention.
    Did the Supreme Court rule on whether PAGCOR has the authority to regulate online POGOs? No, the Supreme Court did not rule on the substantive issue of PAGCOR’s authority to regulate online POGOs. The dismissal was based on procedural deficiencies, meaning the Court did not reach the merits of the constitutional challenge against RR-POGO.
    What is the doctrine of hierarchy of courts? The doctrine of hierarchy of courts dictates that cases should generally be filed with the lower courts that have jurisdiction, before elevating them to higher courts like the Supreme Court. This ensures the Supreme Court focuses on its role as the final court of review and avoids being burdened with cases that lower courts can resolve.
    What does ‘justiciability’ mean in this context? Justiciability refers to the set of conditions that must be met for a court to exercise its power of judicial review. It includes the existence of an actual case or controversy, legal standing of the petitioner, ripeness of the issue, and that the constitutional question is the very essence of the case. In this case, the Court found the petitions lacked ‘actual case or controversy’ and ‘legal standing’.
    What is ‘legal standing’ and why was it important in this case? Legal standing is the right of a party to appear and be heard in court. It requires a personal and substantial interest in the case, meaning the party has suffered or will suffer a direct injury from the challenged government action. The petitioners were deemed to lack legal standing because they did not demonstrate a direct, personal injury resulting from the POGO regulations.
    What is ‘transcendental importance’ and why was it not enough in this case? ‘Transcendental importance’ is an exception that can justify direct resort to the Supreme Court, even if procedural rules are not strictly followed. However, simply claiming transcendental importance is not sufficient. The Court requires specific factors to be present, such as the nature of funds involved, clear violation of law, and lack of other parties with direct interest. Petitioners failed to sufficiently demonstrate these factors.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Supreme Court E-Library

  • Enforceability of Casino Operation Agreements: Investment Commitments vs. Regulatory Authority

    TL;DR

    The Supreme Court dismissed PAGCOR’s petitions, affirming the lower court’s preliminary injunctions that prevented PAGCOR from halting casino operations of Thunderbird and Eastbay Resorts. The Court ruled that PAGCOR must honor its contractual agreements, especially those linked to significant investments made by casino operators. This decision underscores that while PAGCOR has regulatory authority over casinos, this power is not absolute and is constrained by valid contracts. The ruling means casino operators with investment-linked agreements have a degree of legal protection against arbitrary changes in licensing terms, especially when substantial investments have been made in reliance on those agreements. This case reinforces the principle that government agencies, like PAGCOR, are bound by their contracts and cannot unilaterally disregard them.

    High Stakes and High-Rise Hotels: Balancing Investment and Regulation in Casino Franchises

    This case revolves around a dispute between the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) and two casino operators, Thunderbird Pilipinas and Eastbay Resorts. At the heart of the matter was whether PAGCOR could unilaterally alter or terminate the casino licenses of these operators despite existing agreements and substantial investments made. PAGCOR, the state-owned entity tasked with regulating and operating games of chance, sought to annul preliminary injunctions issued by a lower court, which had prevented PAGCOR from closing down the casinos. PAGCOR argued that casino licenses are mere privileges, revocable at will, and not contractual rights. The casino operators, on the other hand, contended that their licenses were tied to significant investment agreements and should be honored for the agreed-upon terms.

    The seeds of this legal battle were sown in several Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs) between PAGCOR and the respondents. These MOAs weren’t simple licensing deals; they were comprehensive investment agreements. Thunderbird and Eastbay Resorts committed to massive investments in casino and resort complexes in exchange for PAGCOR granting them licenses to operate casinos, initially co-terminus with PAGCOR’s franchise. These investments, totaling billions of pesos, were intended to spur tourism and economic activity in areas like Rizal and La Union. Crucially, the agreements stipulated that the casino licenses would be extended if PAGCOR’s own franchise was renewed, aligning the operators’ licenses with PAGCOR’s long-term operational horizon. However, after PAGCOR’s franchise was indeed extended, a new PAGCOR board attempted to impose significantly stricter and shorter-term licensing conditions, deviating from the original agreements.

    When the operators refused these new terms, PAGCOR moved to close down their casinos, asserting that their licenses had expired and they were operating merely on PAGCOR’s tolerance. This prompted Thunderbird and Eastbay Resorts to seek court intervention, arguing that PAGCOR was breaching their valid MOAs. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and subsequently preliminary injunctions to prevent PAGCOR’s closure orders. PAGCOR, bypassing a motion for reconsideration at the RTC and directly appealing to the Supreme Court, claimed grave abuse of discretion by the lower court, arguing that the injunctions were improperly issued as the operators lacked a clear legal right to a license beyond the short terms PAGCOR was now offering. PAGCOR insisted that the issue was purely legal – whether a casino license is a contractual right or a revocable privilege.

    The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with PAGCOR on several fronts. Procedurally, the Court noted PAGCOR’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration at the RTC, a prerequisite for a certiorari petition. It also pointed out PAGCOR’s disregard for the hierarchy of courts by directly appealing to the Supreme Court instead of the Court of Appeals. Substantively, the Court emphasized that the MOAs were not merely about licenses but were intricate investment agreements. These agreements were contractual obligations for PAGCOR, not just discretionary grants of privilege. The Court highlighted the precedent set in PAGCOR v. Fontana Development Corporation, a similar case where the Court upheld the enforceability of a MOA granting a casino license co-terminus with PAGCOR’s franchise.

    The Supreme Court underscored that PAGCOR’s regulatory authority, while significant, is not absolute. It must be exercised within the bounds of its contractual commitments. The Court acknowledged that licenses are generally privileges, but in this case, the licenses were integral components of broader investment agreements, making them subject to contract law principles. PAGCOR could not simply disregard these agreements and impose new terms, especially after the operators had made substantial investments based on the original terms. The dismissal of PAGCOR’s petitions effectively affirmed the preliminary injunctions, allowing Thunderbird and Eastbay Resorts to continue operating under the terms of their original MOAs, pending a full trial on the merits – although the parties eventually settled and dismissed the lower court cases, rendering the petitions technically moot. Despite the mootness, the Supreme Court proceeded to rule on the issues due to their potential for recurrence and public interest.

    FAQs

    What was the central issue in this case? The core issue was whether PAGCOR could unilaterally change the terms of casino operating licenses that were part of investment agreements with casino operators, specifically regarding the duration of the licenses.
    What did the Supreme Court decide? The Supreme Court dismissed PAGCOR’s petitions, upholding the lower court’s preliminary injunctions and reinforcing the enforceability of the investment agreements and original license terms.
    What is an Authority to Operate (ATO) in this context? An ATO is the license granted by PAGCOR that allows casino operators to legally operate casinos in the Philippines. In this case, the duration and conditions of the ATOs were in dispute.
    What were the Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs)? The MOAs were investment agreements between PAGCOR and the casino operators. They outlined investment commitments by the operators in exchange for casino licenses with specific terms, including license duration.
    Why did PAGCOR want to change the license terms? A new PAGCOR board sought to impose stricter and shorter-term licenses with new conditions, potentially due to policy changes or a reevaluation of the agreements.
    Did the Supreme Court say casino licenses are always contractual rights? Not necessarily. The Court emphasized that in this specific case, the licenses were intertwined with substantial investment agreements, giving them a contractual dimension beyond mere revocable privileges.
    What is the practical takeaway from this case? Government regulatory bodies like PAGCOR are bound by contracts they enter into, especially those encouraging significant private investments. Their regulatory power has limits and must respect contractual obligations.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation vs. Thunderbird Pilipinas Hotels and Resorts, Inc., G.R. Nos. 197942-43, 199528, March 26, 2014

  • The Limits of Economic Zone Authority: PAGCOR’s Control Over Games of Chance

    TL;DR

    The Supreme Court ruled that the Zamboanga City Special Economic Zone Authority (ZAMBOECOZONE) does not have the power to operate, license, or regulate games of chance within its zone. This decision affirms that PAGCOR (Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation) retains its exclusive authority to regulate gambling activities nationwide, even within special economic zones, unless explicitly stated otherwise in the law. This ensures uniform regulation of gambling and protects PAGCOR’s mandate. The ruling clarifies the scope of ZAMBOECOZONE’s powers, limiting it to tourism-related activities excluding games of chance.

    When ‘Games’ Aren’t Gambling: Decoding ZAMBOECOZONE’s Powers

    This case revolves around the interpretation of Republic Act No. 7903 (R.A. No. 7903), which created the ZAMBOECOZONE and its governing authority. Specifically, the issue is whether Section 7(f) of this law grants ZAMBOECOZONE the power to license and regulate games of chance. The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) argued that ZAMBOECOZONE overstepped its authority by licensing Philippine E-Gaming Jurisdiction, Inc. (PEJI) to operate online gaming, as PAGCOR believes it has exclusive power to regulate all games of chance in the Philippines. This legal battle boils down to how the words “games” and “amusements” in the law should be interpreted: do they encompass games of chance, or are they limited to other tourism-related activities?

    PAGCOR argued that R.A. No. 7903 did not explicitly authorize ZAMBOECOZONE to operate or license games of chance. To support this, PAGCOR pointed to other laws creating economic zones, such as Republic Act No. 7227 (Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority Act) and Republic Act No. 7922 (Cagayan Economic Zone Act), where the power to regulate games of chance was clearly stated. PAGCOR argued that the absence of such explicit language in R.A. No. 7903 indicated a lack of legislative intent to grant ZAMBOECOZONE this power. PAGCOR highlighted its mandate under Presidential Decree No. 1869 to centralize and regulate all forms of gambling in the country, asserting that ZAMBOECOZONE’s actions encroached upon this authority. This legal argument hinged on the principle of pari materia, suggesting that similar laws should be interpreted consistently.

    ZAMBOECOZONE countered that the terms “games” and “amusements” in Section 7(f) were intended to include games of chance. However, the Supreme Court sided with PAGCOR, emphasizing the principle of verba legis, which dictates that when the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, they should be given their literal meaning. The Court distinguished between the ordinary meaning of “games” and “amusements” and the specific legal concept of “games of chance” or “gambling.” The Court noted that the legislature could have easily used the terms “games of chance” or “gambling” if it intended to grant ZAMBOECOZONE the power to regulate such activities, as it had done in other economic zone laws.

    Furthermore, the Supreme Court took note of an Opinion from the Office of the President, which stated that ZAMBOECOZONE was not authorized to enter into any gaming activity unless expressly authorized by law. The Court gave weight to this opinion under the doctrine of respect for administrative or practical construction. This doctrine holds that courts should defer to the interpretation of a law by the government agency charged with its administration, especially when the agency has expertise and experience in the matter. The Court found the Office of the President’s interpretation persuasive, given its supervisory role over both PAGCOR and the Ecozones. The Court considered the legislative history and purpose in determining the scope of the law.

    The Supreme Court’s decision underscores the importance of clear and explicit language in legislative grants of authority. The ruling confirms that general terms like “games” and “amusements” do not automatically include games of chance, and that specific authorization is required to grant an entity the power to regulate gambling activities. This case also demonstrates the application of key principles of statutory construction, such as verba legis and the doctrine of respect for administrative construction. Ultimately, the decision reinforces PAGCOR’s role as the primary regulator of gambling in the Philippines, ensuring a consistent regulatory framework across the country.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? Whether ZAMBOECOZONE had the authority to license and regulate games of chance within its economic zone, or if that power remained with PAGCOR.
    What is R.A. No. 7903? R.A. No. 7903 is the law that created the Zamboanga City Special Economic Zone (ZAMBOECOZONE) and its governing authority.
    What is PAGCOR’s role? PAGCOR is the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, which is the primary government agency responsible for regulating gambling activities in the Philippines.
    What does “verba legis” mean? “Verba legis” is a principle of statutory construction that states that when the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, they should be given their literal meaning.
    What was the Court’s ruling? The Supreme Court ruled that ZAMBOECOZONE did not have the authority to operate, license, or regulate games of chance within its zone.
    Why did the Court side with PAGCOR? The Court found that R.A. No. 7903 did not explicitly grant ZAMBOECOZONE the power to regulate games of chance, and that PAGCOR retained its exclusive authority under Presidential Decree No. 1869.
    What is the doctrine of respect for administrative construction? It is a principle that courts should defer to the interpretation of a law by the government agency charged with its administration, especially when the agency has expertise and experience in the matter.

    This case serves as a reminder of the importance of clear legal language and the need for economic zones to operate within the bounds of their explicitly granted powers. It also reinforces the role of administrative agencies in interpreting and implementing laws within their area of expertise.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: PAGCOR vs. PEJI, G.R. No. 177333, April 24, 2009

  • Enforceability of Gambling Debts: When Illegal Agreements Taint Casino Winnings

    TL;DR

    The Supreme Court ruled that gambling debts arising from an illegal agreement between a junket operator and the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) are unenforceable. This means a gambler cannot legally compel PAGCOR to redeem gambling chips obtained under such an arrangement. The Court emphasized that PAGCOR’s charter does not allow it to share its gambling franchise with other entities, and any agreements doing so are void. This decision protects PAGCOR from being held liable for debts incurred through illegal gambling operations and reinforces the principle that courts will not enforce agreements that violate the law. For gamblers, this ruling highlights the risk of participating in gaming activities arranged through junket operators when the legality of those arrangements is questionable, as they may have no legal recourse to recover their winnings.

    Chasing Fortune: Can Casino Chips Trump an Illegal Gambling Deal?

    This case centers on Yun Kwan Byung, a Korean national, and his attempt to redeem US$2.1 million in gambling chips from the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). Byung claimed he accumulated these chips at Casino Filipino, managed and operated by PAGCOR. However, PAGCOR argued that Byung was a “junket player” brought in by ABS Corporation under a special arrangement. The core legal question is whether PAGCOR is liable for the gambling debts of players who participated in games arranged by junket operators, especially when the agreement between PAGCOR and the junket operator is deemed illegal.

    The facts reveal that PAGCOR launched a Foreign Highroller Marketing Program to attract foreign players. ABS Corporation, a Korean-based group, availed of this program, entering into a Junket Agreement with PAGCOR. Under this agreement, ABS Corporation would bring in foreign players to designated gaming tables at Casino Filipino. PAGCOR provided ABS Corporation with separate junket chips, and ABS Corporation was responsible for paying the winnings and collecting debts from its players. A crucial clause in the agreement stated that ABS Corporation would hold PAGCOR harmless from any liability arising from the arrangement. Adding a layer of complexity, PAGCOR posted notices in English and Korean stating that the gaming room was operated exclusively by ABS Corporation, and ABS was solely accountable for the playing chips.

    The trial court found that the Junket Agreement was void because PAGCOR had essentially shared its franchise with ABS Corporation, violating its charter. Presidential Decree No. 1869, which governs PAGCOR, does not authorize the agency to lease portions of its gambling tables to private entities. Specifically, Section 13 outlines how PAGCOR can utilize foreign currencies in its casinos, but it does not allow for the delegation of its franchise to private parties. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed this decision, emphasizing that the notices posted by PAGCOR served as a warning to players that special rules applied to certain gaming areas, even if the agreement giving rise to those rules was void.

    Building on this, the Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s ruling, stating that courts will not enforce debts arising from illegal gambling. While gambling is generally prohibited in the Philippines, PAGCOR is granted a franchise to operate casinos. However, this franchise cannot be shared or delegated to other entities. The Supreme Court cited Senator Jaworski v. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., emphasizing that PAGCOR acted beyond its authority when it passed on or shared its franchise. This is rooted in the principle that a legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state and cannot be exercised at will.

    The Court also addressed the applicability of Republic Act No. 9487 (RA 9487), which amended PAGCOR’s charter and granted it the power to enter into special agreements with third parties. However, the Court clarified that RA 9487 could not be applied retroactively to this case, as the Junket Agreement was entered into before the amendment. Thus, the gambling activity participated in by Byung remained illegal. Since the Junket Agreement violated PAGCOR’s charter, gambling between the junket player and the junket operator under such an agreement is illegal and may not be enforced by the courts, as noted in Article 2014 of the Civil Code.

    Furthermore, the Supreme Court rejected Byung’s claims of implied agency and agency by estoppel. For an agency to exist, there must be representation – the agent acts for and on behalf of the principal. In this case, PAGCOR did not hold out ABS Corporation as its agent. Instead, PAGCOR posted notices warning players that they were playing under special rules. The Court found that the intention of the parties negates the existence of an implied agency or an agency by estoppel. The players brought in by ABS Corporation were covered by a different set of rules in acquiring and encashing chips. The players used a different kind of chip than what was used in the regular gaming areas of PAGCOR, and that such junket players played specifically only in the third floor area and did not mingle with the regular patrons of PAGCOR. Finally, the Court affirmed that a void contract cannot be ratified. Since the Junket Agreement was void from the beginning, PAGCOR could not have ratified the acts of ABS Corporation.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether PAGCOR was liable for gambling debts incurred by a player who participated in games arranged by a junket operator under an illegal agreement.
    Why was the Junket Agreement deemed illegal? The Junket Agreement was deemed illegal because it violated PAGCOR’s charter by allowing ABS Corporation to operate gaming tables, effectively sharing PAGCOR’s exclusive franchise.
    What is a junket operator in this context? A junket operator is a third party that brings in foreign players to casinos under special arrangements, often involving different rules and chips.
    What does it mean that courts will not enforce illegal gambling debts? It means that if a gambling activity is illegal, a court will not assist a winner in collecting their winnings or a loser in recovering their losses.
    Did RA 9487 change the legal landscape for PAGCOR? Yes, RA 9487 amended PAGCOR’s charter to allow it to enter into special agreements, but it did not apply retroactively to this case.
    What is implied agency, and why did it not apply here? Implied agency arises from the actions of the principal. It did not apply because PAGCOR did not hold out ABS Corporation as its agent or mislead the public into believing an agency existed.
    What is agency by estoppel, and how does it differ from implied agency? Agency by estoppel is based on apparent authority, where the principal’s conduct leads a third party to believe that an agent has authority. It differs from implied agency in that no agency relationship exists at all.

    In conclusion, this case underscores the importance of adhering to the limitations of a legislative franchise and the principle that courts will not enforce illegal agreements. It serves as a warning to both gambling operators and players to ensure that all gaming activities comply with the law. This ruling reinforces the regulatory framework governing PAGCOR and provides clarity on the enforceability of gambling debts in the Philippines.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Yun Kwan Byung vs. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 163553, December 11, 2009