TL;DR
The Supreme Court clarified that the government’s right to recover “behest loans”—loans granted under questionable circumstances—is not easily barred by prescription. The prescriptive period starts from the discovery of the wrongdoing, not necessarily from the date the loan was given. However, the Court also affirmed the Ombudsman’s broad discretion in deciding whether to pursue criminal charges, emphasizing that courts should not interfere without compelling reasons. This case underscores the ongoing effort to recover ill-gotten wealth while respecting the Ombudsman’s prosecutorial independence. The ruling balances the need for accountability with the recognition of the Ombudsman’s authority in evaluating the merits of a case.
Marcos-Era Loans: Can the Government Recover Ill-Gotten Gains?
The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) sought to recover funds from what it alleged were “behest loans”—loans granted under suspicious circumstances during the Marcos regime. The case revolved around a loan obtained by the Philippine Cellophane Film Corporation (PCFC) from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). The PCGG claimed this loan bore the characteristics of a “behest loan,” including being undercollateralized, the borrower being undercapitalized, endorsements from high government officials, and unusual speed in its release. The central legal question was whether the government’s right to recover these loans was subject to prescription and to what extent the Ombudsman’s discretion in dismissing such cases could be challenged.
The PCGG argued that the right to recover ill-gotten wealth is imprescriptible under the Constitution and that prescription should not apply in favor of a trustee against the beneficiary, which is the State. Furthermore, they contended that the crime involved was a continuing one. The Supreme Court addressed the issue of prescription under Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, clarifying when the prescriptive period begins. According to Section 2 of Act No. 3326, prescription starts from the day of the violation or, if not known at the time, from the discovery thereof. The Court emphasized that “discovery” meant when the State could reasonably know about the violation, especially in cases involving collusion and conspiracy.
Building on this principle, the Court referenced the case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Hon. Aniano Desierto, stating that it was often impossible for the State to know about these violations at the time they occurred because of the clandestine nature of the transactions. Therefore, the prescriptive period should be computed from the discovery of the commission, not the commission itself. However, the Court also recognized the wide discretion afforded to the Ombudsman in determining whether a prima facie case exists. The Court noted it would not interfere with the Ombudsman’s decision unless there was a clear abuse of discretion.
In this context, the Court cited Espinosa vs. Office of the Ombudsman, highlighting that the Constitution and RA 6770 grant the Ombudsman broad investigatory and prosecutory powers, insulated from undue influence. Unless there are compelling reasons to indicate otherwise, the Court will respect the Ombudsman’s independence in deciding whether to pursue a case. Despite the Ombudsman initially dismissing the case, the Court’s scrutiny focused on whether this dismissal constituted a grave abuse of discretion. This is because the investigating officers pointed out the private respondents were charged with violation of R. A. No. 3019 solely on account of their being incorporators of PCFC. Graft Investigation Officer Busran and Special Prosecutor Sulit emphasized that the complaint lacked specific details showing evident bad faith, manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence.
Even if the guarantee loan was undercollateralized and the company undercapitalized, the investigators noted this did not automatically make the respondents liable under Section 3(e) of R. A. 3019. The Court weighed these considerations, ultimately siding with the Ombudsman’s determination that a prima facie case was lacking. The Court determined the Ombudsman had already thoroughly examined the merits of the complaint. Therefore, the Court decided against subjecting the private respondents to further legal proceedings.
For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact Atty. Gabriel Ablola through gaboogle.com or via email at connect@gaboogle.com.
Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: PCGG vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 140358, December 08, 2000

Leave a Reply