TL;DR

The Supreme Court affirmed that divorce according to Ibaloi customs is not legally recognized under Philippine law. This means that even if an Ibaloi council of elders grants a divorce, it does not dissolve a marriage in the eyes of the law. Consequently, if someone remarries after such a customary divorce, the second marriage is considered bigamous and void. Children from the second marriage are deemed illegitimate and inherit only as such. This ruling underscores that for non-Muslim indigenous groups, only state law, not customary practices, dictates the dissolution of marriage.

When Custom Collides with Code: Can Tribal Divorce Undo a Legal Knot?

This case, Anaban v. Anaban-Alfiler, revolves around a family dispute concerning inheritance, but at its heart lies a fundamental question: In the Philippines, can the customary divorce practices of an indigenous group supersede the formal legal framework governing marriage and its dissolution? The petitioners, children from a second marriage sanctioned by Ibaloi tribal custom, claimed legitimacy and equal inheritance rights. They argued that their father’s first marriage was validly dissolved by a council of elders according to Ibaloi tradition before he married their mother. However, the respondents, children from the first marriage, contended that Philippine law does not recognize customary divorce for non-Muslims, rendering the second marriage bigamous and the petitioners illegitimate.

The legal journey began in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), which initially favored the petitioners, recognizing the Ibaloi customary divorce and declaring all children as legitimate heirs. The MCTC emphasized the validity of both the divorce and subsequent marriage under Ibaloi customs. However, this decision was overturned by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA). Both the RTC and CA ruled that Philippine law, specifically the Civil Code and related statutes, does not recognize divorce based on tribal customs for non-Muslims. They declared the second marriage bigamous and the petitioners illegitimate, thus altering their inheritance rights. The Supreme Court, in this case, was tasked to determine whether to recognize the Ibaloi customary divorce in light of Philippine legal history and the constitutional and statutory provisions on indigenous peoples’ rights.

The Supreme Court meticulously traced the history of divorce in the Philippines, starting from the Spanish colonial era through various legislative acts. It highlighted that from the Spanish Civil Code to Act No. 2710 and subsequent laws, divorce has always been a matter strictly regulated by state law, not by customs or religious practices, except for specific provisions later made for Muslim Filipinos. The Court cited the principle enshrined in Article 5 of the Spanish Civil Code, which stated that customs cannot prevail against the observance of laws. This principle, the Court noted, is echoed in Article 11 of the Old Civil Code, which disallows customs contrary to law, public order, or public policy.

Crucially, the Supreme Court revisited its 1933 ruling in People v. Bitdu, a case with similar factual underpinnings involving Moro customary divorce. In Bitdu, the Court explicitly held that “a valid divorce can be granted only by the courts and for the reasons specified in Act No. 2710.” This precedent firmly established that, outside of specific statutory exceptions (which at the time were non-existent for non-Muslim indigenous groups), customary divorces lack legal validity. The Court in Anaban reiterated that laws governing marriage and divorce are matters of public policy, and customary practices cannot override statutory law in this domain.

Petitioners argued that Article 78 of the Old Civil Code, which recognized marriages between non-Christians performed according to their customs, impliedly extended recognition to customary divorces as well. They also invoked the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) and Administrative Order No. 3 (AO 3) of the Philippine Statistics Authority, asserting that these instruments support the recognition of indigenous customary laws, including divorce. However, the Supreme Court rejected these arguments. It clarified that Article 78 and related provisions in IPRA-IRR and AO 3 explicitly refer only to the solemnization of marriages according to custom, not to their dissolution. The Court emphasized that the legislature has only explicitly recognized Muslim customary divorce through the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, indicating a deliberate and specific exception, not a general acceptance of all customary divorce practices.

Furthermore, the Court pointed out a critical evidentiary gap in the petitioners’ case. Even if customary divorce could be recognized, the petitioners failed to sufficiently prove the existence and specifics of Ibaloi customary divorce practices. They did not present concrete evidence of the procedures, grounds, or even the decision of the council of elders allegedly granting the divorce. The burden of proving customary law as a fact rests on those asserting it, and in this instance, the petitioners fell short. The Court also dismissed the relevance of PSA AO 3, as it was enacted in 2004, long after the purported divorce in 1947, and cannot be applied retroactively. Moreover, AO 3 is procedural, designed to register civil status changes already recognized by substantive law, not to create new grounds for divorce.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court firmly upheld the decisions of the lower courts. It ruled that the Ibaloi customary divorce between Pedrito and Virginia was not legally valid. Consequently, Pedrito’s subsequent marriage to Pepang was bigamous and void ab initio. The petitioners were declared illegitimate children, inheriting only as such under Philippine law. This decision reinforces the principle of legal centralism in matters of marriage and divorce, underscoring that for non-Muslim indigenous communities, state law prevails over customary practices in defining marital status and its dissolution.

FAQs

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Anaban v. Anaban-Alfiler, G.R. No. 249011, March 15, 2021